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My first chapter studies tenure on corporate boards. It is unclear how the length of
tenure of directors on corporate boards is related to the board’s purpose of over-
seeing firm management. I provide insight to the relationship using a sample of
corporate directors for firms in the S&P 1500 for the period 1996–2017. I find that
director tenure influences membership on three important committees. I also find
that tenure of board members on committees is related to important committee
outcomes, such as the need to refile financial statements and CEO compensation.
Finally, I find that firms with long median tenures on their boards do not expe-
rience more CEO turnover, but do have lower market-to-book ratios. My results
provide evidence of tenure’s importance on boards.
My second chapter revisits an influential and well-cited paper by Adams and
Ferreira (2009) on the effect of female representation in corporate boards on the
inputs of the board and the consequences of those inputs to the firm. I replicate the
original work using the time period 1996–2003 and find that my sample replicates
many of their findings. I also test their findings for persistence using a second
sample of board members from S&P 1500 firms for the period 2004–2017. I find
that many of the results do not persist in the latter time period.
In my third chapter, we show that the gender wage gap is substantially smaller
among part-time workers than among full-time workers in the U.S., and that this
ii
has been true since at least the 1970s. An explanation for this new fact is that in-
creased labor market flexibility reduces gender wage gaps. However, we find that
labor market flexibility arising from legal mandates such as the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act reduced gender wage convergence and contributed to the stagnation
of women’s wages beginning in the mid-1990s. We conclude that flexibility aris-
ing from workers sorting into part-time work has the opposite effect of flexibility




Without her there would never have been a single drop of ink on these pages.
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CHAPTER 1
TENURE ON CORPORATE BOARDS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
1.1 Introduction
Boards of directors are an important economic institution that are designed to
oversee CEOs on behalf of shareholders. It is unclear how tenure is related to the
board’s ability to achieve its purpose. For instance, a board member may become
more productive as his human capital increases with tenure. However, the same
board member may become too close to management over time to be an effective
monitor. This paper studies the length of tenure on corporate boards and its effect
on committee memberships, committee outcomes, and firm outcomes.
I define tenure on corporate boards in two ways. The first is “director tenure,”
defined as the length of tenure for a director. The second is “board tenure,” defined
in two dimensions: the median length of tenure of all directors on the board and
the coefficient of variation of the length of tenure on the board. The exploration
of director tenure and director behavior focuses on committee membership, be-
cause much of the work on boards is done in committees. If tenure influences the
committees to which a director is appointed, tenure may be related to committee
outcomes. Therefore, I examine the relationships between board tenure on the rel-
evant committee and refiled financial statements, CEO compensation, and board
1
appointments. After showing how board tenure affects committee outcomes, I
study firm outcomes via CEO turnover and firm performance using two measures:
the firm’s market-to-book ratio and the firm’s return on assets.
Director tenure results in both general human capital and specific human capi-
tal (Becker, 1962). Service on any board, whether for the focal firm or on another
firm, represents a form of general human capital if board service per se makes a
director more productive. Longer tenure on the board of a particular firm, how-
ever, may generate specific human capital as the director becomes more familiar
with the specifics of a firm. At General Electric (GE), for example, as of October
9th, 2019, six of the board’s nine independent directors have prior experience on
other boards. One is on the board of Enlink Midstream and another is at Intel,
which both engage in operations related to GE’s principal business units. At the
same time, the median service of GE’s independent directors on GE’s board is 2
years (General Electric, 2019).1
The benefits to having directors with longer tenure on the board include the
facts that directors with longer tenure provide institutional memory and are more
knowledgeable about the firm. Directors with longer tenure may also possess
the experience necessary to steer the firm across economic climates. Moreover,
directors with longer tenure may be able to better oversee senior management. If
tenure on the board provides a net benefit to firms, we may expect long-tenured
1GE’s board has a relatively low length of median tenure on the board compared to the average
firm in the sample, about 8 years. The low length of tenure is related to the recent upheaval of the
board at GE during the end of Jeffrey Immelt’s term as CEO and short service at CEO by John
Flannery.
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directors to serve on different committees, boards with long lengths of tenure to
have different committee outcomes, and firms with long-tenured boards to have
better outcomes.
There may also be costs to having directors with longer tenure on the board.
Directors with longer tenure may be able to entrench themselves and abuse their
positions on the board for personal gain at the expense of shareholder value (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1986). Long-tenured directors may also become too close to man-
agement to be effective monitors. The concern about the relationship between
long-tenured directors and management is significant. The Wall Street Journal es-
timated 30 percent of S&P 500 firms would no longer have a majority-independent
board if directors with more than 10 years of tenure counted as insiders (Francis
and Lublin, 2016). Additionally, long-tenured directors may lack the fresh per-
spectives the business requires for long-term success. If tenure on the board is a
net cost to firms, we may expect long-tenured directors to serve on different com-
mittees, boards with long lengths of tenure to have different committee outcomes,
and firms with long-tenured boards to have worse outcomes.
There may be costs and benefits of extended tenure. It is an empirical ques-
tion whether tenure on corporate boards affects committee membership, board
decisions, and firm outcomes. I use data on corporate directors in the S&P 1500
for the years 1996–2017 to determine whether tenure’s costs and benefits affect
committee memberships, committee outcomes, and firm outcomes.
I find that director tenure influences the committee membership of directors.
Related to committee memberships, I find that tenure on the board of directors is
3
related to important committee outcomes. Given tenure’s importance for commit-
tee membership and subsequent board behavior, I provide evidence for tenure’s
effect on firm outcomes. First, I find that boards with higher median tenure are
not statistically less likely to experience CEO turnover. Second, board tenure is
negatively related to the market performance of the firm, as measured by market-
to-book ratio, but not the firm’s return on assets, after accounting for endogeneity
using instrumental variables. Taken together, my results provide evidence that
longer tenure on the board does not necessarily lead to entrenchment nor decrease
oversight of management, as hypothesized by Francis and Lublin (2016).
My econometric analysis begins with an examination of the relationship be-
tween director tenure, a measure of firm-specific human capital, and committee
memberships. Using linear probability models with director fixed effects, I find
that director tenure is related to the committees on which a director serves. For
instance, as director tenure increases, a director is less likely to sit on the audit
committee. The probability that a director sits on the compensation or nomina-
tion committees increases and then decreases with director tenure with the highest
probabilities of committee membership occurring at 11 and 20 years of director
tenure. I also test for the effect of general human capital on boards by determining
the relationship between the length of tenure a director has on outside boards and
committee membership. I find that outside director tenure is also an important
determinant of committee membership.
Next, I examine board decisions directly related to the audit, nomination, and
compensation committees, including the need to refile financial statements, the
4
size and structure of the CEO’s compensation package, and characteristics of sub-
sequent appointments to the board. Using linear models with firm fixed effects, I
find that the median length of tenure on the committee is related to the commit-
tee’s outcome.
I then describe the relationship between board tenure and firm outcomes, in-
cluding CEO turnover and firm performance. I use two measures of firm perfor-
mance, market-to-book ratio and return on assets, to study the relationship be-
tween board tenure and firm performance. Using linear probability models with
firm fixed effects, I do not find that boards with higher median tenure are statisti-
cally more or less likely to experience CEO turnover. I do find evidence that the
median length of tenure on the board affects the financial performance of the firm
when I account for endogeneity using instrumental variables.
Prior research has focused on board composition and its effects on corpo-
rate governance along several dimensions. The ages of directors are explored
by Bøhren and Strøm (2007) and Bernile et al. (2018), who find that older and
more age-diverse boards tend to have lower firm risk and decreased director share
holdings. The gender composition of the board is studied by Adams and Ferreira
(2009) and Adams (2016), who find that firms with higher female representation
on the board tend to have worse performance. The independence of the board is
positively related to oversight of the CEO (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Adams
and Ferreira, 2007). The “busyness” of a director tends to negatively impact his
ability to carry out his duties when he is appointed to several boards (Ferris et al,
2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2008; Hauser, 2018).
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One characteristic that has garnered less attention in the literature is that of
director tenure on corporate boards of directors. Li and Wahid (2018) show that
boards with greater diversity of director tenure tend to experience higher levels
of CEO turnover when share-price performance is low. Bodenhorn (2018) uses
a sample of directors for banks in the 19th and early 20th century to show that
banks with longer-tenured boards tend to take on greater levels of risk. Tenure on
corporate boards has gained notoriety in the press due to its potential impact on
director independence, as well as for its explanation of the gender-representation
gap on corporate boards (Francis and Lublin, 2018; Fuhrmans, 2019).
This paper contributes to the literature on corporate board composition in two
ways. First, it provides empirical evidence for the effects of director tenure on
committee membership, committee outcomes, and firm outcomes. Second, the
paper contributes to the literature on diversity on boards by examining the effect
that the mixture of tenure has on corporate boards. Existing studies measure di-
versity by gender, ethnicity, and age (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Bernile et al.,
2018). This paper, along with Li and Wahid (2018), adds another element to the
diversity mix.
1.2 Data and Methodology
Data on corporate directors for firms in the S&P 1500 are obtained from Institu-
tional Shareholder Services (ISS) for the period 1996–2017 (Institutional Share-
holder Services, 2018a; Institutional Shareholder Services, 2018b). The data are
6
organized as a director-firm-year panel. I generate the director’s length of tenure
using the difference between the observation year and the year of appointment
to the board. I use ISS data to calculate the median tenure on the board and
the coefficient of variation of tenure on the board. Director tenure on the board
is right-skewed, so the median is used as the measure of director tenure for the
typical director in firm-level analysis.2 I also use the coefficient of variation of
board tenure as a measure of the mixture of the board’s tenure.3 The ISS data are
augmented with data from Compustat, Execucomp, and Center for Research in
Security Prices using data available from Coles et al. (2014).4
The Compustat data include net sales for the firm, recorded in millions and de-
flated to 2017 dollars, the book value of assets, the shareholder’s equity, income
after taxes and before extraordinary items, and the market value of the firm (Com-
pustat, 2018a). The data are used to calculate market-to-book ratio and return on
assets for the firm.
The Execucomp data contain information on the CEO of the firm, including
the age, sex, tenure, whether the CEO sits on the board, and real compensation—
measured in thousands and deflated to 2017 dollars (Compustat, 2018b). Due to
a methodology change in the Execucomp data, the calculation of compensation
for the CEO is not consistent across the sample period. To correct this variable,
2For literature on tenure affecting group outcomes, see Wagner et al., 1984; Hermalin and
Weisbach, 1988; Pelled et al., 1999; Berger et al., 2014; and Bodenhorn, 2018.
3For literature on tenure mix affecting group outcomes, see Wagner et al., 1984; O’Reilly et
al., 1989; Haveman, 1995; Milliken and Martins, 1996; van Dijk et al., 2012; and Li and Wahid,
2018.
4For further information about the matching procedure, please see Appendix I.
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I use data from Greene and Smith (2017) for total CEO compensation. The data
are also used to calculate the proportion of CEO compensation deemed incentive
pay.5
The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data are used to calculate
the volatility of the firm’s shares and the returns on the firm’s shares net of the
return on the CRSP value-weighted market index (CRSP, 2019).
The descriptive statistics for director tenure in the sample are provided in Ta-
ble 1.1. The average director in the sample has a tenure of just under 9 years. The
distribution of board tenure, shown in the histograms in Figure 1.1 and the ker-
nel densities in Figure 1.2, is right-skewed. The median level of director tenure
is seven years, and the modal value of tenure occurs around one to two years.
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that the distribution of director tenure for
1996 is not the same as the distribution of director tenure in 2017 (p-value< 0.01).
The density appears to have declined for earlier years of tenure and increased in
the 10–15 year range of tenure. The shift is also apparent across specific indus-
tries, as shown in Figures 1.3(a) and 1.3(b), which provide kernel densities for four
industries in the years 1996 and 2016. The industry kernels reveal that industries
have different mixtures of tenure at the lower end of the tenure distribution, and
all industries have long-serving directors. The increasing distribution of tenure
may explain why institutional shareholders and the popular press have taken an
interest in tenure on boards (see Francis and Lublin, 2016; BlackRock, 2019).
5CEO Incentive Pay is calculated following Adams and Ferreira (2009) as
1− Salary+BonusTotal CEOCompensation .
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Service on other firms’ boards may lead to the accumulation of general human
capital. It is likely that general human capital will influence the productivity of the
director. When we look at outside board service, we see that the average director
serves on 0.87 outside boards with an average of 3.5 years of tenure on outside
boards.6 The distribution of outside director tenure is heavily right-skewed. The
75th percentile of the distribution is zero years of outside director tenure. Because
of the large probability mass at zero years of outside director tenure, I generate
the histogram of outside director tenure omitting observations with zero years of
outside director tenure in Figure 1.4. The truncated distribution of outside director
tenure shows a similar distribution to the distribution of director tenure for the
focal firm in Figure 1.1. The kernel densities of outside director tenure in the
year 1996 and 2017 omit observations with zero years of tenure and are displayed
in Figure 1.5. The distribution of outside director tenure appears to have higher
values of outside director tenure in the year 1996. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
confirms that the distribution of outside director tenure in 1996 is not the same as
that in 2017 (p-value < 0.01). The industry kernels presented in Figures 1.6 (a)
and (b) show that industries use outside directors with varying amounts of tenure.
I use outside director tenure in Section 1.3.2 as a measure of general human capital
and its effect on committee memberships.
An important and observable measure of board-member behavior is committee




where b indexes the boards the director sat on in year t, B is the total number of boards the
director sat on in year t, and b = 1 is always considered the board in question. If B = 1, then the
formula for outside director tenure yields zero.
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membership on the board. The ISS data include information on three committees
beginning in 1998—including the audit committee, the compensation committee,
and the nomination committee. Based upon the descriptive statistics in Table 1.1,
about 40 percent of the sample served on the audit committee, 39 percent served
on the compensation committee, and 36 percent served on the nomination com-
mittee. Roughly 72 percent of the sample served on at least one of these three
committees. Almost 88 percent of the independent directors in the sample served
on at least one committee at some point in their observable career during the sam-
ple period. Interestingly, independent directors with at least one year of service
on a committee had longer maximum tenures on average, 9.3 years, than direc-
tors who never served on a committee, 8.0 years. The difference is significant at
the one-percent confidence level, but the direction of causality is not clear. For
instance, longer tenure may lead to committee memberships, committee member-
ship may lead to longer tenure, or some combination of both causal directions.
Further, 31 percent of independent directors served on only one of the three com-
mittees during the course of their observable careers; 38 percent served on two of
the three committees; and 19 percent served on all three committees at some point
during their observable career.
The average age in the sample is almost 61 years old. About 12 percent of the
sample is female, and about 82 percent of the sample is independent—directors
who are not employed by the firm outside of their director position.
The descriptive statistics for the firm characteristics are also given in Table 1.1.
The average firm-year in the sample has a board with a median tenure level of al-
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most 8 years. The coefficient of variation for the board’s tenure level for the aver-
age firm-year is 0.73. The average firm-year has a board composed of 9 directors,
net sales of just under $8 billion, deflated to 2017 dollars, and a market-to-book
ratio of two.7 The average firm-year has return on assets of 3.44 percent.8 The
share-return volatility—standard deviation in monthly share-price returns, exclud-
ing dividends—is 0.12, and the share-price performance—the return on the prior
12 months for the share price net of the CRSP value-weighted market index—is
about two percent.
The descriptive statistics for the characteristics of the CEO are included in
Table 1.1 as well. The average CEO in the sample earns just over $6 million
per year, deflated to 2017 dollars, and has 59 percent of their compensation tied
to incentive pay. Roughly 9 percent of the CEO observations are for outgoing
CEOs.9
As a first test for the effect of the level of board tenure and the diversity of
board tenure, I estimate tests for the difference in means for several characteristics
based on the median tenure level of the board and the coefficient of variation of
board tenure. The sample is split by firms in the first quintile of the distribution of
7To calculate market-to-book ratio, I follow Adams and Ferreira
(2009) and Bernile et al. (2018) and use Book-to-Market Ratio =
Book V alue of Assets−Shareholder Equity+Market V alue of Equity
Book V alue of Assets . The average value of my
sample is similar to the average value in each of these papers.
8Return on assets is calculated as IncomeBeforeExtraordinary ItemsBook V alue of Assets ∗ 100.
9An outgoing CEO is a CEO who is observed for the last time working for the company during
the year in the data set but the firm is observed in subsequent years. In the last year of observation
for the firm, a CEO is never considered outgoing.
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median tenure and the fifth quintile of the distribution of median tenure by year.
Separately, the sample is also split for the first quintile of the distribution of the
coefficient of variation in board tenure and the fifth quintile of the distribution of
the coefficient of variation in board tenure by year.
The results of the univariate tests are given in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3. The
results show that firms with the longest tenure have a higher market-to-book ratio,
a higher return on assets, a lower level of CEO compensation, a lower proportion
of CEO compensation tied to incentive pay, and less CEO turnover relative to
firms in the first quintile. The results show that firms with the most heterogeneous
levels of board tenure have a lower market-to-book ratio, similar return on assets,
the same level of CEO compensation, a smaller proportion of CEO compensation
tied to incentive pay, and about the same rate of CEO turnover relative to firms in
the first quintile. The results provide evidence that the median and coefficient of
variation of board tenure are related to important firm outcomes.
The univariate results are compelling, but they alone do not answer the ques-
tion of the effect of tenure on corporate boards. The results may be explained by
observable characteristics of the firm and suffer from endogeneity. Moreover, the
results do not provide a mechanism for how tenure on corporate boards culmi-
nates in different outcomes for firms. Therefore, I describe in Section 1.2.1 the
methodology I use to address these concerns.
12
1.2.1 Methodology
To test the theory of whether tenure on corporate boards has costs and benefits,
I use linear regressions that control for director tenure as a quadratic or board
tenure as a linear term. I use the quadratic specification because it can tell us if
the directors in the sample experience the costs and benefits of tenure differently
throughout a tenure spell. I use the linear term for the firm-level analyses to see
if the costs (less effective monitoring) or benefits (human capital accumulation)
dominate. Moreover, it is not clear that the costs and benefits will manifest them-
selves differently throughout the spectrum of the board’s median tenure level.
As in other studies on corporate boards, endogeneity causes a problem for
interpreting results and generating causal estimates. The endogeneity arises due
to the process that creates the board. For instance, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)
present a model where the CEO and board bargain over board seats, and CEOs
with higher prior performance have greater bargaining power. The CEOs use their
power to nominate directors with a lower appetite for oversight. In addition to the
bargaining process, directors may have an incentive to signal their ability to the
market (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Directors may try to preserve their high-quality
signals by leaving the board of poorly-performing companies or companies that
will soon experience poor performance. Ravina and Sapienza (2009) show that
independent directors earned abnormally high returns when trading the company’s
stock prior to bad news, which provides evidence that directors act in their own
self interest based on expected firm performance.
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Another concern may also arise because of the omitted-variable bias from di-
rector characteristics and firm characteristics. For instance, it is unobservable to
the econometrician whether a director is chosen for appointment on the board due
to the board’s need for a strong audit committee member. In an effort to allevi-
ate endogeneity due to director characteristics, director fixed effects are included
in regressions that are conducted at the director level. The director fixed effects
absorb any time-invariant omitted characteristics the director has over the sample
period, such as qualification for membership on a specific committee. Under the
assumption that tenure changes the director’s productivity, even indirectly through
firm-specific human capital or some other channel, the estimated coefficient of di-
rector tenure should be identified, even with the inclusion of director fixed effects.
The reason the coefficient can be identified is that the effect of tenure is not time
invariant. Therefore, the tenure variable is different from a simple variable stating
the first year of directorship, which would be accounted for by the director fixed
effects.10
In an effort to reduce omitted-variable bias due to firm characteristics, I in-
clude firm fixed effects in regressions conducted at the firm level. The firm fixed
effects should absorb any time-invariant firm characteristics such as the objectives
that govern board behavior at the firm. For instance, Eldenburg et al. (2004)
use a panel of hospitals in the state of California and find that the composition
of the board responds to the hospital’s mission and objectives. If the same re-
10For further information regarding the director ID used for the fixed effects, please see Ap-
pendix II.
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lationship occurred in the S&P 1500 from 1996–2017 and the firm’s mission is
time-invariant, the fixed effects will capture the effect.
Estimating regressions for firm performance provides a unique challenge be-
cause the board determines performance, but performance may also determine the
board. The joint causality is potentially strong with respect to the tenure of the
board because poorly performing boards may be more susceptible to turnover. In
an effort to deal with the endogeneity concern, I instrument for the median tenure
on the board with the average median board tenure of outside boards that a firm’s
directors sit on. I instrument for the coefficient of variation of tenure on the board
with the average coefficient of variation of outside boards that a firm’s directors
sit on.11 The instrument is discussed in detail in Section 1.5.
1.3 Director Tenure and Committee Membership
Director tenure can culminate in increased firm-specific and general human cap-
ital for a director. It may make the director more productive on the board as his
knowledge of the firm increases in different economic climates. However, the in-
creased tenure may also lead to director entrenchment as the director gains status
and seniority on the board—resulting in decreased productivity by the director.
As director productivity changes, so may the committees the director sits on. I
explore committee membership and director tenure in two dimensions. First, I
11For instance, William Cadogan sat on two boards in 1996, ADC Telecommunications and
Banta. Banta has a median tenure of 5 years and a coefficient of variation equal to 0.96 in 1996.
Jean-Pierre Rosso sits on the board of two firms, ADC Telecommunications and Inland Steel
Industries. Inland has a median board tenure of 8 years and a coefficient of variation equal to 0.80
in 1996. The instrument values for ADC Telecommunications are 6.5 and 0.88.
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examine the relationship between director tenure on the board of directors, which
can be thought of as a firm-specific human capital measure, and committee mem-
bership on the board. Second, I examine the relationship between a director’s
tenure on outside boards in the year of observation, which may be a general hu-
man capital measure, and committee membership on the board.
1.3.1 Director Tenure and Committee Membership
To test whether and how much director tenure affects committee membership, I
estimate four linear probability models. The models estimate the probability a
director serves on the audit committee, the compensation committee, the nomina-
tion committee, or on any of these three committees.
I estimate four linear probability models of the form
Committeeift = β0 + β1DirectorTenureift + β2DirectorTenure
2
ift+
β3MedianBoardTenureft + ~γX+ ~ζF+DRCTR + Y EAR + εift, (1.1)
where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if director i of firm f
serves on the audit committee, compensation committee, nomination committee,
or any of the three in calendar year t. I focus on these three committees due to their
relevance for board decisions and firm outcomes. The audit committee is respon-
sible for approving an auditor for the firm and determining the internal financial
controls and procedures of the firm. The nomination committee is responsible for
the size and composition of the board, recommending candidates to the board,
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and setting director compensation. The compensation committee is responsible
for reviewing and approving the compensation package of senior management.
Connections between the length of tenure on the board and committee outcomes
are explored in Section 1.4.
The independent variables of interest in all four models are director tenure and
director tenure squared, which are chosen to account for non-linearity between
director tenure and committee membership.12 Increases in director tenure may
initially make it more likely a director sits on a committee as the director gains
firm-specific human capital. However, after a certain level of tenure, it may be the
case that entrenchment sets in for the director and subsequent increases in tenure
make it less likely the director will sit on a committee. The sample is restricted
to independent directors which helps to control for passage in 2002 of the rule by
the New York Stock Exchange and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that seats on the audit
committee must be held by independent directors (Fields and Keys, 2003).
I use linear probability models rather than maximum-likelihood models such
as probit regressions in order to include director fixed effects. Because the com-
mittee regressions include 166,568 observations and there are 22,659 independent
directors used in the regressions, I cannot use a probit specification. Director
fixed effects are necessary in the model because they may help to identify a causal
relationship between director tenure and committee membership. Because the
12The scatter plots in Figure 1.7 show the relationship between the probability a director sits on
a committee and the director’s level of tenure. All of the figures point towards a quadratic relation-
ship between director tenure and committee membership. Results for alternative specifications are
provided in Appendix IV.
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identification assumption may be strong, caution should still be taken when mak-
ing causal statements of the results and they should be interpreted as important
correlations.13
All four models include the same control variables. Median board tenure is
included because director tenure may be more important when a director has a
different length of tenure than the rest of the board. Equation 1.1 also contains
director and firm variables, given by X and F. The proportion of observable years
that a director had an attendance problem is included because directors with prior
attendance problems may be less likely to be chosen for committee membership.
The number of outside board seats the director holds is included because directors
with more outside service have less time to commit to committee service (Ferris
et al., 2003). The size of the board is included because there may be competi-
tion for committee memberships, and boards with more members may have more
competition (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). The fraction of the board that is inde-
pendent is included because independent directors may be more or less likely to
serve on certain committees. The natural log of sales is included to control for
the size of the firm and the relationship it may have on committee membership.
The market-to-book ratio and the firm’s return on assets are used to control for
future and current profitability. Finally, share-return volatility is used as a mea-
sure of the firm’s risk and its effect on committee membership. An indicator for
the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period is included in case changes in regulation altered
13For further discussion on obtaining and interpreting causal estimates in fixed-effects models,
see Angrist and Pischke (2009), pages 221–227.
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the relationship between director tenure and committee membership. The mod-
els include year and director fixed effects. The standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity.
The results for the probability a director sits on any committee are displayed
in the first column of Table 1.4. The results show that the observed probability
a director sits on any of the three committees follows an inverse-U shape, with
a maximum at 5 years of director tenure. The inverse-U shape shows that as a
director gains tenure, the director initially is more likely to sit on a committee.
However, after a certain point, the director becomes less likely to sit on a com-
mittee. The results provide evidence for the idea that director tenure may increase
human capital but may also lead to entrenchment. Moreover, the results pro-
vide evidence that directors tend to gain committee memberships as their relative
tenure increases based on the estimated coefficient on median board tenure.
The probability a director sits on the audit committee is estimated in the sec-
ond column of Table 1.4. The audit committee is the only committee that has a
negative point estimate for the relationship between the length of director tenure
and the observed probability a director sits on the committee. Therefore, the prob-
ability a director sits on the audit committee declines with every additional year
of director tenure. The result may be expected given that new directors may be
less attached to management, and hence, are placed in positions to monitor man-
agement (Francis and Lublin, 2016). The point estimate for the median level of
tenure on the board also adheres to the monitoring hypothesis. An increase in
median board tenure of one year is related to a 0.4 percentage point increase in
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the probability a director sits on the audit committee, all else constant. There-
fore, a director with low tenure serving on a board with high median tenure would
be predicted to be more likely to sit on the audit committee. The result may be
important for refiled financial statements, which are examined in Section 1.4.1.
The third column of Table 1.4 displays the results for estimating the proba-
bility a director sits on the compensation committee. The results show that the
observed probability of a director sitting on the compensation committee follows
an inverse-U pattern, with a maximum at 11 years of director tenure. The result
says that members of the compensation committee are drawn from highly-tenured
directors. The point estimate for median board tenure provides evidence for this
interpretation as well. In fact, if the median tenure on the board were one year
lower, the probability of membership on the compensation committee would in-
crease by a further 0.2 percentage points. The results may be important for deter-
mining the CEO’s compensation package, which is explored in Section 1.4.2.
The final column of Table 1.4 provides the estimates for the probability a di-
rector sits on the nomination committee. The results show that the observed prob-
ability a director sits on the nomination committee follows an inverse-U pattern,
with a maximum at 20 years of director tenure. The result provides evidence that
the nomination committee is heavily drawn from the top of the tenure distribu-
tion. The result may be expected, given that directors with more tenure may have
a larger network of potential board appointments and may better understand what
is expected of directors at the firm. The point estimate for median tenure confirms
this interpretation. Since the point estimate is statistically negative, a decrease in
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median board tenure is related to an increase in the probability a director sits on
the nomination committee. Therefore, a director with high tenure serving on a
board with a low level of median tenure would be forecasted to have the greatest
probability of sitting on the nomination committee. The results may be important
in determining the composition of the board as well. I examine the relationship
between lagged median board tenure and the proportion of subsequent indepen-
dent appointments to the board in Section 1.4.3.
1.3.2 Outside Director Tenure and Committee Membership
To test whether and how much outside director tenure affects committee mem-
berships on a board, I estimate four linear probability models that are analogous
to those used in Section 1.3.1. The four models use the committee membership
indicator variables as dependent variables and use the same controls and estima-
tion strategy as Section 1.3.1. However, there are now four variables of interest,
including inside director tenure, inside director tenure squared, outside director
tenure, and outside director tenure squared. Inside director tenure is the tenure the
director has on the board of the focal firm. Outside director tenure is defined as
the total amount of tenure the director has on boards the director sits on other than
the board in question during the year of observation.
The results from the four linear probability models are displayed in Table 1.5.
The results from all four columns show outside director tenure is also important
for committee membership on a corporate board. The first column shows that the
probability of membership on any committee follows an inverse-U shape in out-
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side director tenure, similar to the results for director tenure in Section 1.3.1.14
The audit committee is related to outside director tenure, and the probability of
membership is maximized at zero years of outside director tenure. The compensa-
tion committee is related to outside director tenure and the maximum probability
occurs at 101 years of tenure.15 The nomination committee is not related to out-
side director tenure, in either the level or quadratic term. The empirical findings
provide some evidence that committee memberships respond to outside director
tenure, and, therefore, general human capital. However, due to the relative lack of
outside director tenure on boards, I focus on the board tenure of the focal firm in
Sections 1.4 and 1.5.16,17
1.4 Board Tenure and Committee Decisions
In Section 1.3, I show that director tenure is related to committee membership on
corporate boards. The result provides evidence for the argument that increased
director tenure on the board comes with a trade off between increased human cap-
ital and potential board entrenchment. In this section, I examine the relationship
between tenure on the board and outcomes that are determined in part by board
committees. The three outcomes I examine are subsequent refiling of financial
14The probability of membership on any committee is maximized at 19 years of outside director
tenure, which is equal to the 95th percentile of the outside tenure distribution.
15The probability of membership in the compensation committee is maximized at 101 years of
outside tenure, which is only obtained by 10 observations in the data set.
16For instance, 75% of observations have no tenure on an outside company board during the
year in question.
17A second concern for using the outside board tenure measures is the lack of observability of
outside director tenure. For instance, if a board member sits on a board that is not in the S&P 1500
in a given year, the outside director tenure variable will erroneously have a value of zero.
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statements to the SEC—related to the audit committee; the size and structure of
the CEO compensation package—related to the compensation committee; and the
observable characteristics of appointments to the board—related to the nomina-
tion committee. I use measures of board tenure for the committee the outcome is
tied to in order to estimate the effect of board tenure on committee outcomes. For
instance, I use the median length of tenure for board members sitting on the audit
committee for regressions on refiled financial statements.
1.4.1 Board Tenure and Refiled Financial Statements
Publicly traded firms must file financial statements quarterly and annually with
the SEC. Financial statements may need to be subsequently refiled for a myriad
of reasons, from simple clerical errors to fraudulent reporting. Because the audit
committee is responsible for approving auditors and setting financial controls and
procedures at the firm, the audit committee is responsible for ensuring the accu-
racy of a financial statement filed to the SEC. Due to the trade off of tenure on the
board, it may be the case that the accuracy of financial statements may increase
or decrease with board tenure. For instance, the directors may be more familiar
with financial procedures overtime and the familiarity may result in fewer cleri-
cal errors and fewer refiled financial statements. A second case scenario would
lead to the opposite conclusion. If the board becomes closer with the CEO over
time, it may be the case that the board begins to over look peculiarities in financial
statements—resulting in more refiled financial statements.
I use four linear probability models to estimate the effect of board tenure on
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subsequently refiled financial statements, given by
RefiledStatementft = β0+β1MedianBoardTenureft+β2CV ofBoardTenureft
+ ~ζF+ FIRM + Y EAR + εft. (1.2)
The first dependent variable I use is an indicator equal to one if the firm f has a
financial statement from year t restated any time after t. I also study whether the
firm had a refiled financial statement due to fraud or a clerical error. Finally, I
study whether the firm had a refiled statement that adversely affected the values
in the original statement. The median length of tenure and coefficient of variation
of tenure for audit committee members for the year of the original statement are
the variables of interest. I use a linear term for median tenure for firm outcomes
because it is not obvious that the full board would respond to the costs and bene-
fits of tenure quadratically, but it may be the case that either the cost or benefits of
tenure dominate. Further, scatter plots do not suggest an obvious quadratic rela-
tionship, commensurate with the idea that committees and boards do not respond
to the costs and benefits of tenure quadratically.18
The control variables include firm characteristics, F, including the fraction of
the board that is female, the fraction of the board that is independent, and the size
of the board. I also include financial firm performance measures, including the
18The scatter plots presented in Figures 1.8 show the relationship between the probability of a
refiled financial statement or category of refiled financial statement and median board tenure. The
scatter plots do not present a clear relationship between refiled financial statements and median
board tenure. Results for alternative specifications are provided in Appendix IV.
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natural log of sales, market-to-book ratio, return on assets, and share-return per-
formance. Finally, all regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Firm fixed
effects are necessary in the model because they may help to identify a causal rela-
tionship between board tenure and refiled financial statements. The identification
assumption may be strong, and caution should be taken when making causal state-
ments from the results. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
The results from all four models can be seen in Table 1.6. The results show
that the median length of tenure on the audit committee is related to neither the
probability of having to refile a financial statement nor the probability of having
to refile a financial statement that is fraudulent, or had a clerical error. Median
tenure on the audit committee is related to the probability the firm had an adverse
restatement. There is evidence that the mixture of tenure on the audit committee
is positively related to the probability a firm has to refile a financial statement due
to fraud.
Section 1.3.1 shows that directors with more tenure are less likely to sit on the
audit committee. The results of Section 1.4.1 show that the adverse restatements
are affected by the length of tenure of the median director on the audit committee
and that the heterogeneity of tenure on the audit committee is related to more
fraudulent restatements.
1.4.2 Board Tenure and CEO Compensation
An important decision made by the board is to create the compensation package
for the CEO. Because Section 1.3 indicates tenure is related to compensation com-
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mittee membership, we may expect board tenure to play a role in determining the
CEO’s compensation package. The CEO’s compensation package contains both
how much total compensation the CEO is paid and what proportion of compen-
sation is tied to incentive pay. The relationship between CEO compensation and
board tenure may be positive or negative. The board may become better at man-
aging the firm as the board gains tenure, which may culminate in less total com-
pensation for the CEO. On the other hand, the directors may become too close to
the CEO with increased board tenure, resulting in more total compensation and a
smaller proportion of incentive pay.
The first effect of tenure on CEO compensation I examine is on the total
amount of CEO compensation. I estimate three regressions with firm fixed ef-
fects to estimate the relationship between tenure and total CEO compensation,
given by
Compensationcft = β0+β1MedianBoardTenureft+β2CV ofBoardTenureft
+ ~ζF+ ~γC+ FIRM + Y EAR + εcft. (1.3)
The dependent variable is the natural log of CEO c’s total compensation recorded
in thousands of real dollars with 2017 as the base year. The three models each
have two variables of interest. In the first model, the median length of tenure
and the coefficient of variation of tenure on the compensation committee are the
variables of interest. In the second model, median tenure on the compensation
committee is entered in the regression as a quadratic. The third model uses the
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natural log of median tenure on the compensation committee.19
The second effect of tenure on CEO compensation I examine is the proportion
of CEO compensation that is tied to incentive pay. I estimate three regressions
with firm fixed effects to estimate the relationship between the length of board
tenure and the mixture of board tenure with the proportion of CEO compensation
tied to incentive pay, given by
IncentivePaycft = β0+β1MedianBoardTenureft+β2CV ofBoardTenureft
+ ~ζF+ ~γC+ FIRM + Y EAR + εcft. (1.4)
The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of the proportion of CEO c’s
compensation tied to incentive pay. The proportion of CEO compensation tied to
incentive pay is bounded between zero and one. Ideally, the model would use the
natural log of the proportion of CEO compensation tied to incentive pay so that
the model mirrors the model for total CEO compensation. However, the natural
log function is not defined at zero. Because the inverse hyperbolic sine mimics the
natural log function and is defined at zero, I use the inverse hyperbolic sine of the
proportion of CEO compensation tied to incentive pay as the dependent variable.
The variables of interest are the same as in the level of total CEO compensation
regressions outlined in Equation 1.3.20
19The scatter plots in Figures 1.9 present the relationship between the level of CEO compen-
sation and the median (a) and coefficient of variation of board tenure (b). Therefore, I present a
linear model as well as two models that allow for a non-linear relationship between CEO compen-
sation and the median length of tenure on the compensation committee. In discussion, I focus on
the linear specification.
20The scatter plots in Figures 1.9 present the relationship between the proportion of CEO com-
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All six models have the same control variables. Firm characteristics, F, in-
clude the fraction of the board that is female, which is included due to the work
of Adams and Ferreira (2009). The fraction of the board that is independent is
included in case firms with more independent boards decide on different compen-
sation packages. The board size is included in case the size of the board changes
the compensation package. Firm size is controlled for with the natural log of
sales. The firm’s performance is controlled for with the market-to-book ratio and
the return on assets. The risk of the firm is controlled for with the share-return
volatility. CEO characteristics, C, are controlled for using CEO tenure, a CEO
female indicator and the age of the CEO. An indicator equal to one if the CEO sits
on the board is included because these CEOs presumably have more control over
their compensation packages, given that the board sets compensation. All spec-
ifications include year and firm fixed effects. Firm fixed effects are necessary in
the models because they may help to identify a causal relationship between board
tenure and CEO compensation packages. The identification assumption may be
strong and caution should be taken when making causal statements from the re-
sults. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
The results from the models estimating the relationship between total CEO
compensation and board tenure are included in the first three columns of Table 1.7
with the preferred linear specification in Column 1. I show that the median length
pensation tied to incentive pay and the median (c) and coefficient of variation of board tenure (d).
Therefore, I present a linear model, as well as two models that allow for a non-linear relationship
between CEO compensation and the median length of tenure on the compensation committee. In
discussion, I focus on the linear specification.
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of tenure for directors on the compensation committee is negatively related to the
level of total CEO compensation. For instance, if the compensation committee
were to increase its median tenure from 5 years to 10 years, commensurate with an
increase from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in median board tenure, the
CEO would be paid $180,000 less. The estimation also shows that the coefficient
of variation of tenure on the compensation committee is not related to the level of
total CEO compensation.
The results from the models estimating the relationship between the proportion
of CEO compensation tied to incentive pay are included in the final three columns
of Table 1.7 with the preferred linear specification in Column 4. I find that the
median length of tenure for directors on the compensation committee is negatively
related to the proportion of CEO compensation tied to incentive pay. Again, we
find that the mixture of tenure on the compensation committee is not related to the
CEO’s compensation package.
1.4.3 Board Tenure and Appointments to the Board
Based upon Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), appointments to the board are de-
termined via a bargaining process between the CEO and the board of directors.
Moreover, Section 1.3 indicates that directors with more tenure are more likely to
serve on the nomination committee, which is responsible for suggesting potential
appointments to the board. Because the work of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)
focuses on determining the independence of the board, I examine the relationship
between median board tenure and the proportion of appointments to the board that
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are independent in a given year. If higher median tenure on the board is related
to increased monitoring, we may expect a positive relationship between median
board tenure and the independence of appointments. If higher median tenure on
the board leads to the directors becoming too close to management to be effective
monitors, we may expect a negative relationship between median board tenure
and the independence of appointments. In addition to the independence of ap-
pointments, I examine the relationship between median board tenure and other
observable characteristics of board appointments, including their gender, age, and
race.
To examine the relationship between the observable characteristics of an ap-
pointment and the median level of tenure on the board, I use four linear regressions
with firm fixed effects, given by
Appointmentsft = β0+β1MedianBoardTenureft+β2CV ofBoardTenureft
+ ~ζFt−1 + ~γCt + FIRM + Y EAR + εft. (1.5)
The first dependent variable is the proportion of appointments to the board in a
given year that are considered independent. The proportion of appointments in
my sample that are independent is 0.84. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model
board composition as a bargaining process between the board and the CEO. If
the board and CEO cannot agree on the composition of the board for the next
year, the CEO is replaced, and the bargaining process restarts. The model predicts
that a CEO with a higher bargaining position is able to capture the board and
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create a board that is less independent and less inclined to monitor the CEO’s
behavior. The CEO’s bargaining position is determined by the expectation of the
CEO’s ability, which is a function of the CEO’s prior performance. Because of
the theoretical model, the variables of interest are the natural log of lagged median
board tenure on the nomination committee and the lagged coefficient of variation
of tenure on the nomination committee.21 In subsequent models, the dependent
variable is the proportion of appointments to the board that are women (average
of 16%), the average age of appointments to the board (average of 55 years), and
the proportion of appointments to the board that are black (average of 17%).
The control variables in all four models are the same. I include controls for
the composition of the board and firm variables, given by F, in the previous year.
The lagged composition variables are the board size and the fraction of the board
that is independent. I also include lagged firm variables, including the natural log
of sales, market-to-book ratio, return on assets, the share-return volatility, and the
share-return performance. I include the lagged firm variables to control for prior
firm performance, which is critical in setting the CEO’s bargaining position. I also
include variables on the CEO, C, including the natural log of the CEO’s tenure,
age, an indicator equal to one if the CEO is a woman, and an indicator equal to
one if the CEO is a director. The CEO variables help to control for the bargaining
position of the CEO. Finally, I include a post-Sarbanes-Oxley indicator variable to
control for changes in regulations. All models include firm and year fixed effects.
21The scatter plots in Figure 1.10 present the relationship between the observable characteristics
of appointments to the board and the median tenure level on the board the previous year. Results
from alternative specifications are presented in Appendix IV.
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The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
The results of all four models are presented in Table 1.8. The results show that
tenure on the nomination committee does not statistically or economically affect
observable characteristics of subsequent appointments to the board.
1.5 Board Tenure and Firm Outcomes
The findings in the preceding sections lead to a natural question: “does tenure on
the board lead to different outcomes for the firm?” I address the question in two
ways. First, I look at the relationship between board tenure and CEO turnover.
Second, I look at the relationship between board tenure and firm performance,
measured by the market-to-book ratio and the return on assets.
1.5.1 Board Tenure and CEO Turnover
An important decision made by the board of directors of a firm is whether to retain
or replace the CEO. Board tenure may increase the likelihood of CEO turnover
as the directors are better able to observe poor CEO performance. On the other
hand, board tenure may decrease the likelihood of CEO turnover if tenured boards
become too close to the CEO to be effective monitors.
To test whether and how board tenure affects the probability of CEO turnover,
I estimate three linear probability models with an indicator variable equal to one
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if the CEO is replaced as the dependent variable, each with the form
Turnovercft = β0 + β1MedianBoardTenureft + β2CV ofBoardTenureft
+ ~ζF+ ~γC+ FIRM + Y EAR + εcft. (1.6)
The first model has two variables of interest: the median tenure on the board and
the coefficient of variation of board tenure. The second model uses median board
tenure as a quadratic. The third model use the natural log of median tenure on
the board and the coefficient of variation of board tenure. I interact the measure
of median board tenure with share-return performance to see if boards with more
tenure are more or less responsive to poor performance.22 I use linear probability
models in order to accommodate firm fixed effects in the regressions and control
for corporate culture (Eldenburg et al., 2004). Firm fixed effects are necessary in
the model because they may help to identify a causal relationship between board
tenure and CEO turnover. Even with the inclusion of firm fixed effects, caution
should be taken when making causal statements from the results.
In all three models, I include the same control variables. Board and firm char-
acteristics, F, are included. The fraction of the board that is female and the frac-
tion of the board that is independent are included. The fraction female is included
due to the work of Adams and Ferreira (2009) who show that boards with women
22The scatter plots in Figure 1.11 present the relationship between the observed probability of
CEO turnover and the median (a) and coefficient of variation of board tenure (b). The graphs do
not suggest an obvious functional form. Therefore, I present a linear model as well as two models
that allow for a non-linear relationship between CEO turnover and the median length of tenure on
the board. In discussion, I focus on the linear specification.
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were more responsive to poor performance when deciding to replace the CEO.
The fraction independent is used to control for the governance that independent
directors tend to provide. The board size is also used to control for any effect that
more directors potentially monitoring the CEO may have. I control for firm size
using the natural log of sales in case the firm size impacts the likelihood of CEO
turnover. Finally, share-return performance and share-return volatility are used
as measures of the CEO’s output for shareholders. CEO tenure is controlled for
with a linear term in all three models. CEO age and an indicator for whether the
CEO is a woman are included to control for basic demographics of the CEO. Fur-
ther, an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also a director on the board
is included because these CEOs may be harder to replace due to their placement
on the board. All specifications include year and firm fixed effects. The sample
does not include the last year of observation for the firm in the data set because
CEO replacement cannot be calculated.23 The standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity.
The results from the three models are reported in Table 1.9 and the preferred
specification is in Column 1. The linear specification does not identify a relation-
ship between CEO turnover and the median length of tenure on the board. The
specification also does not find that boards with greater lengths of tenure are more
responsive to poor performance in the CEO turnover decision. We do see that
boards with a greater mixture of tenure on the board are more likely to experience
23I use 1996–2017 for the CEO sample used to generate CEO turnover. Therefore, the results
include observations from the sample period 1996–2016.
34
CEO turnover, but the relationship is statistically insignificant.
1.5.2 Board Tenure and Firm Performance
In preceding sections, I show that director tenure on the board is related to com-
mittee memberships. I provide evidence that tenure on the board is important in
determining the compensation package of the CEO and in determining whether
to appoint independent directors to the board. Given the importance of tenure for
committee memberships and the decisions of the board, it is reasonable to ask
whether board tenure is an important determinant of firm performance. Because
of the trade-offs of tenure on boards, tenure on the board may be related to higher
or lower firm performance. To test whether board tenure is important to firm per-
formance, I examine the relationship between board tenure and market-to-book
ratio and the firm’s return on assets using OLS, firm fixed effects, and instrumen-
tal variables.
I examine the relationship between board tenure and the performance of the
firm using two measures, the market-to-book ratio and the firm’s return on assets.
The initial examination of the relationship is performed using the ordinary least-
squares regression given by
Performanceft = β0+β1MedianBoardTenureft+β2CV ofBoardTenureft
+ γBoardft + θln(Sales)ft + Y EAR + εft (1.7)
where MedianBoardTenureft is the median length of tenure on the board for
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firm f in year t. CV ofBoardTenureft is the coefficient of variation of tenure
on the board. Boardft is a vector of board characteristics including the frac-
tion of female directors, the fraction of independent directors, and the board size.
ln(Sales)ft is the natural log of net sales. Y EAR are year fixed effects, and εft
is the error term.
Despite the extensive controls used in the OLS regression provided in Equa-
tion 1.7, there may be unobserved firm-specific characteristics that are unaccounted
for that may explain any relationship estimated by Equation 1.7. For instance, the
firms with better cultures may not have a reason to replace directors and may
have higher performance. If that is the case, β1 will be positively biased and will
not capture the true relationship between board tenure and firm performance for
a given firm. To deal with the omitted-variable bias, I include firm fixed effects
in a second regression. The firm fixed effects will control for any time-invariant
characteristics the firm may possess that explains the relationship.
Unfortunately, if there are time-varying effects at the firm level, then the firm
fixed effects will not be enough to correct for omitted-variable bias in Equation
1.7. In order to account for this possibility, I estimate an instrumental-variables
model. I use the average of median board tenure for outside boards and the average
coefficient of variation for outside boards the firm’s directors sit on as instruments
for median board tenure and the coefficient of variation of board tenure.24 The
24For instance, William Cadogan sat on two boards in 1996, ADC Telecommunications and
Banta. Banta has a median tenure of 5 years and a coefficient of variation equal to 0.96 in 1996.
Jean-Pierre Rosso sits on the board of two firms, ADC Telecommunications and Inland Steel
Industries. Inland has a median board tenure of 8 years and a coefficient of variation equal to 0.80
in 1996. The instrument values for ADC Telecommunications are 6.5 and 0.88.
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first stage regressions are given by
MedianBoardTenureft = γ0 + γ1OutsideMedianTenureft+
γ2OutsideCV ofTenureft+ ηBoardft+ θSalesft+FIRM +Y EAR+υft,
(1.8)
and
CV ofBoardTenureft = ρ0 + ρ1OutsideMedianTenureft+
ρ2OutsideCV ofTenureft+ ηBoardft+ θSalesft+FIRM +Y EAR+ νft.
(1.9)
The instrumental variables I use are valid instruments for several reasons. The
instruments may reveal the preferences of directors for serving on boards with a
certain length and diversity of tenure. For instance, if a board member values new
perspective on the board, he may push for higher rates of director turnover. If, on
the other hand, the director sits on a board with many long-serving directors, he
may value long-serving directors and does not press for turnover. Therefore, the
instruments should help to predict the length and diversity of tenure on the board
of the firm in question. Further, valid instruments should not be related to firm
performance except through the length and diversity of tenure on the board. The
question then becomes, “why should the tenure level of Inland Steel Industries
affect the market-to-book ratio or the return on assets of ADC Telecommunica-
tions?” The answer is that it should not. Because the instruments are related to
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the level and diversity of tenure on the board but not firm performance, the in-
struments should be valid. I present first-stage results for the instruments in Table
1.10. The F-statistics are large, 37.90 and 8.61. These results are above or near
the “rule of thumb” that instruments are not weak instruments if the F-statistic is
above 10. Based upon a Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic of 2.08, we can reject
the hypothesis the instruments are weak. The first stage is also not considered un-
deridentified because it has a Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic equal to 4.17 (P-Value
= 0.04). Based upon the theory and the statistics, the instruments are valid and
strong.
The first financial measure I examine is the market-to-book ratio and its re-
lationship to board tenure. I examine the market-to-book ratio because it is a
measure of the firm’s anticipated profitability given their level of assets. There-
fore, the market-to-book ratio is a forward-looking measure of firm performance.
I estimate three models to study the relationship between market-to-book ratio
and board tenure. Because the market-to-book ratio is right-skewed, I use the nat-
ural log of the market-to-book ratio as the dependent variable in all three models.
Figure 1.12 shows that the natural log of the market-to-book ratio has a normal-
shaped distribution. The first model I use is ordinary least-squares regression. I
then estimate a model with firm fixed effects. The variables of interest in both
models are median board tenure and the coefficient of variation for board tenure
of the firm. Finally, I instrument for the median tenure on the board and the co-
efficient of variation on the board by using the average of median board tenure
for outside boards and the average coefficient of variation for outside boards the
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firm’s directors sit on.25 The models also include year fixed effects and the stan-
dard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. The standard errors in the OLS
model are clustered at the firm level and the OLS specification includes industry
fixed effects.
The results for all three models are included in Table 1.11. Once I instrument
for board tenure in Column 3, median board tenure is estimated to have a negative
statistical relationship with the market-to-book ratio. The coefficient of variation
is not statistically related to the market-to-book ratio.
The second financial measure I examine is the firm’s return on assets and its
relationship with board tenure. I use OLS, firm fixed effects, and instrumental
variables to study the relationship in the same way I did for the market-to-book
ratio.26
The results for all three models are displayed in Table 12. The results in col-
umn 3 show tenure on the board is not related to the return on assets of the firm.
The coefficient of variation of board tenure is also not estimated to be related to
the firm’s return on assets.
25The scatter plots presented in Figures 1.13 show the relationship between the market-to-book
ratio and the median (a) and coefficient of variation (b) of board tenure. Results for alternative
specifications are presented in Appendix IV.
26The scatter plots presented in Figure 1.14 show the relationship between return on assets and
the median (a) and coefficient of variation (b) of board tenure. Results for alternative specifications
are presented in Appendix IV.
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1.6 Conclusion
Tenure on corporate boards has benefits and costs. For instance, a board member
may become more productive as his firm-specific human capital increases with his
tenure. However, the same board member may become too close to management
over time to be an effective monitor. I advance the literature by showing how
tenure on boards is related to a variety of committee and firm outcomes.
I find that committee membership is related to a director’s tenure on the board.
A director maximizes his likelihood of compensation committee membership at
11 years and maximizes his likelihood of nomination committee membership at
20 years of tenure. Because of these results, I examine three outcomes related
to these committees, including refiled financial statements, the size and structure
of CEO compensation and the observable characteristics of subsequent appoint-
ments to the board. I find that audit committees with longer tenure tend to have
more adverse restatements and that audit committees which are more heteroge-
neous in tenure have more fraudulent restatements. I also find that compensation
committees with longer tenure tend to pay the CEO less and provide less incentive
pay to the CEO. The results do not show that tenure on the nomination committee
is related to observable characteristics of subsequent appointments to the board. I
finish my study of tenure on boards by examining the relationship between tenure
on the full board and a variety of firm outcomes. I find that boards with more
tenure do not experience more CEO turnover, are negatively related to the firm’s
market-to-book ratio, and is not related to the firm’s return on assets.
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The findings in this paper lead to several further research questions. For in-
stance, what mechanism explains the results for committee membership? How
does career experience, such as occupational choice, affect director tenure and the
relationship between tenure and committee membership? As tenure on boards be-
comes more pronounced in debates on corporate governance, more work is needed
to understand the effect of tenure.
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1.7 Tables
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics (1996–2017)
Obs. Mean SD 25th Median 75th
Director Characteristics
Director Tenure 228,578 8.84 8.00 3 7 12
Outside Director Tenure 228,578 3.48 7.86 0 0 3
Female 228,578 0.12 - - - -
Independent 228,578 0.82 - - - -
Attendance Problem 228,578 0.01 - - - -
Outside Board Seats 228,469 0.87 1.16 0 0 1
Age 228,392 60.68 8.74 55 61 67
Committee Member 210,749 0.72 - - - -
Audit Member 210,749 0.40 - - - -
Compensation Member 210,749 0.39 - - - -
Nomination Member 210,749 0.36 - - - -
Firm Characteristics
Median Board Tenure 25,456 7.75 4.16 5 7 10
CV of Board Tenure 25,428 0.73 0.26 0.56 0.72 0.88
Board Size 25,456 9.10 2.42 7 9 11
Real Sales (Millions of 2017 Dollars) 25,456 7,701.69 22,975.75 775.15 1,953.48 5,764.57
Market-to-Book Ratio 25,456 2.00 1.59 1.20 1.56 2.26
Return on Assets 25,456 3.44 17.56 1.83 4.82 8.55
Share-Return Volatility 25,456 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.14
Share-Price Performance 25,456 0.02 0.49 -0.24 -0.02 0.20
CEO Characteristics
Real Compensation (’000s of 2017 Dollars) 20,559 6,202.34 13,530.96 1,831.66 3,601.11 7,082.16
CEO Incentive Pay 20,559 0.59 0.27 0.42 0.66 0.81
CEO Replaced 20,559 0.09 - - - -
Notes: Data on the board members are retrieved from Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS). Firm data are retrieved from Compustat and CRSP. CEO
data are retrieved from Execucomp and Greene and Smith (2017). Obs. is the number of observations. Director tenure is calculated from variables avail-
able in the ISS data set as the difference between the year of appointment and the year of the observed annual meeting. Outside Director Tenure is de-
fined as the total amount of tenure the director has with boards the director sits on other than the board in question during the year of observation.The
formula for outside director tenure is
B∑
b=1
(DirectorTenurebt) − DirectorTenure1t , where b indexes the boards the director sat on in year
t, B is the total number of boards the director sat on in year t, and b = 1 is always considered the board in question. If B = 1 then the formula
for outside director tenure yields zero. Female is an indicator equal to one if the board member is a woman. Independent is an indicator equal to one
if the board member is not employed by the firm outside of the board appointment. Committee Member is equal to one if the board member sits on at
least one of the audit, compensation, or nomination committees. Committee variables are only available from 1998–2017. Median Board Tenure is the me-
dian level of director tenure on a corporate board during an annual meeting. CV of Board Tenure is the coefficient of variation of director tenure on the
board. Real Sales is the amount of net sales corrected for inflation using data from FRED (FRED, 2019). Market-to-Book Ratio is calculated following
Adams and Ferreira (2009) as Book V alue of Assets−Shareholder Equity+Market V alue of Equity
Book V alue of Assets
. Return on Assets is calculated as
IncomeBeforeExtraordinary Items
Book V alue of Assets
∗ 100. Share-Return Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the prior 60 months return on the
share’s price, excluding dividends. Share-Price Performance is measured as the return on the share’s price, excluding dividends, for the prior 12 months net
of the CRSP value-weighted index, excluding dividends. Real Compensation is the level of compensation for CEOs taken from Greene and Smith (2017)
and measured in thousands of 2017 dollars using FRED data (FRED, 2019). CEO Incentive Pay is calculated following Adams and Ferreira (2009) as
1 − Salary+Bonus
Total CEO Compensation
. CEO Replaced is an indicator variable equal to one in the last year the CEO is observed in the Execucomp data,
but the firm is not in its last year in the data set.
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Table 1.2: Tests for Firm Differences By Median Tenure Level
Characteristic Low-Tenure Boards High-Tenure Boards P-Value
Market-to-Book Ratio 2.00 2.06 0.040
Return on Assets 0.95 4.99 0.000
CEO Compensation 6,928.56 4,947.65 0.000
CEO Incentive Pay 0.61 0.52 0.000
CEO Turnover 0.10 0.08 0.011
Observations 6,234 5,637 -
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, CRSP, and
Greene and Smith (2017). All characteristics are measured as in Table 1.1. The level of obser-
vation is a firm-year. Market-to-Book Ratio is calculated following Adams and Ferreira (2009) as
Book V alue of Assets−Shareholder Equity+Market V alue of Equity
Book V alue of Assets
. Return on Assets is
calculated as IncomeBeforeExtraordinary Items
Book V alue of Assets
∗ 100. Due to data limitations for CEO data,
there are only 4,890 observations for CEO outcomes for first-quintile firms; for fifth-quintile firms, there are 4,567
CEO observations. CEO Compensation is real total CEO compensation recorded in 1000s of 2017 dollars and is
taken from Greene and Smith (2017). CEO Incentive Pay is calculated following Adams and Ferreira (2009) as
1− Salary+Bonus
Total CEO Compensation
. CEO Turnover is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is observed
for the last time in the data set, but the firm is observed in subsequent years.
Table 1.3: Tests for Firm Differences By Coefficient of Variation for Board Tenure
Characteristic Homogeneous Boards Heterogeneous Boards P-Value
Market-to-Book Ratio 2.11 1.87 0.000
Return on Assets 2.89 3.22 0.377
CEO Compensation 6,006.29 5,873.44 0.675
CEO Incentive Pay 0.59 0.57 0.046
CEO Turnover 0.08 0.09 0.041
Observations 5,095 5,094 -
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, CRSP, and
Greene and Smith (2017). All characteristics are measured as in Table 1.1. The level of obser-
vation is a firm-year. Market-to-Book Ratio is calculated following Adams and Ferreira (2009) as
Book V alue of Assets−Shareholder Equity+Market V alue of Equity
Book V alue of Assets
. Return on Assets is cal-
culated as IncomeBeforeExtraordinary Items
Book V alue of Assets
∗ 100. Due to data limitations for CEO data, there
are only 4,047 observations for CEO outcomes for first-quintile firms; for fifth-quintile firms, there are 4,157
CEO observations. CEO Compensation is real total CEO compensation recorded in 1000s of 2017 dollars and is
taken from Greene and Smith (2017). CEO Incentive Pay is calculated following Adams and Ferreira (2009) as
1 − Salary+Bonus
Total CEO Compensation
. CEO Turnover is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is observed
for the last time in the data set, but the firm is observed in subsequent years.
43
Table 1.4: Director Tenure and Committee Membership
Any Audit Compensation Nomination
Dependent Variable: Committee Committee Committee Committee
Director Tenure 0.003*** -0.006*** 0.011*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Director Tenure2 -0.0003*** -0.000 -0.0005*** -0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Median Board Tenure -0.001** 0.004*** -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Proportion of Prior Attendance Problems 0.055** 0.025 0.041 0.053*
(0.023) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Outside Board Seats 0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.008***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Board Size -0.006*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fraction Independent -0.090*** -0.340*** -0.264*** 0.054*
(0.019) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
ln(sales) 0.001 0.012*** -0.017*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.001 0.003** 0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Return on Assets -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share-Return Volatility -0.088** 0.062 0.010 -0.274***
(0.039) (0.062) (0.065) (0.065)
Sarbanes-Oxley 0.102*** -0.022 0.100*** 0.247***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Constant 0.997*** 0.822*** 0.925*** 0.398***
(0.024) (0.039) (0.040) (0.042)
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Director Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 166,568 166,568 166,568 166,568
Number of Directors 22,659 22,659 22,659 22,659
F-Stat 60.14*** 64.61*** 57.09*** 77.27***
Within R-squared 0.042 0.034 0.032 0.048
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between director tenure and committee membership.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured as in Table 1.1.
The level of observation is the board member. Directors who were not independent were excluded from the sample. In Column 1, the dependent
variable is an indicator equal to one if the board member sits on at least one of the audit, compensation, or nominating committee. In Columns
2–4, the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the board member sits on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee. Committee
membership is only available in the data from 1998–2017. Director Tenure is the level of tenure for the board member and Director Tenure2 is the
squared value of Director Tenure. Median Board Tenure is included to control for the tenure of the rest of the board and is included because there
may be competition for committee placement. Proportion of prior attendance problems is the proportion of observed years the board member
served with attendance problems. All four columns report estimated coefficients from linear probability models with director and year fixed
effects. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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Table 1.5: Outside Director Tenure and Committee Membership
Any Audit Compensation Nomination
Dependent Variable: Committee Committee Committee Committee
Inside Director Tenure 0.003*** -0.006*** 0.012*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inside Director Tenure2 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Outside Director Tenure 0.001*** -0.000 0.002** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Outside Director Tenure2 -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Median Board Tenure -0.001** 0.004*** -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Proportion of Prior Attendance Problems 0.055** 0.027 0.040 0.053*
(0.023) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Outside Board Seats 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Board Size -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fraction Independent -0.090*** -0.339*** -0.264*** 0.054*
(0.019) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
ln(Sales) 0.001 0.012*** -0.017*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.001 0.003** 0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Return on Assets -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share-Return Volatility -0.090** 0.065 0.005 -0.275***
(0.039) (0.062) (0.065) (0.065)
Sarbanes-Oxley 0.099*** -0.012 0.089*** 0.244***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Constant 0.994*** 0.823*** 0.922*** 0.397***
(0.024) (0.039) (0.040) (0.042)
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Director Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 166,568 166,568 166,568 166,568
Number of Directors 22,659 22,659 22,659 22,659
F-Stat 57.07*** 61.12*** 54.12*** 72.49***
Within R-squared 0.042 0.034 0.032 0.048
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between outside director tenure and committee membership.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured as in Table
1.1. The level of observation is the board member. Directors who were not independent were excluded from the sample. In Column 1, the
dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the board member sits on at least one of the audit, compensation, or nominating committee. In
Columns 2–4, the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the board member sits on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee.
Committee membership is only available in the data from 1998–2017. Inside Director Tenure is the level of tenure for the board member on
the firm in question and Inside Director Tenure2 is the squared value of Inside Director Tenure. Outside Director Tenure is defined as the total
amount of tenure the director has with boards the director sits on other than the board in question during the year of observation.The formula
for outside director tenure is
B∑
b=1
(DirectorTenurebt) − DirectorTenure1t , where b indexes the boards the director sat on in
year t,B is the total number of boards the director sat on in year t, and b = 1 is always considered the board in question. IfB = 1 then the
formula for outside director tenure yields zero. Median Board Tenure is included to control for the tenure of the rest of the board and is included
because there may be competition for committee placement. Proportion of prior attendance problems is the proportion of observed years the
board member served with attendance problems. All four columns report estimated coefficients from linear probability models with director
and year fixed effects. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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Table 1.6: Board Tenure and Refiled Financial Statements
Accounting Fraudulent Clerical Error Adverse
Dependent Variable: Restatement Restatement Restatement Restatement
Median Board Tenure 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CV of Board Tenure 0.001 0.004*** 0.000 0.009
(0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
Fraction Female -0.003 -0.008 0.001 -0.007
(0.031) (0.006) (0.006) (0.030)
Board Size -0.002* -0.000 0.000 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Fraction Independent 0.115*** -0.006 -0.003 0.088***
(0.026) (0.005) (0.007) (0.026)
ln(sales) 0.015*** 0.001 -0.000 0.013***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.001 0.000 -0.001** -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Return on Assets -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share-Return Performance -0.006 -0.001 0.001* -0.004
(0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
Constant -0.130*** -0.005 0.009 -0.105***
(0.039) (0.007) (0.009) (0.038)
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,793 22,793 22,793 22,793
Number of Firms 2,557 2,557 2,557 2,557
F-Stat 7.45*** 1.40 0.99 5.32***
R-squared 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.003
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and accounting restatements.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, CRSP, and Audit Analytics. All character-
istics are measured as in Table 1.1. The level of observation is the firm. The first column’s dependent variable is an indicator
variable equal to one if a firm has accounting statement refiled in subsequent years. The second column’s dependent variable
is an indicator variable equal to one if the restatement was due to fraud. The third column’s dependent variable is an indicator
equal to one if the restatement was due to a clerical error. The fourth column’s dependent variable is an indicator variable equal
to one if the restatement adversely affected the statement. All four columns report estimated coefficients from linear probability
models with firms and year fixed effects. The models use a sample with every firm year. The standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity.
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Table 1.7: Board Tenure and CEO Compensation
Dependent Variable: Total CEO Compensation CEO Incentive Pay
Median Board Tenure -0.006** -0.005 -0.002* -0.004*
(0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002)
Median Board Tenure2 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
ln(Median Board Tenure) -0.028 -0.012**
(0.018) (0.005)
CV of Board Tenure -0.037 -0.026 -0.021 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
CEO Tenure 0.001 0.017*** -0.002*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO Tenure2 -0.001*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
ln(CEO Tenure) 0.052*** 0.003
(0.017) (0.004)
CEO Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.005** -0.001* -0.001* -0.002***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female CEO 0.096 0.110* 0.084 0.022 0.024 0.026
(0.065) (0.066) (0.062) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
CEO Director -0.013 -0.007 -0.026 0.001 0.002 -0.003
(0.055) (0.055) (0.058) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Fraction Female 0.068 0.052 0.013 -0.055 -0.057 -0.049
(0.139) (0.140) (0.143) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
Fraction Independent 0.318** 0.289* 0.433*** 0.113*** 0.107*** 0.147***
(0.155) (0.153) (0.161) (0.039) (0.039) (0.043)
Board Size -0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ln(Sales) 0.350*** 0.348*** 0.350*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.027***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.052*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Return on Assets 0.002 0.002 0.003** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share-Return Volatility 0.567 0.566 0.363 0.268*** 0.264*** 0.261**
(0.353) (0.352) (0.362) (0.099) (0.099) (0.107)
Constant 5.172*** 5.165*** 5.215*** 0.182** 0.194*** 0.239***
(0.288) (0.285) (0.302) (0.076) (0.074) (0.080)
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,382 18,382 17,075 18,382 18,382 17,075
Number of Firms 2,166 2,166 2,136 2,166 2,166 2,136
F-Stat 23.86*** 25.45*** 23.48*** 41.07*** 40.73*** 40.67***
Within R-squared 0.064 0.068 0.071 0.151 0.153 0.158
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and CEO compensation.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured as in Table 1.1. The
level of observation is the firm-year. All specifications include year and firm fixed effects. In Columns 1, 2, and 3 the dependent variable is the total
level of real compensation paid to the CEO measured in thousands of 2017 dollars. In Columns 3, 4, and 5 the dependent variable is the inverse
hyperbolic sine of the proportion of compensation paid to the CEO that is tied to incentive pay. Median Board Tenure is the median tenure level
on the board. CEO Tenure is the tenure of the CEO. ln(Median Board Tenure) and ln(CEO Tenure) are the natural log of Median Board Tenure
and CEO Tenure. CEO Age is the age of the CEO. Female CEO is the indicator equal to one if the CEO is a woman. CEO Director is an indicator
variable equal to one if the CEO served on the board as well. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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Table 1.8: Board Tenure and Appointments
Independent Female Age Black
Dependent Variable: Appointments Appointments of Appointments Appointments
Lagged Median Board Tenure 0.001 0.001 0.037 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.046) (0.001)
Lagged CV of Board Tenure -0.002 -0.009 0.383 0.005
(0.021) (0.033) (0.619) (0.015)
ln(CEO Tenure) -0.022** -0.018 -0.444* 0.006
(0.009) (0.012) (0.234) (0.007)
CEO Age -0.006*** -0.000 0.037 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.039) (0.001)
Female CEO 0.003 -0.064 0.032 0.026
(0.039) (0.066) (0.992) (0.029)
CEO Director -0.016 0.042 0.747 -0.025
(0.040) (0.073) (1.069) (0.039)
Lagged Board Size -0.008* 0.006 -0.138 0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.116) (0.004)
Lagged Fraction Independent -0.225* -0.079 -4.183 -0.028
(0.118) (0.151) (2.969) (0.073)
ln(Lagged Sales) 0.025 0.059** -0.520 0.019
(0.017) (0.028) (0.591) (0.018)
Lagged Market-to-Book Ratio -0.001 0.020* -0.064 0.008
(0.006) (0.011) (0.174) (0.007)
Lagged Return on Assets -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.025) (0.000)
Lagged Share-Return Volatility 0.226 0.084 0.557 -0.119
(0.186) (0.345) (5.911) (0.169)
Lagged Share-Return Performance 0.008 0.011 0.155 -0.003
(0.013) (0.019) (0.411) (0.012)
Sarbanes-Oxley 0.183*** 0.151 5.182*** 0.009
(0.047) (0.096) (1.552) (0.045)
Constant 1.286*** -0.436 59.809*** -0.070
(0.200) (0.287) (5.433) (0.170)
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,413 3,413 3,404 3,413
Number of Firms 1,315 1,315 1,314 1,315
F-Test 3.19*** 2.08*** 2.94*** 1.41*
R-squared 0.053 0.026 0.041 0.017
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and the proportion of appointments in a year that are independent, the proportion of appointments in a year
that are female, the average age of appointments, and the proportion of appointments in a year that are white.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured as in Table 1.1 and
lagged values are lagged by one year. The level of observation is the firm-year. All specifications include year and firm fixed effects. The dependent
variable in Column 1 is the proportion of appointments to the board in a year that are independent. The dependent variable in Column 2 is the proportion
of appointments to the board that are women. The dependent variable in Column 3 is the average age of appointments to the board. The dependent
variable in Column 4 is the proportion of appointments to the board that are black. Median Board Tenure is the median length of tenure on the
compensation committee. ln(CEO Tenure) is the natural log of CEO Tenure. CEO Age is the age of the CEO. Female CEO is the indicator equal to
one if the CEO is a woman. CEO Director is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO served on the board as well. The standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedasticity.
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Table 1.9: Director Tenure and CEO Turnover
Dependent Variable: CEO Turnover
Median Board Tenure -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.003)
Median Board Tenure*Share-Return Performance 0.002 -0.003
(0.001) (0.003)
Median Board Tenure2 0.000
(0.000)
Median Board Tenure2*Share-Return Performance 0.000
(0.000)
ln(Median Board Tenure) -0.010
(0.007)
ln(Median Board Tenure)*Share-Return Performance 0.004
(0.006)
CV of Board Tenure 0.019 0.039*** 0.009
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
CEO Tenure 0.005*** 0.016*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO Age 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female CEO -0.028 -0.021 -0.028
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
CEO Director -0.122*** -0.119*** -0.122***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Fraction Female -0.021 -0.035 -0.021
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Fraction Independent -0.167*** -0.183*** -0.172***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Board Size 0.005** 0.005*** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(sales) -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.025***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Share-Return Performance -0.033*** -0.017 -0.027**
(0.010) (0.014) (0.012)
Share-Return Volatility 0.260*** 0.258*** 0.260***
(0.092) (0.095) (0.092)
Constant -0.316*** -0.328*** -0.306***
(0.078) (0.080) (0.078)
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,813 19,813 19,784
Number of Firms 2,134 2,134 2,132
F-Stat 28.51*** 40.07*** 28.47***
Within R-squared 0.084 0.093 0.083
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and CEO turnover.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured as in
Table 1.1. The level of observation is the firm-year. All specifications include year and firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is
an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is in its last year of observation but the firm is subsequently observed in the data set.
Median Board Tenure is the median level of tenure on the board. CEO Tenure is the tenure of the CEO. ln(Median Board Tenure)
and ln(CEO Tenure) is the natural log of Median Board Tenure and CEO Tenure. CEO Age is the age of the CEO. Female CEO is
the indicator equal to one if the CEO is a woman. CEO Director is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO served on the board
as well. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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Table 1.10: First Stage Results for the Median and Coefficient of Variation of
Board Tenure
Dependent Variable: Median Board Tenure CV of Board Tenure
Outside Median Tenure 0.11*** -0.003***
(0.013) (0.0008)
Outside CV of Tenure 0.43 0.007
(0.162) (0.011)
Fraction Female -2.86*** 0.15***
(0.394) (0.029)
Fraction Independent -2.09*** 0.08***
(0.392) (0.027)





Centered R-squared 0.043 0.056
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes
Observations 20,893 20,853
Number of Companies 2,070 2,068
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: First-stage results for median and coefficient of variation of board tenure.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All
characteristics are measured as in Table 1.1. The level of observation is the firm-year. All specifica-
tions include year and firm fixed effects. Median Board Tenure is the median level of tenure on the
board. CV of Board Tenure is the coefficient of variation of board tenure. Outside Median Tenure is
the average median board tenure of outside boards that a firm’s board members sit on. Outside CV
of Tenure is the average coefficient of variation of board tenure of outside boards that a firm’s board
members sit on. If the firm did not have any outside board members that were on an outside board, the
firm is omitted from the estimation. The F-Stat is the statistic from an F-test for joint significance of
the instruments. The values are statistically significant and above or near 10 indicating that the instru-
ments are not weak instruments. A Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic for underidentification is equal
to 4.17 with a p-value equal to 0.04. The result is to reject the null hypothesis of underidentification
at the 5 percent level. A Kleibergern-Paap rk Wald F Statistics is equal to 2.08 and indicates that the
instruments are not weak. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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Table 1.11: Board Tenure and Market-to-Book Ratio
Dependent Variable: ln(Market-to-Book Ratio) OLS Firm Fixed Effects IV
Median Board Tenure 0.003 -0.000 -0.051*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.028)
CV of Board Tenure -0.092*** -0.036 -0.867
(0.026) (0.023) (0.909)
Fraction Female 0.243*** -0.020 -0.043
(0.085) (0.072) (0.088)
Fraction Independent -0.359*** -0.254*** -0.293***
(0.085) (0.063) (0.057)
Board Size -0.006 -0.012*** 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.022)




Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,125 21,125 20,893
Number of Firms - 2,302 2,070
F-Stat 45.84*** 70.52*** 25.10***
R-squared 0.098 0.110 -0.151
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and firm performance measured as Market-to-Book Ratio.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured as in
Table 1.1. The level of observation is the firm-year. The dependent variable is the market-to-book ratio, calculated following Adams
and Ferreira (2009) as Book V alue of Assets−Shareholder Equity +Market V alue of Equity
Book V alue of Assets
. The first column
displays results from an OLS model with industry fixed effects. The second column displays results from a model with firm fixed effects.
The third column displays results from an instrumental-variables model with firm fixed effects. Median Board Tenure and CV of Board
Tenure are instrumented for using the Average Outside Median Board Tenure and Average Outside CV of Board Tenure. All columns
include year fixed effects and correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity. Column 1 clusters the standard errors at the firm level.
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Table 1.12: Board Tenure and Return on Assets
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets OLS Firm Fixed Effects IV
Median Board Tenure 0.407*** 0.003 1.648
(0.049) (0.056) (1.245)
CV of Board Tenure 0.550 -0.689 34.713
(0.746) (0.804) (38.266)
Fraction Female 5.119*** 2.960 2.422
(1.713) (2.437) (4.077)
Board Size -0.029 -0.253*** -1.008
(0.083) (0.084) (0.930)
Fraction Independent -2.659 -2.103 -1.528
(1.803) (1.845) (2.790)




Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,125 21,125 20,893
Number of Firms - 2,302 2,070
F-Stat 11.99*** 13.23*** 13.30***
R-squared 0.073 0.033 -0.184
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and firm performance measured as return on assets.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are mea-
sured as in Table 1.1. The level of observation is the firm-year. The dependent variable is the return on assets. The first col-
umn displays results from an OLS model with industry fixed effects. The second column displays results from a model with
firm fixed effects. The third column displays results from an instrumental-variables model with firm fixed effects. Median
Board Tenure and CV of Board Tenure are instrumented for using the Average Outside Median Board Tenure and Average
Outside CV of Board Tenure. All columns include year fixed effects and correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity.
Column 1 clusters the standard errors at the firm level.
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1.8 Figures
Figure 1.1: Histogram of Director Tenure (1996 & 2017)
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services. The above histogram displays the density of directorship observations with a
particular number of years of tenure. Because the tenure variable is recorded as whole years, the width of the bins is set to 1. In order to see if the
distribution of tenure is changing over time, the plot includes one histogram for 1996 and another histogram for 2017. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test indicates that 1996 has a different distribution of director tenure than 2017 (p-value < 0.01). The plots only include observations with less
than 41 years of director tenure. The truncation is used to help visualize the differences in the distributions. But it should be noted that a handful
of observations which have director tenure as high as the mid 60s occur in the data.
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Figure 1.2: Kernels of Director Tenure (1996 & 2017)
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services. The above kernel density plot displays the density of directorship observations
with a particular number of years of tenure using the Epanechnikov kernel function. In order to see if the distribution of tenure is changing over
time, the plot includes one kernel density for 1996 and another kernel density for 2017. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that 1996 has a
different distribution of director tenure than 2017 (p-value< 0.01). The plots only include observations with less than 41 years of director tenure.
The truncation is used to help visualize the differences in the distributions. But it should be noted that a handful of observations which have
director tenure as high as the mid 60s occur in the data.
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Figure 1.3: Kernels of Director Tenure by Industry (1996 & 2016)
(a) (b)
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services. The above kernel density plots display the density of directorship observations with
a particular number of years of tenure using the Epanechnikov kernel function for the year 1996 (a) and 2016 (b) for the four most populous industries
in the data. The plots reveal three things about the data. First, the plots show that industries differ in the density of director tenure on the left-side of
the distribution. Second, the plots also show that all industries have long-tenured board members. Third, the plots show that director tenure has shifted
to the right from 1996 to 2016 and a bimodal distribution is emerging in the latter year. The plots only include observations with less than 41 years
of director tenure. The truncation is used to help visualize the differences in the distributions. But it should be noted that a handful of observations
which have director tenure as high as the mid 60s occur in the data.
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Figure 1.4: Histogram of Outside Director Tenure (1996 & 2017)
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services. The above histogram displays the density of directorship observations with a




DirectorTenure1t , where b indexes the boards the director sat on in year t,B is the total number of boards the director sat on in year t,
and b = 1 is always considered the board in question. IfB = 1, then the formula for outside director tenure yields zero. Because the outside
director tenure variable is recorded as whole years, the width of the bins is set to 1. In order to see if the distribution of outside director tenure
is changing over time, the plot includes one histogram for 1996 and another histogram for 2017. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that the
distribution of outside director tenure in 1996 is different than the distribution in 2017 (p-value < 0.01). The plots only include observations
with more than 0 years of outside director tenure and less than 41 years of director tenure. The truncation is used to help visualize the differences
in the distributions. But it should be noted that a handful of observations which have director tenure as high as 113 years occur.
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Figure 1.5: Kernels of Outside Director Tenure (1996 & 2017)
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services. The above kernel density plots display the density of directorship observations




(DirectorTenurebt) −DirectorTenure1t , where b indexes the boards the director sat on in year t,B is the total
number of boards the director sat on in year t, and b = 1 is always considered the board in question. IfB = 1, then the formula for outside
director tenure yields zero. In order to see if the distribution of outside director tenure is changing over time, the plot includes one kernel density
for 1996 and another kernel density for 2017. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that the distribution of outside director tenure in 1996 is
different than the distribution in 2017 (p-value < 0.01). The plots only include observations with more than 0 years of outside director tenure
and less than 41 years of director tenure. The truncation is used to help visualize the differences in the distributions. But it should be noted that
a handful of observations which have director tenure as high as 113 years occur.
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Figure 1.6: Kernels of Outside Director Tenure by Industry (1996 & 2016)
(a) (b)
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services. The above kernel density plots display the density of directorship observations with
a particular number of years of tenure on outside corporate boards using the Epanechnikov kernel function for the year 1996 (a) and 2016 (b) for the
four most populous industries in the data. The formula for outside director tenure is
B∑
b=1
(DirectorTenurebt) − DirectorTenure1t ,
where b indexes the boards the director sat on in year t,B is the total number of boards the director sat on in year t, and b = 1 is always considered
the board in question. IfB = 1, then the formula for outside director tenure yields zero. The plots reveal three things about the data. First, the plots
show that industries differ in the density of director tenure on outside boards on the left-side of the distribution. Second, the plots also show that all
industries have board members with high levels of tenure on outside boards. Third, the plots show that the outside director tenure densities for the
industries have converged over time. The plots only include observations with more than 0 years of outside director tenure and less than 41 years of
director tenure. The truncation is used to help visualize the differences in the distributions. But it should be noted that a handful of observations which
have director tenure as high as 113 years occur.
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Figure 1.7: Scatter Plots of Committee Membership and Director Tenure
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services. The above scatter plots present the proportion of director observations who sat on
a particular committee given a specific level of director tenure. The scatter plot for service on any of the three committees is presented in (a). The
scatter plot reveals a quadratic relationship between director tenure and the probability a director sits on a committee. A similar pattern is revealed for
service on the audit committee (b), compensation committee (c), and nomination committee (d). Based upon the scatter plots above, I use a quadratic
functional form of director tenure in the linear probability regressions presented in Table 1.4 and Table 1.5. Additional specifications are displayed in
Appendix IV.
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Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services. Scatter plot (a) above presents the proportion of firm-years that had a financial
statement refiled. In scatter plots (b), (c), and (d), the sample is restricted to firm-years with at least one financial statement refiled. In (b), we do not
see a strong relationship between the board’s level of tenure and the probability a financial statement is refiled for fraudulent reasons in subsequent
years. In (c), we do not see a strong relationship between the board’s level of tenure and the probability a financial statement is refiled for clerical
reasons. In (d), we see a positive relationship between the board’s level of tenure and the probability a financial statement is refiled and the refiled
statement has an adverse effect on the values of the original statement.
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Figure 1.9: Scatter Plots of CEO Compensation and Board Tenure
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, CRSP, and Greene and Smith (2017). The above scatter
plots present the average natural log of CEO compensation, (a) and (b), and the proportion of CEO compensation tied to incentive pay, (c) and (d),
based on the median board tenure, (a) and (c), and the coefficient of variation of board tenure, (b) and (d). The scatter plots show that median board
tenure has a non-linear relationship with CEO compensation and incentive pay.
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Figure 1.10: Scatter Plots of Appointments to the Board and Median Board Tenure
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services. The above scatter plots present the average characteristic of appointments to the
board based on the median tenure level of the board the prior year. In Figure (a) the proportion of independent appointments to the board appears to
decrease as median tenure increases. In Figure (b) the proportion of appointments that are women tend to increase with the median level of tenure on
the board. In Figure (c) the average age of appointments tend to increase with the median level of tenure on the board. In Figure (d) there does not
appear to be a strong relationship between the proportion of appointments that are white and the median level of tenure on the board. Because of the
apparent linearity of the relationships, I include the level of median tenure on the board in regressions. I examine other specifications in Appendix IV.
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Figure 1.11: Scatter Plots of CEO Turnover and Board Tenure
(a) (b)
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services and Execucomp. The above scatter plots present the proportion of firm-years that
experience CEO turnover based on the median tenure level of the board (a) and the coefficient of variation of tenure on the board (b). The results show
that CEO turnover tends to decrease with median board tenure and increase with the coefficient of variation of board tenure.
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Figure 1.12: Histogram of ln(Market-to-Book Ratio)
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services and Compustat. The above histogram displays the density of the natural log
of Market-to-Book Ratio. The distribution of Market-to-Book Ratio is right-skewed but the distribution of the natural log of Market-to-Book
Ratio is relatively normal. Because of the normality of the distribution of the natural log of Market-to-Book Ratio, I use the natural log of
Market-to-Book Ratio as the dependent variable in performance regressions.
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Figure 1.13: Scatter Plots of Market-to-Book Ratio and Board Tenure
(a) (b)
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services and Compustat. The above scatter plots present the average value of Market-
to-Book Ratio based on the median tenure level of the board (a) and the coefficient of variation of tenure on the board (b). The results show that
there is a positive relationship between observed values of median tenure on the board and Market-to-Book Ratio. The results also show that
there is a negative relationship between observed values of the coefficient of variation of tenure on boards and Market-to-Book Ratio.
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Figure 1.14: Scatter Plots of Return on Assets and Board Tenure
(a) (b)
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services and Compustat. The above scatter plots present the average value of return on
assets based on the median tenure level of the board (a) and the coefficient of variation of tenure on the board (b). The results show that there is
a positive relationship between the observed values of median tenure as well as the observed values of the coefficient of variation of tenure on
boards and return on assets. The results suggest that the relationship may be non-linear and resembles the shape of a natural log function. For
consistency between the Market-to-Book Ratio and return on assets results, I use a linear functional form of board tenure in my analyses. In
supplemental analyses presented in Appendix IV, I use functional forms that are non-linear in board tenure.
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CHAPTER 2
WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM AND THEIR IMPACT ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE: AN EXTENDED
ANALYSIS AND REPLICATION
2.1 Introduction
Adams and Ferreira (2009) presented an early and influential paper on the role that
women play on corporate boards. Using data from 1996 to 2003, they find that
boards with women tended to devote more resources to oversight and governance
on the board. They do not find higher performance as measured by either Tobin’s
q or the firm’s return on asset for firms with women on their boards.
Since the publication of Adams and Ferreira in 2009, there have been sig-
nificant changes in the institutional background in which corporate boards oper-
ate. First, the representation of women on corporate boards has significantly in-
creased from less than 10 percent from 1996–2003 to almost 20 percent in 2017.
Second, several institutional shareholders have begun to announce their demands
for women on corporate boards (see Jordan, 2008; McNabb, 2017; and Krouse,
2018). Third, policy makers have begun to consider gender quotas on corporate
boards in the United States and Europe (see Matsa and Miller, 2013; Bertrand et
al., 2014; Tyrefors and Jansson, 2017; and Furhmans, 2018). Because of these
changes, it is important to reexamine the work of Adams and Ferreira (2009) to
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determine if their findings persist over a sample period with more female repre-
sentation on corporate boards in a different institutional backdrop.
Adams (2016) states “There is no case for board gender diversity if female
directors are very similar to male directors in terms of their skills, experiences,
and preferences. While the literature documents that female and male directors
have different characteristics, some of these differences are likely to vanish over
time.” If the differences have vanished over time, then it may be the case that many
of the findings of Adams and Ferreira (2009) do not persist. A test for persistence
is particularly pertinent given the sentiment of Ferreira (2015) which states:
It is very hard to disentangle “diversity effects” from the effects of
other individual and group characteristics that correlate with mea-
sures of diversity. Board directors, as a group of people, are highly
non-representative of the general population. For example, there is no
reason to believe that female board members have the same personal-
ity traits as those observed in the general population. Thus, findings
of “gender effects” on boards are unlikely to be generalizable beyond
the board.
In this paper, I consider which of the findings of Adams and Ferreira (2009)
are evident over a longer period for board members of firms included in the S&P
1500. I find that some of the findings of the original work persist. However, I find
that many important findings do not appear in a longer sample with a greater pro-
portion of board seats held by women. The results are important for institutional
68
shareholders as well as policy makers.
In Section 2.2, I begin the empirical analysis with univariate tests for the orig-
inal sample period (1996–2003) and the latter period (2004–2017). The results of
the tests show that firms with women on the board still tend to be larger as mea-
sured by sales, tend to still have higher returns on assets, tend to be less volatile,
and tend to have a larger board size. However, I also find that in the latter period
we see that firms with women on their boards have a statistically lower Tobin’s q
value and the returns on assets have converged, albeit the difference is still statis-
tically significant. The latter findings are the first evidence that the results in the
original paper are not robust to changes in the sample or the sample period.
In Section 2.3, I examine the relationship between women on the board and
important board inputs using probit and linear probability models. The inputs I
study include committee service by the board members and the probability that a
board member has an attendance problem, defined by the Security and Exchange
Commission as not attending at least 75% of the board meetings in the past 12
months. I replicate the original paper to find that women are more likely to serve
on the audit committee and less likely to serve on the compensation committee
in the original sample period. However, in the latter period, I find that women
are no more or less likely to serve on either the audit or compensation commit-
tee. Women also become more likely to serve on the nomination committee in the
latter period. I find that women are no longer less likely to have an attendance
problem in the latter period, a departure from the original sample period. I also
find that men who serve with women are no longer less likely to have an atten-
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dance problem in the latter period, a departure from the original sample period.
In Section 2.4, I examine the relationship between women on the board and
board outputs, including CEO compensation, CEO turnover, and board equity. I
find that having a higher proportion of women on the board is related to the amount
of CEO compensation or the proportion of CEO compensation tied to incentive
pay in either time period. I do not find that boards with more women on the board
are more sensitive to poor share-return performance in the CEO turnover decision
in either period, a departure from the original paper. Finally, I find that boards
with a higher proportion of women on the board do not hold different amounts of
the firm’s equity.
In Section 2.5, I examine the relationship between women on the board and
firm performance as measured by Tobin’s q and return on assets. Due to endogene-
ity concerns, I follow Adams and Ferreira (2009) in using instrumental variables.
The instrument that is used is the proportion of men on the board that serve on
another board where at least one woman is present. In the original sample period,
the result is that more women on the board lead to lower performance, as mea-
sured by Tobin’s q and return on assets. In the latter period, I find that the point
estimates are muted and statistically insignificant from zero.
Taken together, my results do not support the hypothesis that the original find-
ings of Adams and Ferreira (2009) are persistent over the latter sample period.
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2.2 Data and Methodology
The data on corporate directors are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Ser-
vices (ISS) for the sample period 1996–2017 for firms in the S&P 1500 (Institu-
tional Shareholders Services, 2018a; Institutional Shareholder Services, 2018b).
The survey unit for the data set is the firm and the unit of observation is the di-
rector. The sample is organized as a director-firm-year panel with observations
recorded on the firm’s annual meeting date. The ISS data include director char-
acteristics such as the gender, age, first year of service, committee memberships,
independent status, and an indicator for whether the director exhibits an atten-
dance problem (attended less than 75% of meetings) that year.
Several data sets are added to the ISS data using data available from Coles
et al. (2014).1 Data on the CEO of the firm during the year are provided via
Execucomp. Financial data for the firm are added from Compustat. Finally, share
price data from CRSP are included, as well.
The Compustat data include the net sales for the firm, adjusted to millions of
real 2017 dollars, the book value of assets for the firm, the net income of the firm
before depreciation and extraordinary items, the market value of equity for the
firm, and the total amount of shareholders’ equity for the firm (Compustat 2018a).
Using the Compustat data, I calculate Tobin’s q and return on assets (ROA) for
1The Coles et al. (2014) data are available through 2014, but I extend the linking file using
CUSIP data available in the ISS data.
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the firm.2,3
The Execucomp data include the gender of the CEO, the compensation of the
CEO, including total compensation, salary, and bonus, and the year of appoint-
ment for the CEO (Compustat, 2018c). The compensation of the CEO is adjusted
to real 2017 dollars using CPI data from FRED (FRED, 2019). Following Adams
and Ferreira (2009), I use the Execucomp data to calculate the share of CEO com-
pensation that is incentive pay.4 Due to methodology changes in the Execucomp
data, the reported compensation for the CEO is not consistent across the sample
period. To correct the series, I use data from Greene and Smith (2017) for CEO
compensation.
The CRSP data provide the monthly returns for the share price and a CRSP
value-weighted index, both excluding dividends. The volatility of the stock is
calculated via the standard deviation of returns for the prior 60 months, including
the month of the firm’s annual meeting. The performance of the stock is calculated
as the share’s return for the prior 12 months, net of the prior 12 months’ return on
the CRSP value-weighted index.
Unfortunately, my data are not an exact replication of the data used by Adams
and Ferreira (2009). Therefore, I do not have access to some variables, including
the number of business segments the firm has, the total compensation for the di-
rectors, the fraction of equity pay for directors, the meeting fee for directors, the
2To calculate Tobin’s q, I follow Adams and Ferreira (2009) by using Tobin′sQ =
Book V alue of Assets−Shareholder Equity+Market V alue of Equity
Book V alue of Assets .
3Return on assets is calculated by IncomeBeforeExtraordinary ItemsBook V alue of Assets ∗ 100.
4CEO Incentive Pay is calculated following Adams and Ferreira (2009) as
1− Salary+BonusTotal CEOCompensation .
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number of meetings a board has in a year, an indicator for retired status, an in-
dicator for the corporate governance committee, and shareholder rights data from
ISS. Due to concern for omitted variable bias, I estimate all of my results for the
original sample period and compare my results to those in Adams and Ferreira
(2009). I find that many of the results are similar to the original study, in spite of
omitting several variables.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the sample. The summary statistics
are organized into three categories: director characteristics, CEO characteristics,
and firm characteristics.
About 12% of the director observations in the sample are women. Roughly 1
percent of the observations had attendance problems in the prior year. About 83%
of the sample is independent, defined as directors who are not direct employees
of the firm following Linck et al. (2008), and 72% were members of a commit-
tee. The average board size for the sample was 9.10 directors. Roughly 66% of
the directors served on a board with at least one woman. About 37% of the the
directors served on a board with exactly one woman.
Following Adams and Ferreira (2009), I estimate several univariate tests for
differences in firm characteristics between firms with a woman on the board and
firms without a woman on the board. The firm characteristics I test are the natural
log of sales, Tobin’s q, ROA, share-return volatility, and board size. I also test
for differences in the firm’s share-return performance, which Adams and Ferreira
(2009) do not originally test for. The test results are reported in Table 2.2 for
the period 1996–2003, Table 2.3 for the period 2004–2017, and Table 2.4 for the
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period 1996–2017. I find that similar to the original sample period, firms with
women on their boards were larger as measured by the natural log of sales, have
greater returns on assets, have lower share-return volatility, and have larger board
sizes compared to firms without women on their boards. Dissimilar to the original
sample period, I find that firms with women on their boards have lower Tobin’s q
values and the same share-return performance as boards without female directors
in the recent sample period. I also find that the difference in returns on assets
are much closer in the more recent sample period (about 0.48) compared to the
original sample period (greater than 5).
The results of the univariate tests illustrate that while some of the findings of
the original work extend to the latter sample period, others have not or have sig-
nificantly changed. Because these estimates do not control for observable char-
acteristics it is not clear that women on the board is the only reason for these
differences. It is also not clear that these univariate tests provide causal estimates
of the effect of having women on the firm. Because of the drawbacks of the uni-
variate tests, in Section 2.1.1 I describe the methodology that will be used in the
econometric analyses to generate estimates that may be closer to the causal effect.
2.2.1 Methodology
A difficulty of empirical analysis on corporate board composition and firm out-
comes is the potential for endogeneity to bias the estimates. I follow Adams and
Ferreira (2009) by addressing the endogeneity in two ways, including the use of
firm fixed effects and instrumental variables.
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I include firm fixed effects in the estimates because the inclusion of firm fixed
effects may generate causal estimates. Firm fixed effects may help to generate
causal estimates because the firms with the best corporate culture may attract
women to their boards, but may also have the best financial performance. How-
ever, the identification assumption may be strong and caution should be taken
when making casual statements, and the estimates should be interpreted as impor-
tant correlations.5
I instrument for female board representation in performance regressions in
order to make the best effort at generating the causal effect that women have on
corporate boards. I follow Adams and Ferreira (2009) and use the proportion of
men serving on the board that serve on other boards with women as an instrument
for the proportion of women on the board. The reason that this instrument is
relevant is that men serving on boards with women have women in their networks,
which has been oft-cited as a reason women do not have greater representation on
boards. The instrument is discussed in further detail in Section 2.5.
2.3 Female Board Representation and Board Inputs
Adams and Ferreira (2009) begin their analysis of the effect of women on corpo-
rate boards by examining key inputs to the board, including committee service,
meeting attendance, and the meeting attendance of men who serve with women.
The authors find that women were more likely to serve on the audit committee
5See Angrist and Pischke (2009) pages 221–227 for further discussion on obtaining and inter-
preting causal estimates in fixed-effects models.
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than men, women were less likely to have poor attendance records, and men serv-
ing with women were less likely to have poor attendance records.
To the extent possible, I estimate the same econometric models as those used
in Adams and Ferreira (2009) for two separate sample periods: 1996–2003 and
2004–2017. I estimate the models for the period 1996–2003 to replicate the tables
in Adams and Ferreira (2009) as closely as possible. The second period is used
to extend the results of Adams and Ferreira (2009) and to test whether the results
are persistent over a longer period with a greater share of board seats held by
women. In all cases, the first table presented in a subsection is for the 1996–2003
sample period, and the second table is for the 2004–2017 period. I also include
results for the full sample period, 1996–2017. Taken together, the results of the
three sections show that caution should be taken before generalizing the findings
of Adams and Ferreira (2009) over a longer time period.
2.3.1 Women on Boards and Committee Assignment
Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that boards with women tended to devote more
resources to oversight. That conclusion is partially due to the committees that
women are observed to sit on in the period 1998–2003.6
In my analysis, I follow Adams and Ferreira (2009) by estimating a linear
probability model with firm fixed effects for the probability that a director sits on
any committee or sits on a particular committee7. I replicate the original findings
6Committee service variables are only available beginning in 1998.
7ISS does not have data for governance committee membership for the entire sample period.
Therefore, I do not estimate any equations for the governance committee. Governance committee
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of Adams and Ferreira (2009) by showing that women are more likely to serve
on the audit commitee and less likely to serve on the compensation committee
than men in my sample during the original sample period. However, the results
from the latter sample period do not adhere to those from the original period. In
the extension period, women are no more or less likely to serve on the audit or
compensation committee than men. I also find that women are more likely to
serve on the nomination committee than men in the latter period.
I estimate the relationship between the probability of service on three impor-
tant committees and the gender of the director. I focus on the audit, compensa-
tion, and nomination committees because they are important committees that are
observable in the data. The audit committee is responsible for determining the
auditor for the firm and setting financial practices at the firm. The compensa-
tion committee is responsible for determining compensation packages for senior
management, including the CEO. The nomination committee is responsible for
identifying potential candidates for the board and making appoinment recommen-
dations for future directors.
I follow Adams and Ferreira (2009) and use linear probability models where
the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the director serves
on a particular committee during the year. The independent variable of interest is
an indicator equal to one if the director is a woman. Control variables include the
proportion of prior years the director has an attendance problem because direc-
tors with attendance problems may be less likely to be appointed for committee
membership is also not included in the calculation of the “Committee Member” variable.
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service. I include the number of other directorships the director has due to the
time constraint of multiple directorship (Ferris et al., 2003). The size of the board
is included because there are only so many committee positions available. The
fraction of independent directors is included to control for the composition of the
board along a key governance dimension. I include the tenure and age of the di-
rector as well to control for the human capital of the director (Posmanick, 2020).
I control for firm size using the natural log of the firm’s net sales. The firm’s
Tobin’s q controls for the financial performance of the firm, and the return on
assets controls for the accounting performance of the firm. Finally, I include
share-return volatility to control for the risk of the firm. All specifications include
firm fixed effects and year dummies. The standard errors are corrected for het-
eroskedasticity, as recommended by Boone et al. (2007). The sample is restricted
to independent directors.
Table 2.5 shows that the results for my estimation are very similar to the re-
sults in Adams and Ferreira (2009). For the 11 variables that I am able to include
in Column 1, I find that 7 estimated coefficients have a confidence interval that in-
cludes the point estimate from Adams and Ferreira (2009). That number increases
to 8 for both Column 2 (audit committee) and Column 3 (compensation commit-
tee), but decreases to 5 for Column 4 (nomination committee). The results are
consistent with the findings of Adams and Ferreira (2009) who show that women
are statistically more likely to be committee members, more likely to be on the au-
dit committee, less likely to be on the compensation committee, and statistically
78
insignificantly more likely to be on the nominating committee, relative to men.8
Table 2.6 shows how the results change in the latter period. Women are still
more likely to hold a committee membership than men. The result that women are
working on committees more frequently than men is consistent with the findings
of Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) who find that women are not simply added for
political reasons. However, in the larger sample women are virtually no more or
less likely than men to sit on either the audit or compensation committee. The es-
timated coefficient for Female on the nomination committee is almost three times
the estimated coefficient for the same committee in the period 1998–2003. The
results are particularly noteworthy given that women are more likely to be inde-
pendent directors and that the New York Stock Exchange passed a rule in 2002
that the audit, nomination, and compensation committees must be composed of
independent directors (Fields and Keys, 2003). The committee results show that
the findings of Adams and Ferreira (2009) do not persist in the latter period.
2.3.2 Women on Boards and Meeting Attendance
Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that women are less likely, than their male coun-
terparts, to have an attendance problem, defined as being present for less than 75%
of the board meetings in the prior year. The authors also find that men are less
likely to have an attendance problem when they serve on boards with a higher
fraction of female directors. I test this phenomenon for persistence using both a
8My result does not find a statistically significant effect for nominating committee service.
However, my point estimate is virtually the same as Adams and Ferreira (2009) (0.019 vs. 0.020).
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probit model with 1-digit industry controls and a linear probability model with
firm fixed effects. I find that women were less likely to have an attendance prob-
lem than men in both periods, but there is less evidence for the effect in the latter
period. I also find that the effect of a higher female percentage on the board was
to lower male attendance problems in the original sample period, but not in the
latter. In all results, I find that the effect of gender is muted in the latter sample
period as shown by a lower point estimate in absolute value for the 2004–2017
sample period compared to the 1996–2003 period.
The specifications include the proportion of prior years a director had atten-
dance problems, the number of other directorships the director held (Ferris et
al., 2003), the size of the board (Lehn et al., 2009), the fraction of independent
directors on the board, the tenure of the director, the age of the director, the nat-
ural log of the firm’s net sales, the Tobin’s q, the ROA, and the volatility of the
firm’s stock price return9. All probit specifications include 1-digit industry and
year effects. All linear probability specifications include firm and year fixed ef-
fects. The standard errors are corrected for potential heteroskedasticity, in concert
with Boone et al. (2007), and observations are restricted to independent direc-
tors. In specifications without firm fixed effects, standard errors are clustered at
the director-by-firm level.
The results in Table 2.8 are strikingly similar to the original results presented
9Unfortunately, the number of board meetings and the fee paid for meeting attendance is not
available in the Compustat data for all years. Therefore, these variables are omitted from the
analysis. Based upon the results, the variable of interest, Female, is not significantly impacted
from the omission.
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in Adams and Ferreira (2009). In fact, of the 10 variables that I was able to include
in the regressions in Column 1, 6 of the 95% confidence intervals for estimated
betas included the Adams and Ferreira (2009) value. The number increases to 9 in
Column 2, and is 6 and 8 in Columns 3 and 4. The results in Table 2.8 show that
my sample, while not entirely the same as Adams and Ferreira (2009), provides
many of the same results for board attendance.
The results for the extended time period are reported in Table 2.9. The results
in Columns 1 and 2 show that women are less likely to have attendance problems
in the longer sample period. However, the effect is somewhat smaller from the
estimated effect in Table 2.9. For instance, the estimated coefficient on Female
from the probit model has decreased from -0.147 in Table 2.9 to -0.085 in Table
2.8. The coefficient on Female from the linear probability model in Column 2 of
Table 2.9 decreased to a statistically insignificant -0.001 from -0.008 in Table 2.8.
The result that women are less likely to have attendance problems remains in the
latter sample, but the effect is muted and may be evidence that women and men
are becoming more similar in their willingness to miss board meetings over time.
The result may also be driven by the fact that so few directors have attendance
problems in the latter period that estimating a differential effect is difficult.
The specifications for Columns 3 and 4 are restricted to only male observa-
tions to estimate the effect that having women on the board has on male director’s
willingness to miss board meetings. In both specifications, the effect of having
a higher proportion of women on the board is to decrease male attendance prob-
lems. However, the estimated coefficients are smaller than those in Table 2.8 and
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those in Adams and Ferreira (2009). In fact, after including firm fixed effects,
my results show that there is not a statistically significant relationship for the full
sample period. It appears that the presence of women on the board has a less
pronounced effect than Adams and Ferreira (2009) find. The fact that the effect
disappears with firm fixed effects may point to the importance of firm culture.
2.3.3 Female Representation and Male Meeting Attendance
Because women have shorter tenures in the sample, it may not be a gender effect
causing the decreased willingness to miss meetings, but a general effect of having
any new director on the board. Adams and Ferreira (2009) test this possibility by
looking at the effect of the fraction of female directors on the tendency to have
an attendance problem for male directors who are not newly appointed. They
also examine the relationship between the fraction of new male directors and the
probability a male director has an attendance problem. Using probit regressions
for the two sample periods, I show that the effect of women on directors is muted
in the latter sample period compared to the 1996–2003 sample. The result fits with
the prior results that found smaller effects for women in the latter sample period.
The specifications include the proportion of prior years a director had atten-
dance problems, the number of other directorships the director held (Ferris et al.,
2003), the size of the board (Lehn et al., 2009), the fraction of independent direc-
tors on the board, the tenure of the director, the age of the director, the natural log
of the firm’s net sales, the Tobin’s q, the ROA, and the volatility of the firm’s stock
price return. All specifications include 1-digit industry dummies and year dum-
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mies. Standard errors are clustered at the director-by-firm level. The standard er-
rors are corrected for potential heteroskedasticity, following Boone et al. (2007),
and observations are restricted to independent directors. In Table 2.11–2.13, in
Columns 2–3 the sample is restricted to men who were not newly appointed. In
Column 4 the sample is restricted to men with prior attendance problems.
Table 2.11 shows that of the 11 variables included in a given column, Column
1 has 7 estimated coefficients whose 95% confidence intervals include the point
estimate from Adams and Ferreira (2009). Columns 2, 3, and 4 have 7, 9, and 10
estimated coefficients whose 95% confidence intervals include the point estimate
from Adams and Ferreira (2009). These results show that the sample I have, while
not exactly the same as Adams and Ferreira (2009), produces similar results for
the closest time period I have to their sample.
However, the results in Table 2.12 paint a different picture from those in Table
2.11 and those in Adams and Ferreira (2009). In Column 1, the estimated coeffi-
cient for Female is about 40% smaller in absolute value than the same estimated
coefficient in Table 11. This result is consistent with the muted effect of women
found in Table 2.9. Further, in Columns 2 and 3, the effect of the fraction of
women on the board on male directors who are not newly appointed is 38% and
74% smaller in absolute value than the same estimated coefficients from Table
2.9. Finally, in Column 4, the estimated effect of having a higher proportion of
women on the board is to increase the likelihood that men with prior attendance
problems will have attendance problems again. This is a stark departure from both
Table 2.11 and Adams and Ferreira (2009) which both show a decreasing effect.
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The estimated coefficients for the fraction of new male directors also changes to
a positive effect in the longer sample period. These results show that the inclu-
sion of female directors or new male directors is not persistently affecting male
director attendance the way that it did in the period 1996–2003.
2.4 Female Representation and Board Decision Making
Adams and Ferreira (2009) also study the decisions that boards make in order to
determine whether boards with more women are acting in a different way than
boards with fewer or no women. The authors show that boards with more women
tend to be more responsive to poor stock performance when deciding to replace
the CEO, which is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach’s (1998) model of CEO
turnover, and board formation and the contention that gender-diverse boards de-
vote more resources to oversight. They also show that boards with more women
tended to be paid in higher proportions with equity-based pay and had higher lev-
els of total director compensation. Finally, the authors present findings that the
CEO is paid with a larger proportion of incentive pay and is paid more overall
with a higher level of female representation on the board. I estimate a similar
series of tests for both the 1996–2003 and 2004–2017 sample periods. The em-
pirical description and discussion of the results are presented in three subsequent
subsections. As in Section 2.3, the period 1996–2003 is used to replicate the sam-
ple period of Adams and Ferreira (2009) as closely as possible and is presented
first. The latter period is used to extend and test for whether their results hold over
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the longer sample period and is presented second. Results for the pooled sample
from 1996–2017 are presented third.
2.4.1 Female Representation and CEO Compensation
Adams and Ferreira (2009) conclude that women on the board do not have an af-
fect on the CEO compensation package. The finding is intuitive given that women
in the original sample period did not tend to serve on the compensation committee.
In the extended sample, women are no less likely to serve on the compensation
committee than men. It may be the case that the CEO compensation package has
responded to increased female representation on the board and on the compen-
sation committee. I follow Adams and Ferreira (2009) by estimating regressions
with firm fixed effects on both the fraction of CEO compensation tied to incentive
pay and the total amount of CEO compensation. I find that female representa-
tion on the board lowers the proportion of incentive pay a CEO receives in the
latter time period, a departure from the findings of Adams and Ferreira (2009).
I also show there is no effect of female representation on total compensation for
the CEO in the latter time period, which is consistent with Adams and Ferreira
(2009).
In Adams and Ferreira (2009), they estimate the effect of female representation
on the natural log transform of CEO incentive pay, where CEO incentive pay is the
proportion of compensation paid to the CEO that is incentive pay. CEO incentive
pay is bounded between 0 and 1. In order to take the natural log transform of CEO
incentive pay, the authors add “a very small number” to all the CEO incentive pay
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where IncentivePay is the proportion of CEO compensation tied to incentive
pay10 I estimate the effect of female representation on incentive pay in Columns 1
and 2 of Tables 2.14 and 2.15.
Adams and Ferreira (2009) also estimate the effect that female representation
has on the natural log of total CEO compensation, given in real 2003 dollars. I es-
timate the same regressions for the natural log of CEO compensation in Columns
3 and 4 of Tables 2.14 and 2.15 using 2017 dollars.
The specifications include the age of the CEO, an indicator for the CEO being
a woman, an indicator for the CEO serving on the board, the CEO tenure, the
board size, the fraction of independent directors, the natural log of the firm’s net
sales, Tobin’s q, ROA, and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. The
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and in specifications without
firm fixed effects the errors are clustered at the firm level.
Based on Table 2.14, many of the coefficients in the regression for CEO in-
centive pay, are similar to the results in Adams and Ferreira (2009). In fact, 8
of the 11 coefficients listed in Column 1 contain the point estimates from Adams
and Ferreira (2009) in their 95% confidence intervals. In Column 2, 6 of the 11
coefficients contain the point estimates from Adams and Ferreira (2009) in their
10I follow Adams and Ferreira (2009) and calculate the proportion of compensation tied to
incentive pay as 1− Salary+BonusTotal CEOCompensation .
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95% confidence intervals. My results from 1996–2003 have point estimates which
show that CEO incentive pay increases with gender diversity.
Table 2.15 shows that in the latter sample period increasing the fraction of
board seats held by women leads to a decrease in CEO incentive pay. Column 2
shows that there is a statistically negative relationship between CEO incentive pay
and the proportion of board seats held by women. The result shows the relation-
ship between female representation on the board and the incentive-based pay used
in CEO compensation has gone from positive to negative.
Table 2.14 also provides in Columns 3 and 4 regression results for the total
level of compensation for the CEO based on female representation on the board.
The results are similar to those in Adams and Ferreira (2009) with 8 of the 11
coefficients having 95% confidence intervals that contain the point estimates from
the original study in Columns 3 and 4.
The results in Columns 3 and 4 for both Table 2.14 and Table 2.15 are con-
sistent with the findings of Adams and Ferreira (2009). The coefficients for the
fraction of women on the board are not statistically different from zero in specifi-
cations with firm fixed effects for either sample period.
Overall, the results show that the fraction of the board seats held by women
is negatively related to CEO incentive pay and not related to total CEO compen-
sation. The result is different from the result in Adams and Ferreira (2009) and
shows that women may not have the same influence over time in the setting of
CEO compensation packages.
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2.4.2 Female Representation and CEO Turnover
Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that firms with a higher fraction of women on
the board are more responsive to poor firm performance when deciding to replace
the CEO. The measure of firm performance is the return on the firm’s shares net
of the return for value-weighted CRSP index in the past twelve months. To test
whether this is true in my sample, I estimate linear probability models with firm
fixed effects for CEO turnover. I estimate the models for the period 1996–2003
and for the period 2004–2017. My results show that boards with more women
in the latter sample period experience more CEO turnover, but the boards are not
more responsive to firm performance. The result is a departure from Adams and
Ferreira (2009).
Adams and Ferreira (2009) include 3 specifications: one specification without
an interaction between the fraction of the board that is female or independent and
firm performance, one specification with an interaction between the fraction of
female directors and firm performance but no interaction between independence
and performance, and one specification with an interaction between the fraction of
female directors and firm performance, as well as firm performance and indepen-
dence. I include an additional specification that only includes an interaction be-
tween performance and independence, but not the proportion of female directors
and performance. I include the additional specification because of the findings of
Weisbach (1988), Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), Wang et al. (2010), and Kaplan
and Minton (2012), which show that independent directors are more responsive to
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poor firm performance when deciding to replace the CEO.
The specifications include the age of the CEO (Wagner et al., 1984), an indi-
cator for the CEO being a woman, an indicator for the CEO serving on the board,
the CEO tenure (Caldwell and Barnett, 1989; Haveman, 1995), the board size,
the fraction of independent directors, the natural log of the firm’s net sales, and
the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All specifications include firm fixed
effects. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
Table 2.17 contains the point estimates for 4 sets of linear probability models
for the sample period 1996–2003. The model reasonably replicates the results of
Adams and Ferreira (2009). 5 out of 10 coefficients in Column 1 have 95% con-
fidence intervals that contain the original point estimates. That number declines
to 5 out of 11 in Column 2 and increases to 7 out of 12 for Column 4. Column 3
does not have a corresponding column in the original study.
In Table 2.17 and Table 2.18 (2004–2017), I do not obtain statistically neg-
ative point estimates between the female-by-performance interactions and CEO
turnover. This is contrary to the results of the initial study. In fact, I obtain statis-
tically insignificant point estimates for the interactions in the full sample period.
However, as opposed to Adams and Ferreira (2009), I find a statistically negative
correlation between the level of female representation and CEO turnover.
2.4.3 Female Representation and Board Equity
In the original study, the authors estimated the effect of female representation on
the corporate board on the compensation packages for the directors. The authors
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study the natural log of equity-based pay for the board and the natural log of total
director compensation for the board. However, I do not have data for these mea-
sures. Instead, I estimate the relationship between the percentage of a firm’s shares
held by the average director and the proportion of board seats held by women us-
ing regressions with industry or firm fixed effects. I estimate the regressions for
both sample periods in order to estimate whether there is a change in the relation-
ship over the time periods. The results show that the fraction of women on the
board does not affect the percentage of shares held by the board.
The specifications include the proportion of the board that is independent, the
natural log of the firm’s net sales, Tobin’s q, ROA, and the volatility of the firm’s
stock price return. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are
clustered at the firm level for specifications without firm fixed effects.
The results from the regressions are presented in Table 2.20 for the sample
period 1996–2003 and in Table 2.21 for the sample period 2004–2017. The
first columns present regressions with industry dummies and the second columns
present regressions with firm fixed effects. The results generally show that women,
despite their increased inclusion on the nomination committee, typically respon-
sible for the compensation packages of the directors, do not affect the percentage
of the shares held by the average director. The result is a bit surprising as Adams
and Ferreira (2009) find that women on the board are associated with an increase
in equity-based pay for the board. On the other hand, Adams et al. (2011) find
that male directors tend to be more share-holder oriented in their decisions than
female directors, which should indicate a negative point estimate on the fraction
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of women on the board. My results do not follow either of the previous studies.
2.5 Female Board Representation and Firm Performance
Finally, Adams and Ferreira (2009) test whether women on corporate boards in-
crease or decrease firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s q and ROA. There
is no theoretical reason why board diversity should unambiguously increase firm
value (Carter et al., 2003; and Gompers et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2007).
Moreover, prior research has found that women may decrease the risk of the de-
cisions of the firm, decreasing the value of the firm (Huang and Kisgen, 2013;
Levi et al., 2014; Faccio et al., 2016). At the same time, Berger et al. (2014)
show that German banks with more women on the board increased risk taking of
the banks’ portfolio. Their results are mirrored by Adams and Funk (2012) and
Adams and Ragunathan (2017). However, the results of Adams and Funk (2012),
Berger et al. (2014), and Adams and Ragunathan (2017), may not generalize to all
directors in the United States as the latter two studies use boards of banks, which
Adams and Kirchmaier (2016) show are different from directors in other sectors,
and the former uses Swedish firms. Further, the performance of the board may
be negatively impacted by conflict generated by increased diversity (Milliken and
Martins, 1996; Pelled et al., 1999; Van Dijk et al., 2012). Adams and Ferreira
(2009) conclude that women on corporate boards lower a firm’s performance us-
ing instrumental variables after showing a positive relationship using OLS. The
authors instrument for the proportion of women on the board by using the propor-
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tion of men who serve on other boards with women, an instrument used in Levi et
al. (2014) as well. I replicate their analysis using two sample periods: 1996–2003
and 2004–2017, as well as a complete sample of both periods.
The specifications include the proportion of women on the board, the size of
the board, the proportion of independent directors on the board, and the natural
log of the firm’s net sales. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and
are clustered at the firm level in specifications without firm fixed effects.
Table 2.23 shows the results of the first-stage estimation using the proportion
of men on a board who serve on another board with women as an instrument for
female representation on the focal firm’s board. The results show that in all three
sample periods the instrument is not weak and positively related to female board
representation for the focal firm.
Table 2.24 displays results from estimating the analyses for Tobin’s q for the
period 1996–2003. Column 1 does not include firm fixed effects. The proportion
of board seats held by women is estimated to be positively related with Tobin’s
q in the regression. However, once firm fixed effects are included in Column 2
the point estimate becomes negative and the point estimate becomes statistically
insignificant. Once female representation is instrumented for in Column 3, the
point estimate stays the same as in Column 2, but the standard error decreases.
The results for all three columns are qualitatively similar to the findings of Adams
and Ferreira (2009).
Table 2.25 displays results from estimating the analyses for Tobin’s q for the
period 2004–2017. The results are now statistical zeroes in every specification.
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The results do not suggest that female representation on boards affects the firm’s
Tobin’s q, which is a departure from Adams and Ferreira (2009).
Table 2.27 displays results from estimating the analyses for ROA for the period
1996–2003. Column 1 does not include firm fixed effects. The proportion of
board seats held by women is estimated to be positively related with ROA in
the regression. However, once firm fixed effects are included in Column 2 the
point estimate becomes statistically insignificant and negative. The result does not
change with the instrumental-variables strategy, but the point estimate becomes
more negative. The results are qualitatively similar to those in Adams and Ferreira
(2009).
Table 2.28 displays results from estimating the analyses for ROA for the pe-
riod 2004–2017. The results for all three estimation strategies show that female
representation is statistically unrelated to ROA. This is a departure from the find-
ings of the prior period and prior study. However, it is a potentially interesting
finding for policy makers who argue for the mandated representation of women
on boards.
2.6 Conclusion
The findings of Adams and Ferreira (2009) have been influential and well cited
in the literature on corporate boards and gender. Because of the influence of their
research, I test whether their findings persist over a longer time period in which
female representation on corporate boards is higher. The results cast doubt on
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the generalizability of the argument that women change the nature of the boards,
either in how they operate or their consequences.
Further work on this topic should include a way to test for the dynamics of
the convergence between men and women with respect to monitoring and corpo-
rate governance. Further work can also look at the cause and effect of increased
representation of women on the nomination committee. Prior work has noted that
male board members do not tend to have networks that include many women. In
a setting where mandates have been considered and implemented, there is policy
relevance to asking whether having women on the nomination committee is a way
to add more women than is otherwise expected.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics (1996–2017)
Mean SD Obs.
Director Characteristics
Female 0.12 - 228,578
Independent 0.82 - 228,578
Attended Less than 75% 0.01 - 228,578
Committee Member 0.72 - 210,749
Audit Member 0.40 - 210,749
Nomination Member 0.36 - 210,749
Compensation Member 0.39 - 210,749
Firm Characteristics
Net Sales (Millions of 2017 Dollars) 7701.69 22,975.75 25,456
ln(sales) 7.68 1.55 25,455
Tobin’s q 2.00 1.59 25,456
ROA 3.44 17.56 25,456
Volatility 0.12 0.06 25,456
Performance 0.02 0.49 25,456
Board Size 9.10 2.42 25,456
Any Women 0.66 - 25,456
One Woman 0.37 - 25,456
CEO Characteristics
Real Compensation (Thousands of 2017 Dollars) 6,202.34 13,530.96 20,559
CEO Incentive Pay 0.59 0.27 20,559
Source: Institutional Shareholder Services (2018a); Institutional Shareholder Services
(2018a); Compustat (2018a); Compustat (2018b); Compustat (2018c); Greene and Smith
(2017); CRSP (2019); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2019)
Notes: Female is an indicator variable equal to one if the director is a woman. Independent is an indicator variable
equal to one if the director is not an employee of the firm. Attend less than 75% is an indicator variable equal to one
if the director did not attend at least 75% of the board meetings in the last year. Committee Member is an indicator
variable equal to one if the director is a member of at least one committee of the Audit Committee, Nomination Com-
mittee, and the Compensation Committee. Net Sales is reported in millions of 2017 dollars. Tobin’s q is calculated as
(BookV alueofAssets−ShareholderEquity+MarketV alueofEquity
BookV alueofAssets
. ROA is the return on assets
for the firm and is calculated as IncomeBeforeExtraordinary Items
Book V alue of Assets
∗ 100. Volatility is measured as the
standard deviation of the stock price return for the prior 60 months. Performance is the stock return for the year net
of the value-weighted CRSP index. Board size reports the number of seats on the board. Any Women is an indica-
tor equal to one if the director serves on a board with at least one woman. One Woman is an indicator equal to one
if the director serves on a board with exactly one woman. Real Compensation is reported in thousands of real 2017





Table 2.2: Tests for Differences in Firm Characteristics (1996–2003)
Mean for Firm-Years Mean for Firm-Years
Characteristic with Women on the Board without Women on the Board P-Value
ln(sales) 8.08 6.76 0.000
Tobin’s q 2.03 2.08 0.289
Return on Assets 3.77 -1.97 0.000
Volatility 0.11 0.16 0.000
Performance 0.02 -0.003 0.069
Board Size 10.30 7.79 0.000
Observations 5,818 4,278 -
Table 2.3: Tests for Differences in Firm Characteristics (2004–2017)
Mean for Firm-Years Mean for Firm-Years
Characteristic with Women on the Board without Women on the Board P-Value
ln(sales) 8.14 6.86 0.000
Tobin’s q 1.96 2.01 0.008
Return on Assets 4.96 4.48 0.009
Volatility 0.10 0.13 0.000
Performance 0.03 0.04 0.230
Board Size 9.60 7.46 0.000
Observations 11,054 4,306 -
Table 2.4: Tests for Differences in Firm Characteristics (1996–2017)
Mean for Firm-Years Mean for Firm-Years
Characteristic with Women on the Board without Women on the Board P-Value
ln(sales) 8.12 6.81 0.000
Tobin’s q 1.98 2.05 0.003
Return on Assets 4.55 1.27 0.000
Volatility 0.10 0.14 0.000
Performance 0.03 0.02 0.162
Board Size 9.85 7.63 0.000
Observations 16,872 8,584 -
Notes: The tables present univariate tests for firms with women on the board versus firms with-
out women on the board using the pooled sample period of 1996–2017. All characteristics
are measured as in Table 1. Tobin’s q is calculated following Adams and Ferreira (2009) as
(BookV alueofAssets−ShareholderEquity+MarketV alueofEquity
BookV alueofAssets
. Return on Assets is
calculated as IncomeBeforeExtraordinary Items
Book V alue of Assets
∗ 100. Volatility is the standard deviation of the
previous 60 months stock returns, including dividends. There are only 4,277 observations without women on the board
for ln(sales) for the period 1996–2003. There are only 8,583 observations without women on the board for ln(sales) in
the full sample period.
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Table 2.5: Gender and Committee Memberships (1998–2003)
Committee Audit Compensation Nomination
Dependent Variable: Membership Committee Committee Committee
Female 0.036*** 0.050*** -0.042*** 0.019
(0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44,355 44,355 44,355 44,355
Number of Companies 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880
Within R-squared 0.016 0.009 0.011 0.023
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.6: Gender and Committee Memberships (2004–2017)
Committee Audit Compensation Nomination
Dependent Variable: Membership Committee Committee Committee
Female 0.046*** -0.014 0.012 0.078***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 112,315 112,315 112,315 112,315
Number of Companies 1,721 1,721 1,721 1,721
Within R-squared 0.056 0.024 0.014 0.017
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.7: Gender and Committee Memberships (1998–2017)
Committee Audit Compensation Nomination
Dependent Variable: Membership Committee Committee Committee
Female 0.044*** 0.001 -0.000 0.065***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 156,670 156,670 156,670 156,670
Number of Companies 2,404 2,404 2,404 2,404
Within R-squared 0.043 0.022 0.015 0.026
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The specifications above are for linear probability models with indicator variables equal to one for committee
service as the dependent variable. The specifications include the proportion of prior years a director had attendance
problems, the number of other directorships the director held, the size of the board, the fraction of independent directors
on the board, the tenure of the director, the age of the director, the natural log of the firm’s net sales, Tobin’s q, ROA,
and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All variables are defined as in Table 2.1. All specifications include firm
fixed effects and year dummies. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and observations are restricted
to independent directors. Tables with full regression results can be found in Appendix V, Tables B3–B5.
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Table 2.8: Probability a Director Has an Attendance Problem (1996–2003)




Fraction Women -0.429** -0.033
(0.184) (0.021)
[-0.029**]
Sample Independent Independent Male Independent Male Independent
Directors Directors Directors Directors
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Industry Firm
Observations 67,162 67,162 59,896 59,974
Number of Companies 2,053 2,053
Within R-squared 0.003 0.003
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.9: Probability a Director Has an Attendance Problem (2004–2017)




Fraction Women -0.284 -0.005
(0.173) (0.007)
[-0.006*]
Sample Independent Independent Male Independent Male Independent
Directors Directors Directors Directors
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Industry Firm
Observations 112,250 112,250 95,299 95,299
Number of Companies 1,721 1,720
Within R-squared 0.002 0.002
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.10: Probability a Director Has an Attendance Problem (1996–2017)




Fraction Women -0.387*** -0.012
(0.127) (0.008)
[-0.015*]
Sample Independent Independent Male Independent Male Independent
Directors Directors Directors Directors
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Industry Firm
Observations 179,412 179,412 155,273 155,273
Number of Companies 2,576 2,575
R-squared 0.007 0.007
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 include probit regression coefficients. Columns 2 and 4 include linear probability model coefficients. The dependent
variable is an indicator equal to one if the director had an attendance problem, defined as attending less than 75% of meetings in a year. The
specifications include the proportion of prior years a director had attendance problems, the number of other directorships the director held,
the size of the board, the fraction of independent directors on the board, the tenure of the director, the age of the director, the natural log of
the firm’s net sales, Tobin’s q, ROA, and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All variables are defined as in Table 2.1. All probit
specifications include 1-digit industry dummies and year dummies. All linear probability specifications include firm fixed effects and year
dummies. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and observations are restricted to independent directors. Brackets contain
the average marginal effects for probit models. In specifications without firm fixed effects, standard errors are clustered at the director-by-firm
level. Full regression results are provided in Appendix V, Tables B6-B8.
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Table 2.11: Women and New Director Effect on Attendance (1996–2003)







Fraction Women -0.445** -0.462** -0.770
(0.184) (0.209) (0.565)
[-0.030**] [-0.031**] [-0.183]
Fraction New Men -0.317* -0.304
(0.174) (0.608)
[-0.021*] [-0.072]
Lagged New Men -0.453**
(0.216)
[-0.031**]
Sample Independent Veteran Veteran Prior Attendance
Directors Directors Directors Problem
Observations 70,771 59,896 43,926 1,787
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.12: Women and New Director Effect on Attendance (2004–2017)







Fraction Women -0.275 -0.120 0.977**
(0.173) (0.182) (0.437)
[-0.006] [-0.002] [0.076**]
Fraction New Men 0.256 1.106*
(0.220) (0.595)
[0.006] [0.086*]
Lagged New Men 0.136
(0.264)
[0.003]
Sample Independent Veteran Veteran Prior Attendance
Directors Directors Directors Problem
Observations 116,807 95,299 83,939 4,438
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.13: Women and New Director Effect on Attendance (1996–2017)







Fraction Women -0.392*** -0.319** 0.132
(0.128) (0.139) (0.361)
[-0.016***] [-0.012**] [0.017]
Fraction New Men -0.109 0.360
(0.139) (0.445)
[-0.004] [0.045]
Lagged New Men -0.211
(0.168)
[-0.008]
Sample Independent Veteran Veteran Prior Attendance
Directors Directors Directors Problem
Observations 187,578 155,273 128,057 6,260
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The above table reports estimated coefficients for probit models. The specifications include the
proportion of prior years a director had attendance problems, the number of other directorships the direc-
tor held, the size of the board, the fraction of independent directors on the board, the tenure of the director,
the age of the director, the natural log of the firm’s net sales, the Tobin’s q, the ROA, and the volatility of
the firm’s stock price return. All variables are measured as in Table 2.1. All specifications include 1-digit
industry dummies and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the director-by-firm level. More-
over, the standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and observations are restricted to independent
directors. In Columns 2–3 the sample is restricted to men who were not newly appointed. In Column 4
the sample is restricted to men with prior attendance problems. Full results are provided in Appendix V,
Tables B9–B11. Brackets contain average marginal effects for probit specifications.
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Table 2.14: CEO Compensation and Female Representation (1996–2003)
Dependent Variable Incentive Pay CEO Compensation
Fraction Female 0.199 0.972** 0.321 0.114
(0.357) (0.445) (0.206) (0.199)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Industry Firm
Observations 7,721 7,721 7,752 7,752
Number of Companies 1,602 1,607
R-squared 0.142 0.036 0.375 0.081
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.15: CEO Compensation and Female Representation (2004–2017)
Dependent Variable Incentive Pay CEO Compensation
Fraction Female 0.103 -0.399* 0.327* 0.195
(0.246) (0.220) (0.178) (0.127)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Industry Firm
Observations 12,786 12,786 12,807 12,807
Number of Companies 1,675 1,676
R-squared 0.178 0.111 0.292 0.073
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.16: CEO Compensation and Female Representation (1996–2017)
Dependent Variable Incentive Pay CEO Compensation
Fraction Female 0.135 -0.264 0.323** 0.061
(0.214) (0.188) (0.144) (0.102)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Industry Firm
Observations 20,507 20,507 20,559 20,559
Number of Companies 2,200 2,204
R-squared 0.191 0.126 0.315 0.071
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 examine the natural log transform of the proportion of
CEO compensation tied to incentive pay calculated as ln( IncentivePay
1−IncentivePay +
0.01). The share of CEO compensation that is incentive pay is calculated as
1− (Salary+Bonus)
TotalCEOCompensation
. Columns 3 and 4 examine the natural log of
total CEO compensation recorded in thousands of 2003 dollars. The specifications
include the age of the CEO, an indicator for the CEO being a woman, an indica-
tor for the CEO serving on the board, the CEO tenure, the board size, the fraction
of independent directors, ln(Sales), Tobin’s q, ROA, and the volatility of the firm’s
stock price return. All variables are measured as in Table 2.1. The standard errors are
corrected for heteroskedasticity and in specifications without firm fixed effects the
errors are clustered at the firm level. Full results are provided in Appendix V, Tables
B12–B14.
102
Table 2.17: Probability of CEO Turnover (1996–2003)
Dependent Variable CEO Turnover
Fraction Female 0.005 0.011 0.004 0.010
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Fraction Female by Performance -0.086 -0.082
(0.066) (0.066)
Fraction Independent -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.252*** -0.252***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067)
Fraction Independent by Performance -0.029 -0.023
(0.048) (0.048)
Share-Return Performance -0.003 0.003 0.019 0.020
(0.006) (0.008) (0.039) (0.039)
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,752 7,752 7,752 7,752
Number of Companies 1,607 1,607 1,607 1,607
R-squared 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.126
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.18: Probability of CEO Turnover (2004–2017)
Dependent Variable CEO Turnover
Fraction Female -0.119** -0.122** -0.119** -0.122**
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Fraction Female by Performance 0.110 0.112
(0.068) (0.069)
Fraction Independent -0.165** -0.164** -0.165** -0.163**
(0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068)
Fraction Independent by Performance 0.001 -0.018
(0.076) (0.079)
Share-Return Performance -0.039*** -0.051*** -0.040 -0.036
(0.007) (0.009) (0.065) (0.066)
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,807 12,807 12,807 12,807
Number of Companies 1,676 1,676 1,676 1,676
R-squared 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.19: Probability of CEO Turnover (1996–2017)
Dependent Variable CEO Turnover
Fraction Female -0.022 -0.020 -0.022 -0.021
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Fraction Female by Performance -0.032 -0.024
(0.049) (0.049)
Fraction Independent -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.153*** -0.153***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Fraction Independent by Performance -0.047 -0.044
(0.040) (0.040)
Share-Return Performance -0.020*** -0.017*** 0.018 0.017
(0.005) (0.006) (0.033) (0.033)
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,559 20,559 20,559 20,559
Number of Companies 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204
R-squared 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table provides the results of linear probability models where an indicator variable equal to
one if the firm experienced CEO turnover for any reason during the year is the dependent variable. All
columns include coefficient estimates from linear probability models for CEO turnover. The specifications
include the age of the CEO, an indicator for the CEO being a woman, an indicator for the CEO serving
on the board, the CEO tenure, the board size, the fraction of independent directors, ln(sales), and the
volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All specifications include firm fixed effects. The standard errors
are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Full results can be found in Appendix V, Tables B15–B17.
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Table 2.20: Percentage of Shares Held (1996–2003)
Fraction Female -0.074 1.114
(1.327) (0.842)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm
Observations 7,966 7,966
Number of Companies 2,054
R-squared 0.097 0.011
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.21: Percentage of Shares Held (2004–2017)
Fraction Female 0.404 -0.228
(0.552) (0.233)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm
Observations 15,358 15,358
Number of Companies 1,720
R-squared 0.173 0.047
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.22: Percentage of Shares Held (1996–2017)
Fraction Female 0.281 -0.056
(0.711) (0.261)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm
Observations 23,324 23,324
Number of Companies 2,576
R-squared 0.134 0.057
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The regression coefficients reported above are for the dependent vari-
able for the percentage of the firm’s shares held by the average director of
the firm. The specifications include the proportion of the board that is in-
dependent, ln(sales), Tobin’s q, ROA, and the volatility of the firm’s stock
price return. All variables are measured as in Table 2.1. The standard er-
rors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the firm level
for specifications without firm fixed effects. Full results can be found in
Appendix V, Tables B18–B20.
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Table 2.23: First-Stage Results
1996–2003 2004–2017 1996–2017
Female Connections 0.076*** 0.110*** 0.100***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
F-Stat 256.81*** 914.02*** 1,391.49***
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The regression results above are first-stage results for the proportion of board seats at the firm held by women. The instrumental
variable is the proportion of men on the board who sit with a woman on another board. The specifications also include board size,
fraction independent, and the natural log of sales. The specifications include firm and year fixed effect. The standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedasticity.
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Table 2.24: Tobin’s q and Female Representation (1996–2003)
OLS FE IV
Fraction Female 0.342*** -0.052 -1.049***
(0.131) (0.119) (0.361)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Firm
Observations 10,095 10,095 9,869
Number of Companies 2,055 1,829
R-squared 0.071 0.090 0.069
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.25: Tobin’s q and Female Representation (2004–2017)
OLS FE IV
Fraction Female 0.087 0.026 -0.067
(0.083) (0.064) (0.136)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Firm
Observations 15,360 15,360 15,268
Number of Companies 1,721 1,630
R-squared 0.108 0.149 0.149
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.26: Tobin’s q and Female Representation (1996–2017)
OLS FE IV
Fraction Female 0.166** -0.069 -0.523***
(0.079) (0.064) (0.138)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Firm
Observations 25,455 25,455 25,258
Number of Companies 2,577 2,381
R-squared 0.087 0.103 0.096
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




The specifications include the proportion of women on the board, the size of the board,
the proportion of independent directors on the board, and ln(sales). Standard errors are
corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the firm level in specifications without
firm fixed effects. Full results may be found in Appendix V, Tables B21–B23.
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Table 2.27: ROA and Female Representation (1996–2003)
OLS FE IV
Fraction Female 12.012*** -2.675 -13.204
(3.473) (3.759) (15.728)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Firm
Observations 10,095 10,095 9,869
Number of Companies 2,055 1,829
R-squared 0.070 0.027 0.026
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.28: ROA and Female Representation (2004–2017)
OLS FE IV
Fraction Female -1.328 -0.774 -2.280
(1.353) (1.525) (4.843)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Firm
Observations 15,360 15,360 15,268
Number of Companies 1,721 1,630
R-squared 0.057 0.065 0.065
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.29: ROA and Female Representation (1996–2017)
OLS FE IV
Fraction Female 2.462 1.403 -3.494
(1.552) (2.095) (5.646)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Firm
Observations 25,455 25,455 25,258
Number of Companies 2,577 2,381
R-squared 0.065 0.036 0.035
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the firm’s ROA. The specifications include the proportion
of women on the board, the size of the board, the proportion of independent directors on the
board, and ln(sales). Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered
at the firm level in specifications without firm fixed effects. Full results may be found in
Appendix V, Tables B24–B26.
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CHAPTER 3
WHEN DOES LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY REDUCE GENDER
WAGE GAPS? (JOINT WITH PETER BLAIR)
3.1 Introduction
At the 126th annual meeting of the American Economic Association, Claudia
Goldin delivered the presidential address titled “A Grand Gender Convergence:
Its Last Chapter.” In the address, Goldin foreshadowed that the final frontier in
gender wage convergence “must involve alterations in the labor market, in par-
ticular changing how jobs are structured and remunerated to enhance temporal
flexibility” (Goldin, 2014). In this paper, we study two aspects of labor-market
flexibility. First, we study the extent to which existing temporal flexibility in the
labor market affects gender wage gaps and gender wage convergence. To study
the effect of temporal flexibility, we study part-time (flexible) and full-time or
over-time (inflexible) work arrangements. Second, we study how state-mandated
policies promoting temporal flexibility in the labor market, notably the Family
and Medical Leave Act (1993) and its antecedents, affected gender wage gaps and
gender wage convergence.
From the literature, there is reason to believe that temporal flexibility that
arises endogenously in the market through firms and workers matching to more
flexible work contracts could have a different impact on wages when compared to
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temporal flexibility that is exogenously supplied through state and federal man-
dates. For example, the work of Antecol et al. (2018) shows that family-friendly
tenure policies at universities produce the unintended consequence of advantaging
men relative to women in the tenure process. An earlier example comes from the
work of Gruber (1994), in which he shows that state laws that “outlawed (insur-
ance companies) treating pregnancy differently from other illnesses” lowered the
wages of women early in their career. These two examples, among many others,
provide motivation for us to provide evidence on the wage impacts of endogenous
versus exogenous temporal flexibility in the labor market.
We use part-time (6–34 hours per week) work as a proxy for flexible work
and full-time (35–40 hours) or over-time (more than 40 hours) work as a proxy
for inflexible work. The supposition that part-time work is potentially more flexi-
ble than full-time is supported by the literature. Goldin (2014) defines workplace
flexibility to include “the number of hours to be worked and also the particular
hours worked, being ‘on call’, providing ‘face time’, being around for clients,
group meetings, and the like.” Moreover, according to Goldin and Katz (2011)
“the costs of workplace flexibility include penalties to labor supply behavior that
is more compatible with having a family. These behaviors include job interrup-
tions, short hours, part-time work during some part of the working life, and work
flexibility during the day [emphasis added].” In addition to part-time work con-
tracting on fewer hours, which allows workers greater flexibility in partitioning
time between paid labor and home production, on the firm side, part-time work
is less regulated than full-time work. There is no legal requirement for employ-
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ers to provide part-time employees with health, vacation, or retirement benefits.
Hence, as indicated by the Goldin hypothesis, we expect to see smaller gender
wage gaps among part-time workers than among full-time or over-time workers,
ceteris paribus.
We start our analysis by looking at the gender wage gaps between part-time
workers to see whether they are indeed smaller than the gender wage gaps faced by
women in full-time work. The existence of smaller gender wage gaps in part-time
work is a natural implication of Goldin (2014). To this end, we use the Current
Population Survey (CPS) to document the part-time and full-time gender wage
gaps over four decades (1975–2015). Most work that considers long-term trends
in gender wage gaps either ignores part-time workers or does not separately con-
sider part-time workers. Two studies that do consider part-time gender wage gaps
Blank (1990) and Hirsch (2005), focus on short and more recent time windows,
1987 and 1995–2002. As shown in Figure 3.1, going back as far as 1975 we find
that the gender wage gap among part-time workers has consistently been smaller
than the gender wage gap among full-time workers. This is a new empirical fact
which persists after we condition on observables, instrument for labor supply us-
ing state-by-year variation in income tax rates, and exclude workers earning the
minimum wage.1 In pointing out the fact that gender wage gaps are smaller among
part-time than full-time workers, we are not saying that part-time work is supe-
rior to full-time work. In fact, wage levels for both men and women are lower in
1Summers (1989) argues that government employer mandates may not be fully capitalized into
wages in the presence of wage rigidities like minimum wage laws.
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part-time work than full-time work. What we are doing is establishing a new fact
about the U.S. labor market.
In the second part of this work we focus on the effect of state-mandated poli-
cies promoting labor market flexibility on both the gender wage gap and the rate
of gender wage convergence. From Figure 3.1, it is evident that there is a break
in the trend from narrowing gender wage gaps to a persistent gender wage gap.
Prior to this trend break, the gender wage gap is decreasing by roughly 1 percent-
age point per year; following the trend break, gender wage convergence stalls.
The finding provides an explanation for a well-known puzzle in economics: “why
did women’s wage growth relative to men stagnate in the 1990s after decades of
growth (Blau and Kahn, 2007)?”
We first establish descriptively that this trend break occurs concurrently with
the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 1993. The FMLA
required large employers (more than 50 employees) to provide 12 weeks of un-
paid leave to workers for family and medical reasons. The federal policy applied
only to workers who worked more than 1,250 hours in the previous year. Follow-
ing Kleven et al. (2013), we fit a piece-wise linear regression model to the data
and show that a trend break in the FMLA year maximizes its explanatory power.
Next, we leverage variation in the timing of state laws that were antecedents to
the FMLA in an event-study design to show that legislation mandating work-place
flexibility benefits also stagnates gender wage convergence.
Taken together, our results suggest that the temporal flexibility that arises nat-
urally in labor markets reduces wage inequality. These results are consistent with
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Goldin (2014) who states that “the explanation [of the residual gender wage gap]
will rely on labor market equilibrium with compensating differentials and endoge-
nous job design.” By contrast state-mandated flexibility policies may be differen-
tially capitalized into the wages of women, slowing the rate of wage convergence
(Gruber, 1994). We estimate that in the absence of the FMLA, white women and
black women would have achieved gender wage parity with white men by 2016
and 2023.
3.2 Literature Review
According to Noonan et al. (2005) and Bertrand et al. (2018), gender differences
in wages among workers in the U.S. are small at the onset of a worker’s career
and that they grow over time. Albrecht et al. (2018) paints a similar picture
for Sweden. The life cycle of gender-wage differences stands in contrast to the
statistical discrimination results of Altonji and Pierret (2001), which shows that
statistical discrimination on race decreases with labor-market experience.
Kleven et al. (2019) provide evidence that a key driver of the gender wage gap
is the “mommy penalty.” Across many different countries, women’s wages fall by
20% following the birth of their first child. Consistent with the “mommy penalty,”
Goldin (2014) argues that preferences for work flexibility can explain these gender
differences in wage via a Rosen (1986), Pitts (2003), and Mas and Pallais (2017)
compensating wage differential story where women who value flexibility pay for
it in lower wages.
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The sorting in the labor market on flexibility occurs on both sides of the labor
market. On the labor supply side, women’s labor force participation is more sensi-
tive than men’s to the availability of affordable childcare (Cortes and Pan, 2019).
Similarly, Altonji and Usui (2007) show that women are more likely to take un-
paid leave from work than men. Correspondingly, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999)
find that women who value flexibility do not sort to firms with high human-capital
requirements, and that firms, weary of workplace interruptions by women, shy
away from hiring women.
On the intensive margin of hours worked, Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) show
that highly competitive work places are unlikely to offer short-hour jobs due to the
signal they send about the workers willingness to respond to financial incentives
to working longer hours.2 Perhaps these responses by firms and workers explain
why Averett and Hotchkiss (1996) find that the full-time wage premium kicks in
earlier for men than for women: 33 hours worked versus 37–39 hours. In one of
the most comprehensive studies of the gender wage gap, Cook et al. (2018) use
the universe of Uber drivers to estimate a gender pay gap of 7%, which is fully
explained by preferences for flexibility, preferences for driving speed, and worker
experience.
An important gap in the literature is an application of what we know about
labor-market flexibility to the study of gender wage gaps among part-time work-
ers. Most work that considers the long-term trends in gender wage gaps either
2Altonji and Paxson (1986) show that firms and employee preferences are important when
setting work hours.
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ignores part-time workers or does not disaggregate wage gaps separately for part-
time and full-time workers. Two studies that do consider part-time gender wage
gaps, Blank (1990) and Hirsch (2005), focus on specific windows of time—1987
and 1995 to 2002. Our paper contributes to the literature by documenting the part-
time gender wage gap and by showing that it has been historically lower than the
full-time gender wage gap. This finding is consistent with the Blank (1990) result
of a larger part-time wage penalty for men than women (35% versus 24%), which
implies a smaller gender wage gap.
A second gap in the literature that our paper addresses is the long standing
puzzle of stagnation in women’s wages during the 1990s. We provide evidence
that the FMLA and it antecedents are responsible for the slow down in gender
wage convergence. The closest paper in the literature to our study regarding the
effects of the FMLA on women’s wages is Waldfogel (1999), which finds no
immediate impact of the FMLA on relative female wages, using a difference-in-
difference estimate. Our results also show no significant change in wages after the
passage of the FMLA, but, because of our larger sample period, we can test for
whether the FMLA affects the rate of gender wage convergence separately from
its immediate effect on the wage level. We find evidence for a reduction in the rate
of gender wage convergence due to the FMLA and similar family leave policies
that passed in several states prior to the FMLA.
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3.3 Data
We use data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the
Current Population Survey (CPS) covering 1975–2015.3 The data set includes
information on total wage income earned during the previous year, usual hours
worked per week during the previous year, and number of weeks worked dur-
ing the previous year, which allows us to construct our key dependent variable—
hourly wages; our key explanatory variable is usual hours worked per week.4 In
our empirical analysis, we use the usual hours worked per week variable to split
our sample by worker employment status, which we partition in three categories:
(i) part-time worker (fewer than 35 hours per week), (ii) full-time worker (35–40
hours per week), and (iii) over-time worker (more than 40 hours per week). In
addition to the wage and employment data, the CPS also reports key demographic
variables including gender, race, occupation, educational attainment, state of res-
idence, etc., which we use for the dual purpose of exploring heterogeneity in our
data and serving as controls in our Mincer regression of wages on employment
status. We restrict our sample to black and white workers aged 18–65 who re-
ported greater than 5 hours worked per week and positive earnings.
We supplement the forty years of CPS data with data from four other sources:
Consumer Price Index data available from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Eco-
3The data are available from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) at the Min-
nesota Population Center (Flood et al., 2017).
4Hours worked per week and total wage income have top-coded values. In the presented anal-
ysis, we do not adjust the data for the top coding. However, based upon additional analysis, the
top-code does not affect the results.
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nomic Database (FRED), O*Net, and the TaxSim9 calculator available from the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (see: Feenberg and Coutts, 1993;
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013). We use the FRED data to adjust
the nominal wages reported in the CPS for inflation, taking 2000 as our base year,
and as a source of state minimum wages over time. From the O*Net database,
we merge in flexibility characteristics of each occupation in the CPS by SOC
code. For example, O*Net reports the extent to which a job has structured versus
unstructured work, which we take as a continuous measure of the occupation’s
flexibility. From TaxSim9, we obtain estimates of the marginal state and federal
tax rates of the individuals in the CPS. We use the tax rates as an instrumental
variable for the labor supply decision.
3.3.1 Summary Statistics
In Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, we report summary statistics of the data for 4
groups: white men, white women, black men, and black women. For each group,
we provide summary statistics for three types of workers based on employment
status: part-time, full-time, and over-time. When compared to full-time workers
and over-time workers, part-time workers tend to be younger and are less likely to
have a college or graduate degree. They also earn lower wages on average.
Using full-time workers as our baseline, part-time workers of the same race
and gender earn between 84% and 91% of the hourly wages of full-time workers.
Overtime workers earn 108% - 116% of the hourly wage of their full-time coun-
terparts. Changing the reference group to be white men of a given employment
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status, we find that part-time white women experience a smaller gender wage gap
than full-time women or over-time women (22% relative to 28% and 24%). We
find a similar pattern in the raw data for black women and black men, with part-
time black women facing a gender wage gap of 29% versus 31% and 32% and
part-time black men facing a racial wage gap of 17% versus 19% and 22% for
full-time and over-time workers.
White men who work part-time have on average 0.42 children compared to
1.17 children for white women working part-time. There are similar patterns for
black men and women who work part-time (0.43 and 1.10 children). The picture
is starkly different for white men who work full-time (1.03 children) and white
women who work full-time (0.97 children). In fact, as white men work more
hours per week, they tend to have more children, on average. However, this is the
exact opposite of the pattern for white women, who tend to have fewer children on
average when they work longer weeks. A similar pattern appears for black men
and women.5
White men tend to be married at greater rates as they work more hours (part-
time white men are married 35% of the time compared to 67% for full-time work-
ing white men and 76% for over-time working white men). This is the exact op-
posite of the pattern for white women (part-time white women are married 64%
of the time compared to a 60% marriage rate for full-time working white women
and a 58% marriage rate for over-time working white women). A similar pattern
5Black women have more children when they work full-time than part-time. However, over-
time working black women have the fewest children among black women workers—a return to
the general pattern.
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is present for black men but not black women. However, these patterns are consis-
tent with an increase in demand for flexibility caused by the increased household
production of married women compared to married men.
3.3.2 Trends in the Data
In Figure 3.2 we present the time-series of raw hourly wages for four demographic
categories of workers: white men, white women, black men, and black women.
The results show that, as men (both white and black) faced increased labor-market
competition from women and changing demands for labor in the part-time and
full-time sector, the wages of men dropped while the wages of women tended to
stay the same, a result consistent with Juhn and Kim (1999). However, in the early
1990s this pattern changed. Specifically, hourly wages of male workers increased
in both the part-time and full-time sectors. At the same time, after experiencing a
stagnation in part-time hourly wages, women began to experience growth in part-
time wages. Finally, over-time working men experienced a growth in their wages
for the first time in our sample in the early 1990s. The timing of these changes is
coincident with a lagged response to labor demand after the passage of the Family
and Medical Leave Act.
In Figure 3.3 we present the time-series of raw wage gaps between part-time
workers of different demographic groups relative to white men and the time-series
of wage gaps between full-time workers of different demographic groups rela-
tive to white men. The results are both stark and important to our hypothesis of
the supply and demand of flexibility in the labor market. The plot of the me-
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dian wage gap between white women and white men in Figure 3.3(a) shows that
white women working part-time have faced wage gaps that were 20–30 percent-
age points smaller than their full-time counterparts, as far back in the data as 1975.
This result is predicted by our hypothesis. Since part-time jobs have a cheaper
supply of flexibility, the wage gaps caused by using flexibility should be smaller
than the wage gaps caused in full-time work, a setting with a relatively more ex-
pensive supply of flexibility, ceteris paribus. The result is also persistent despite
a trend in the data towards gender wage parity between white women and white
men in both the part-time and full-time sectors. Finally, a break in the trend to raw
median wage parity occurred in 1993—coincident with the Family and Medical
Leave Act.
The plot of the median wage gap between black women and white men in
Figure 3.3(b) shows a very similar picture to the plot for white women. As a type
of placebo test, we generate a similar time-series for the wage gaps faced by black
men. In Figure 3.3(c), we do not see the clear pattern of lower wage gaps for black
men relative to white men in part-time work than full-time work. This suggests
that the main effects that we are documenting are due to factors related to gender.
3.4 Empirical Specification
Our goal in this paper is to analyze the theory that gender wage gaps are smaller
for women in part-time work because of the flexibility of part-time work. There-
fore, we segment the data into three hours-worked categories: part-time (less than
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35 hours worked per week), full-time (35–40 hours worked per week), and over-
time (greater than 40 hours worked per week).6 For each segment of the labor
market s—part-time workers, full-time workers, and over-time workers— for each
year t we estimate the following Mincer wage equation
log(wits) = α0t + β1tWWits + β2tBWits + β3tBMits + ~γt · ~Xits + εits. (3.1)
The dependent variable in our specification is the natural log of the implied
real hourly wages (measured in 2000 dollars) for worker i during year t who is
observed to work in labor market segment s; WWits, BWits, and BMits are in-
dicator variables equal to 1 if the individual is a white woman, black woman, or
black man and 0 otherwise; ~Xits is a vector of observable worker characteristics: a
quadratic in age, 3-digit occupational fixed effects, state fixed effects, and dummy
variables for the level of education; εits is the error term. We run the weighted
regressions in Equation 3.1 separately for each year t and for each labor market
segment s.7 In doing so, we are conditioning on both year and work status, which
allows for us to abstract from including time fixed effects in our regression. Run-
ning separate regressions also allows us to have occupation fixed effects that vary
by year and labor market segment.
6This classification of employment status arises from some states categorizing 35 hours of work
as full-time whereas other states use 40 hours as the threshold for full-time work.
7The weighting scheme in the CPS changed in 2014 and the scheme remained changed in
subsequent years. In 2014, the sample was surveyed two different ways and had two different sets
of weights. Since there is not a clear way to choose weights for 2014 given our sample period, we
use all individuals and both sets of weights in that year.
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Our coefficients of interest are β1t and β2t, which represent the percentage
gap in earnings between white or black women and white men in labor market
segment s at time t. In our main results, we plot these coefficients over time to
map out how the gender wage gap differs across labor market segments and how
the difference in the gender wage gap between part-time and full-time workers
has changed over time. For comparison purposes we also report the time-series
for β3t, which is the percentage gap in earnings between black men and white men
in labor market segment s at year t. By comparing whether the racial wage gap
among men resembles the gender wage gap, we can determine whether our results
capture time trends that are common among all groups of non-white male workers
or if the gender wage results that we document are driven by the relationship
between gender, employment flexibility, and wages.
The key threat to identification in our setting is that workers endogenously
sort into their observed labor market segment by choosing how many hours to
work. While our OLS procedure will produce unbiased estimates if this selection
is fully captured by the observed characteristics, it is susceptible to bias arising
from selection on unobserverables. To address selection on unobservables, we use
a selection model presented by Dahl (2002) and instrument for the labor supply
of a given worker, and hence her or his observed labor market segment, using the
average total of the state and federal marginal tax rates faced by other workers of
a similar age, same gender and marital status, and who live in the same resident
state.
The selection model allows for selection into a specific market out of N pos-
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sible markets. In our case, N = 3, part-time, full-time, and over-time. The model
will allow us to correct for the bias of only observing wages in the selected labor-
market segment. We estimate two selection models per year, one for selection
into part-time (versus full-time and over-time), and one for selection into full-
time (versus part-time and over-time). The tax rates are valid instruments due to
our use of pre-tax income and the findings of Deslauriers et al. (2018), who show
that payroll taxes are passed entirely onto workers. Assuming the same is true
for income taxes, the income tax will only affect the pre-tax income through the
choice of hours worked. The first stage of our procedure is










where sigadt is an indicator equal to 1 if the worker i chose to work in labor market
segment s as a worker of marital group g, in age group a, living in state d at time
t; marginal tax−igadt is the mean total of the federal and state marginal tax rates
faced by type g individuals (excluding worker i), in age group a, in state d, and in
year t. The variables Zitk allow for heterogeneity in the labor supply response to
the marginal tax rate by age, gender, marital status and the number of children.
After correcting for selection, the gender wage gaps are ultimately estimated
using
log(wits) = α0t+β1tWWits+β2tBWits+β3tBMits+λits+~γit · ~Xits+εits. (3.3)
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Equation 3.3 differs from Equation 3.1 by the inclusion of λits, which is the selec-
tion correction term.
The labor supply instrument is similar to the labor supply instrument in An-
grist (1991) and Blau and Kahn (2007), who instrument for an individual’s hours
worked using the mean hours worked by similar individuals. Our instrument is
different in two dimensions. First we use the jackknife or leave-out mean, which
reduces the possibility for a mechanical correlation between the individual hours
worked and the average hours worked.8 Second, instead of using average hours
worked to construct our leave-out labor supply IV, we use the average total fed-
eral and state marginal tax rate. This allows us to exploit a different source of
variation—heterogeneity in tax rates—which affects the labor supply decision in
a micro-founded model of labor supply and only affects wages through its effect
on hours worked. Moreover, our IV is interacted with marital status, which has
been shown to cause spouses to respond differently to taxation than single adults
(Isaac, 2018).
3.5 Results
To test whether selection on observables is driving the patterns that we document
in the raw data we estimate Equation 3.1 separately for each year by employment
status and record the estimated wage gap coefficients for women and black men.
In Figure 3.4 and 3.5, we report the estimated coefficients along with 95% confi-
8In large data samples, the effect of this mechanical correlation converges at rate 1N , making
this a minor concern for large N.
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dence intervals for each year for both full-time workers and part-time workers.
Controlling for selection on observables, as shown in Figure 3.4(a), reveals
that the gender wage gap for part-time white women is larger than what we find in
the raw data. For example, in the raw data we observe a part-time gender wage gap
of 12% in 1976, whereas with OLS we estimate a wage gap of 18%. Moreover,
during the entire 40-year period, part-time white women do not achieve wage par-
ity with men, although the raw data suggest this. The estimated wage gaps for
full-time white women, by contrast, look remarkably similar to those in the raw
data throughout the time series. The net effect is that the part-time gender wage
gap is smaller than the full-time gender wage gap by 10–20 percentage points, as
opposed to the apparent 20–30 percentage point gap in the raw data. Moreover,
throughout our sample period, the 95% part-time gender wage gap confidence in-
terval is non-overlapping with that of the full-time gender wage gap. In Figure
3.4(b), we show that the differences between wage gaps for part-time and full-
time workers are significant at the 95% level. Further, we observe gender wage
convergence for both part-time and full-time women until the mid 1990s, after
which there is stagnation in gender wage convergence. Finally, the results for
black women are very similar in patterns and trend to the results for white women
and can be seen, along with all other subsequent results for black women, in Ap-
pendix VI.
As a placebo, we perform the same exercise for black men, to see if selection
on observables is responsible for our failure to find the same pattern for black men
in the raw data as we saw for women. As shown in Figure 3.5(a) we do not find
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that the part-time racial wage gaps for black men are smaller than their full-time
counter parts. Instead, the confidence intervals are overlapping everywhere and in
some cases the part-time point estimates are more negative that the full-time point
estimates. Moreover, the differences between the part-time and full-time gaps are
now insignificant based upon Figure 3.5(b). This suggests that the part-time wage
premium we are observing for women is, in fact, gender-specific.
While the results we have described so far suggest that the part-time gender
wage premium is a persistent phenomenon, we were concerned that selection on
unobservables could be driving our results. We use selection models available
from Dahl (2002) to assuage our concerns.9 In Figure 3.7(a), we report the es-
timated wage gaps for full-time white women and part-time white women. As
before, we observe a part-time gender wage gap which is smaller than the full-
time gap. In fact, we find that women earn more than men in part-time. While the
explanation for the premium is beyond the scope of this paper, we can conclude
from the results that selection on unobservables is not driving the differences in
wage gaps between white women in part-time and full-time work. Finally, we see
a very similar picture for black women.
In Figure 3.7(b), we plot an analogous graph for black men to Figure 3.7(a)
for white women. One noticeable difference in the results for black men is that
we observe much smaller differences between the part-time and full-time racial
wage gaps. Which wage gap is smallest also changes year-to-year. And for some
9We show in Figure 3.6 that part-time work is correlated with the leave-one-out average tax rate
after controlling for the number of children, marital status, occupation, and educational attainment.
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years there is no difference at all between the part-time and full-time wage gaps
between black men and white men. This result stands in contrast to the results for
white women, where we see a clear hierarchy of magnitudes that is both large and
persistent over time in favor of women in part-time work arrangements.
Besides the potential for selection on unobservables, which we address with
our instrumental variables approach, there are other concerns that may affect our
results. Chief among these concerns is the possibility that the minimum wage
truncates the lower end of the wage distribution more heavily for part-time work-
ers than full-time or over-time workers, and that the differential truncation may
mechanically produce smaller gender wage gaps among part-time workers than
among full-time workers (Summers, 1989). To address this concern, we drop
workers earning the minimum wage from our sample and re-estimate our mod-
els.10 The results from the non-minimum wage sample are reported in Appendix
VI (see: the raw median gaps in Figure C1, the estimated wage gaps when con-
trolling for observables in Figure C2 and the differences in the estimated wage
gaps in Figure C3. The key finding is that the original results are robust to this
alternative sampling technique. Therefore, the striking results presented in Sec-
tion 5 are not being driven by the minimum wage, but appear to be driven by the
forces detailed in our hypothesis.
We also test for the appearance of larger wage gaps for workers who may be
identified as high-flexibility workers. To accomplish the test, we look at wage
10We use state minimum wages when available, and federal minimum wages only when state
minimum wages are not available.
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gaps between single white men and married workers, as well as the gap between
single white men and workers who are married with children. In Figure C4, we
present results from a modified version of Equation 3.1. In the modified version,
we include indicator variables for workers who are married or are parents. We also
include interactions between white women, black women, and black men with the
new indicator variables. We find that white women who are married experienced
larger wage gaps relative to single men and married women with children had the
largest wage gaps. The result is predicted by the flexibility hypothesis. We also
use black men as a placebo again, and do not find a similar pattern which, along
with our other results, points to a gender-specific mechanism.
Our last concern is that measurement error in the ASEC may cause our re-
sults because the question in the survey asks for “income last year”, “usual hours
worked per week”, and “weeks worked”. To handle this concern, we use the
Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG), which asks about hours worked last
week and earnings last week. The use of variables for only one week of income
may have less measurement and reporting error than a year’s worth of income
earned at least 3 months prior. Unfortunately, we cannot estimate a selection
model on the MORG data due to the lack of data for tax purposes, but we can
estimate OLS regressions. In C5, we show that the results are not driven by mea-
surement error in the ASEC.
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3.6 Flexibility and the Family and Medical Leave Act
According to usage data, women account for 58% of leave takers under the FMLA
(Tompson and Werner, 1997). The different rates of take-up by gender is un-
surprising given the work of Antecol et al. (2018), that shows the differential
effects of supposedly gender neutral policies. One way to rationalize the slow-
down in gender wage convergence is that the cost of expected leave is capitalized
into wages and hiring decisions, consistent with the findings of Das and Polachek
(2015) and Bana et al. (2018). We provide three pieces of evidence for this hy-
pothesis.
First, we run a linear regression of the gender wage gap on a time trend, where
we allow for a discontinuous change in the slope of the gender wage gap and the
intercept at the FMLA year to see if the break in trend is statistically significant:
wage gapgt = α0g+βgTrend+γgFMLAg+φgFMLAg×Trendgt+εgt. (3.4)
The variable Trend is the year centered around 1993 and FMLAg = 1 if the year
is in the post-FMLA time period. Therefore, the pre-FMLA rate of gender wage
convergence is βg and the post-FMLA rate of gender wage convergence is βg+φg
for group g.
In Table 3.5 we report the results of the regression in Equation 3.4 for white
women, black women, and black men. For each of these groups, we report regres-
sion results for part-time, full-time, and over-time workers. First we notice that
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women experienced shrinking gender wage gaps regardless of employment status.
Prior to 1993, the gains for full-time and over-time women are roughly twice the
size of those for part-time women (0.6% per year versus 1.2% per year) during
this period. Following the passage of the FMLA, the rate of gender wage conver-
gence is close to zero across the board for women. The interaction FMLA*Trend
coefficient is roughly equal in magnitude and opposite in sign to the trend coeffi-
cient. Since the FMLA affects a full-time or over-time working woman’s outside
option, part-time workers also see a stagnation of the rate of convergence (Gruber,
1994).
Moreover, there is a level drop in wages for full-time white women and over-
time black women that is marginally significant at the 10% level. By contrast,
the time trends in the racial wage gap for black men prior to the FMLA range
from 50% to 97% smaller than the corresponding time trends for the gender wage
gaps. Moreover, these pre-trends are only statistically significant for black men in
full-time roles, and even there it is one-sixth the size of the companion time trend
in the gender wage gap for women. The passage of the FMLA does not have a
significant effect on the convergence rate of the racial wage gap among men except
for full-time workers, who experience a shift from a very small positive pre-trend
to a very small negative post-trend. This negative post trend for full-time black
men is also offset by a 3.6 percentage-point increase in wages. The pre-FMLA
and post-FMLA rates of wage convergence are available for all white women and
black men in Figure 3.8.
For full-time workers in all groups, we find that the regression fit is very good.
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The R2 for full-time white women is 0.973, full-time black women 0.927, and
full-time black men is 0.771. The fact that our fit is markedly better for women
than for men is consistent with the FMLA having a stronger effect on the rate
of gender wage convergence than racial wage convergence among men. The fit
for women in over-time roles is also quite good R2 = 0.921 (white women) and
R2 = 0.504 (black women). By contrast, the model has no explanatory power for
black men in over-time roles (R2 = 0.006). For part-time female workers, our
piecewise linear model does not do nearly as well in explaining the time series in
the gender wage gap R2 = 0.623 (white women) and R2 = 0.356 (black women).
The fit is also relatively poor for black men in part-time work (R2 = 0.125), which
itself is much worse than the part-time fit for women. These results are consistent
with the FMLA having a larger policy effect on women than on men, and within
gender having a larger effect on full-time and over-time workers than part-time
workers.
As a back-of-the-envelope calculation, we calculate the total effect on wages
for white women due to the passage of the FMLA. We calculate the costs of the
FMLA as foregone wages using a constant rate of wage convergence following
the rate calculated in Table 3.5, with no convergence after the year where wage
parity is achieved. We calculate total wage gaps experienced for white women





the number of years required for parity. We adjust the calculation to account for
cases where there is not complete convergence in our time period. For part-time
white women, who achieve parity in 2010, we also include five years of wage
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gaps equal to those calculated in 1993. Once we have calculated the total wage
gaps experienced, we convert the wage gaps into annual income using the average
earnings for white men in the labor-market segment multiplied by the average
number of hours women worked in the segment and multiplied by 50 (a full year’s
worth of weeks worked). We find that an average white woman in part-time work
who followed the convergence path paid $24,512 for the FMLA between 1993
and 2015. We also find that the average white woman in full-time work paid
$100,787 and in over-time work she would have paid just under $122,000. These
calculations show that the cost of the FMLA may not be trivial for white women.
While this evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that the workplace regu-
lations imposed by the FMLA retarded female wage growth, it is not dispositive.
We test this hypothesis in two ways. First we alter our model in Equation 3.4 by
moving the break from 1993 to alternative placebo years. We then plot the regres-
sion R2 for each group as a function of the break year. Following the approach
in Kleven et al. (2013), we look for the break year that maximizes the R2 as the
most likely break year in trend for the wage gaps that we estimated. For full-time
women, the R2 is maximized with the break at the FMLA year, which is denoted
by the vertical line in Figure 3.9. For full-time men, R2 is maximized away from
the FMLA year. For part-time workers, the results are less clear because the R2
curve is relatively flat. This is not surprising given that the FMLA predominantly
applied to full-time workers and was taken up differentially by women.
We have a second tool at our disposal to test our hypothesis that government-
imposed, labor-market flexibility contributed to the stagnation in gender wage
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convergence. Twelve states and the District of Columbia enacted maternity leave
laws prior to the FMLA (Table 3.6). Of these states, close to half enacted their
policy in either 1987 or 1988—namely Minnesota, Rhode Island, Maine, Oregon,
Tennessee, and Wisconsin. In Figure 3.10(a) we plot the estimated gender wage
gaps for full-time white women in these states with pre-existing leave laws. We
find a similar pattern to the pattern in the overall data. Prior to the enactment
of these laws we observe a steady reduction in the gender wage gap. In Figure
3.10(b), we show that the R2 for the break in the time trend is also maximized
near the time the FMLA-style laws are passed. In Figures 3.10(c)–(d), we show
that the rate of gender wage convergence is positive and significant prior to the
FMLA-style law, and small and statistically indistinguishable from 0 afterwards.
By comparison, there is no pre or post trend for black men, as was the case with
the actual FMLA.
Not only do we find that a break in the time series at the FMLA year best
explain the data for women, as measured by the R2, but it is also associated with
large significant pre-trends of gender wage convergence across the board, and a
flat post-trend to describe gender wage stagnation. Furthermore, we observe a
similar pattern in gender wage convergence for states that adopted FMLA-style
laws prior to the FMLA. Notably we observe a steady reduction in the gender
wage gap prior to the implementation of the leave policy and a stagnation in the
gender wage gap following the implementation of the policy. The weight of the
evidence points towards a rate of family leave policies in stymieing gender wage
convergence.
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As a thought experiment, we extrapolate the pre-FMLA trends in the gender
wage gap to determine when gender wage parity would have occurred in the ab-
sence of the FMLA. At the time that the FMLA is enacted, the gender wage gap
is given by the constant term in the regression Equation 3.4, and the pre-FMLA
rate of convergence in the gender wage gap is given by the coefficient on trend, βg.
Under a linear extrapolation, white women in part-time work would have achieved
wage parity with white men in 2011, followed by part-time black women in 2012,
then over-time white women in 2013, then over-time black women in 2014, full-
time white women in 2016, and full-time black women in 2023.
In addition to testing for breaks in trend and a placebo test, we also test for the
effect of the FMLA on gender-wage convergence using a difference-in-difference
model. The dependent variable for the model is the wage gap between white men
and a specific demographic group, such as white women. The wage gaps are esti-
mated for young and old workers by year following Equation 3.1 for two groups of
states: those states who passed a maternity-leave law before the FMLA and those
who did not. There are 12 states, including the District of Columbia, that passed
maternity-leave laws before the passage of the FMLA at the federal level. In our
DID specification, these states are used as one of two control groups. The second
control group we use is older workers, which we define as those workers who are
at least 35 years of age. We use the older workers as a control group because it is
unlikely that a woman would have a baby after the age of 35, and therefore would
not be affected by a maternity-leave law such as the FMLA. Finally, we use only
one observation per demographic and state group per year, and omit the passage
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year of the FMLA, 1993, from the estimation.
The DID model is estimated separately for each demographic group and each
hours-worked segment of the economy. The model is given by
Gapats = α0 + β1Trendt + β2FederalOnlys + β3FMLAEnactedt
+ β4Y ounga + β5DIDts + β6DIDY oungats + εats (3.5)
where Gapats is the estimated wage gap for the demographic group of age a in
year t in state group s. Trendt is a simple trend counter centered around 1993, the
year the FMLA was passed. FederalOnlys is an indicator for the experimental
group, the group that is only affected by the FMLA and not a prior state law.
FMLAEnactedt is an indicator equal to one if the year is after 1993. Y ounga
is an indicator if the gap is for young workers. DIDts is the interaction between
Trendt and FMLAEnactedts; it controls for a change in the convergence rate
for all workers after the passage of the FMLA. DIDY oungats is the interaction
between DIDts and Y ounga; it controls for a potential change in convergence
for young workers that may occur after the passage of the FMLA. If the FMLA
is causing gender wage convergence to stall, we should see a negative coefficient
on DIDY oungats that is equal to the prior Trendt coefficient. We should see
the negative coefficient because the workers most likely to bear the cost of the
FMLA are young workers, due to their increased probability of having a child and
using the leave compared to older workers. Moreover, we would expect to see the
negative coefficient only in full-time and over-time wage gaps for women. The
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reason we would not expect to see convergence for part-time women is that the
FMLA is not targeted at part-time workers. Finally, we would not expect to see
the convergence for black men because women tend to make more FMLA claims
than men (Tompson and Werner, 1997). The racial gaps between white men and
black men are used as a placebo test.
The results from estimating the DID specification in Equation 3.5 are given in
Table 3.7. The results show exactly what we would expect to see if the FMLA
were causing the stagnation in gender wage convergence. For white women, we
see that there is a statistically significant negative point estimate for the coefficient
of DIDY oung for full-time and over-time workers. We do not see a statistically
significant negative estimate for part-time white women. The finding confirms our
prior that the effect of FMLA would be concentrated on full-time and over-time
workers. A null hypothesis for β1 + β6 = 0 cannot be rejected for any of the
demographic groups or time segments. The result confirms our prior about the
effect of the FMLA stalling gender wage convergence. We also do not find that
there is a statistically significant effect for workers as a whole, given by the coef-
ficient of DID. The finding confirms our second prior that the effect of FMLA
is concentrated on those who may use the maternity-leave, and therefore bear the
costs of such leave. Finally, we do not see a statistically significant coefficient on
either DID or DIDY oung for black men. The finding confirms our third prior
that men are unlikely to be affected by the FMLA because they are less likely to
use the FMLA than women. The results of the DID estimation confirm that the
FMLA retarded gender wage convergence in the early 1990s.
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These results show that maternity-leave laws and the FMLA were associated
with a stagnation in the gender wage gap—a new and surprising finding. What is
left to explain is how the FMLA may be causing stagnation in different segments
of the economy than we anticipated seeing. The mechanism causing the stagnation
associated with the FMLA may be running through the labor supply and labor
demand for workers in different segments of the economy, as shown by Gruber
(1994).
To further examine the changes in labor supply and demand, we examine the
proportion of workers in a particular labor-market segment by demographic group.
The labor force participation for white men does not appreciably change during
the sample period, which would be expected if the FMLA were mainly affect-
ing women instead of men. The biggest difference is seen in the proportion of
women who are working over-time jobs. For both white and black women, the
proportion of workers who were working over-time was steadily increasing prior
to the passage of the FMLA. However, in the post-FMLA period, the proportion
growth has stagnated. This may be caused by a reluctance of firms to hire women
in the highly-competitive and time-sensitive roles associated with working over-
time due to the increased probability the women would take extended leave from
work. Moreover, the proportion of black men in over-time work stagnated during
this period as well, confounding the starkness of the results for women. Even with
the confounding factor of results for black men, this finding deserves further con-
sideration in future work on flexibility, as well as on work regarding family-leave
policies.
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In addition to a difference-in-difference model, we leverage the full sample of
states that pass pre-FMLA maternity leave laws by using an event study. For our
event study design, we define an event as the implementation of a family leave
policy using the 12 states which implemented family-leave laws prior to 1993 and
the federal law in 1993 for all other states. Therefore, we have 12 events prior to
1993 and a remaining 39 events in 1993.
Our event study estimates derive from a two-stage process, similar to Charles
and Guryan (2008). In the first stage, we obtain gender and racial wage gaps for
each state and year by estimating Equation 3.1 for each labor-market segment.
We keep one observation for each labor-market segment in each state-year. In
our second step, we regress the state wage gaps on event-time indicator variables
ranging from T = −10 to T = 10 and omit T = −1. We do not include additional
state and year controls in the second stage because our first-stage estimates are
obtained using observations in a state-year. We also weight the state wage gaps by
the inverse of the standard error from the first stage in order to have a lower weight
on noisy observations. Our hypothesis is that there will be signs of convergence
before the event and stagnation thereafter.
From our event study design we find qualitatively similar results of conver-
gence before the passage of a maternity-leave law and stagnation thereafter (Fig-
ure 3.11 & 3.12). Quantitatively, the results show that white women in full-time
work experienced 10 percentage points of convergence in the gender wag gap
prior to the passage of a maternity-leave law and no convergence after the law.
Conversely, the results for black men show that they experienced no convergence
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before or after the passage of a maternity-leave law. The results are expected
based on our priors regarding preferences for flexibility.
3.7 Conclusion
The work of Claudia Goldin has presented evidence of the way in which labor
market flexibility impacts wage inequality in the labor market. Inspired by this
work, we set out to see if part-time work was historically more equal than full-
time work. We find that indeed this is the case and that this finding is robust
to different sampling and empirical specifications. Our result is consistent with
Goldin’s finding that women earn less per hour because they work fewer hours
than men (Goldin, 2014). The result is also consistent with theoretical work on
flexibility in the workplace and contract design (Goldin and Katz, 2011; Goldin,
2014). We also document evidence that imposed labor-market flexibility, through
the introduction of family-leave laws, was coincident with the depression of gen-
der wage convergence, which is consistent with prior work (Gruber, 1994). The
key lesson from this work is that flexibility is priced-in to wage and compensa-
tion contracts for workers and firms. Therefore, flexibility that arises due to a
workplace’s environment, culture, and organization can play a constructive role
in reducing gender wage inequality. Flexibility that arises in an occupation due
to government mandates and programs, on the other hand, can have the opposite




Figure 3.1: Estimated Median Gender Wage Gaps (1975–2015)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS.
We report the median gender wage gap between white men and white women in part-time jobs and the median gender wage gap
between white men and white women in full time work.
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Figure 3.2: Median Hourly Wages by Labor-Market Segment (1975–2015)
(a) (b)
(c)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS.
In the figures above we report the raw median hourly wages for white men, white women, black women, and black men for
part-time (a), full-time (b), and (c) over-time workers.
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Figure 3.3: Estimated Raw Median Wage Gaps (1975–2015)
(a) (b)
(c)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS.
In the figures above we have reported the raw median wage gaps between white men and workers from three demographic
categories: (a) white women, (b) black women, and (c) black men (c).
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Figure 3.4: Gender Wage Gap for White Women Controlling for Observables
(a) (b)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS.
In the figures above we have reported the estimated wage gaps from Equation 1 for white women (a) and the difference between the wage gaps using a pooled
sample of all workers in a given year which controls for part-time work (b).
Figure 3.5: Racial Wage Gap for Black Men Controlling for Observables
(a) (b)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS.
In the figures above we have reported the estimated wage gaps from Equation 1 for black men (a) and the difference between the wage gaps using a pooled
sample of all workers in a given year which controls for part-time work (b).
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Figure 3.6: Probability of Working Part-Time (1977–2015)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS and NBER.
In the figures above we have reported the estimated probability of working part-time given the leave-one-out average tax
rate.
Figure 3.7: Gender and Racial Wage Gaps Controlling for Selection 1977–2015
(a) (b)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS and NBER.
In the figures above we have reported the estimated wage gaps from a selection-corrected model following Dahl (2002) for white women (a) and black men
(b).
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Figure 3.8: Estimated Trends in National Wage Gaps
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS.
In the figures above we have reported the trend in the estimated wage gaps estimated with Equation 1. We present the gaps and trend lines for white women in
(a) and black men in (b). We present the trend rates and confidence intervals for white women in (c) and black men in (d).
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Figure 3.9: Testing for Structural Break at FMLA Year (1993)
(a) (b)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS.
In the figures above we have reported the r-squared values for trends in the wage gaps for white women (a) and black men (b). We allow the break year to vary
and record the r-squared values as a placebo test. We find that for women, the r-squared values are maximized in 1993, the year the FMLA is passed. We do
not find a similar pattern for black men. The findings point towards a gender-specific mechanism that is consistent with the flexibility hypothesis.
146
Figure 3.10: Estimated Trends in State Wage Gaps
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS.
In the figure above, we have reported the results of a regression on the estimated wage gaps for the average, controlled white woman and black man using
linear trends. Here, we use a sample of states which passed FMLA-style laws in 1988-89 and caused the change in the trend of the wage gap convergence.
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Figure 3.11: Event Study: Family Leave Policy on White Female Wage Gap
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS.
In the figure above, we have reported the estimated coefficients for an event study for state-year wage gaps between white men and white women in full-time
work. The event time is centered on the passage of the state’s FMLA-style law or the passage of the federal law. We omit t = −1.
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Figure 3.12: Event Study: Family Leave Policy Wage Black Male Wage Gap
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS.
In the figure above, we have reported the estimated coefficients for an event study for state-year wage gaps between white men and black men in full-time
work. The event time is centered on the passage of the state’s FMLA-style law or the passage of the federal law. We omit t = −1.
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for White Men (1975–2015)
Part-time Full-time Over-time
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Employment Characteristics
Hourly Wage (2000 $) 15.45 65.30 18.91 18.09 21.13 20.35
Hours Worked Per Week 23.04 6.92 39.71 1.10 52.77 9.18
Educational Characteristics
Less than High School 0.24 0.43 0.31 0.46 0.21 0.40
High School 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.42 0.18 0.39
Some College 0.34 0.47 0.22 0.42 0.22 0.42
College Degree 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.37 0.23 0.42
Post Graduate 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.16 0.37
Personal Characteristics
Age 32.30 14.88 38.14 12.05 39.49 11.02
Children 0.42 0.92 1.03 1.23 1.20 1.26
Married 0.35 0.48 0.67 0.47 0.76 0.43
Flexibility Characteristics
Level of Competition 49.82 9.67 51.73 8.71 53.68 9.31
Time Pressure 68.83 10.77 72.24 6.89 72.25 6.45
Duration of Workweek 58.49 17.47 66.05 14.03 70.14 13.73
Structured vs. Unstructured 27.63 7.87 26.15 7.74 22.73 8.58
N 95782 753606 445254
Source: ASEC Supplement of the CPS available through IPUMS, O*Net, FRED
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for White Women (1975–2015)
(1) (2) (3)
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Employment Characteristics
Hourly Wage (2000 $) 12.35 19.30 13.79 20.17 16.00 15.08
Hours Worked per Week 22.44 7.13 39.31 1.59 50.86 8.38
Education Characteristics
Less than High School 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.44 0.14 0.35
High School 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.16 0.36
Some College 0.32 0.47 0.27 0.44 0.23 0.42
College Degree 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39 0.27 0.45
Post Graduate 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27 0.20 0.40
Personal Characteristics
Age 36.66 13.00 38.15 11.91 39.62 11.15
Children 1.17 1.24 0.97 1.12 0.87 1.08
Married 0.64 0.48 0.60 0.49 0.58 0.49
Flexibility Characteristics
Level of Competition 47.77 9.44 48.23 9.26 51.06 9.91
Time Pressure 66.73 11.94 71.17 8.68 71.04 7.89
Duration of Workweek 53.24 16.32 58.98 15.22 66.03 15.23
Structured vs. unstructured 24.70 7.60 23.22 7.17 20.72 6.86
N 273986 675870 164363
Source: ASEC Supplement of the CPS available through IPUMS, O*Net, FRED
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics for Black Men (1975–2015)
(1) (2) (3)
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Employment Characteristics
Hourly Wage (2000 $) 12.89 42.16 15.31 15.66 16.61 17.57
Hours Worked per Week 23.28 6.73 39.67 1.17 53.33 9.61
Educational Characteristics
Less than High School 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.22 0.41
High School 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.23 0.42
Some College 0.31 0.46 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44
College Degree 0.08 0.28 0.12 0.33 0.18 0.39
Post Graduate 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.21 0.11 0.31
Personal Characteristics
Age 32.26 13.89 38.38 11.91 39.27 10.99
Children 0.43 1.00 0.91 1.28 1.00 1.28
Married 0.25 0.43 0.53 0.50 0.59 0.49
Flexibility Characteristics
Level of Competition 48.23 9.38 48.82 8.32 50.38 9.20
Time Pressure 69.04 10.77 72.00 7.28 72.09 6.98
Duration of Workweek 57.05 17.70 62.45 14.84 65.30 14.92
Structured vs. Unstructured 28.63 7.06 27.64 7.21 25.59 8.51
N 12356 88641 23927
Source: ASEC Supplement of the CPS available through IPUMS, O*Net, FRED
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for Black Women (1975–2015)
(1) (2) (3)
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Employment Characteristics
Hourly Wage (2000 $) 10.54 16.85 13.18 15.94 14.39 13.23
Hours Worked per Week 23.13 6.94 39.38 1.52 52.38 9.25
Education Characteristics
Less than High School 0.33 0.47 0.24 0.43 0.15 0.36
High School 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.18 0.39
Some College 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45
College Degree 0.09 0.28 0.15 0.36 0.22 0.41
Post Graduate 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.25 0.16 0.37
Personal Characteristics
Age 35.94 13.94 38.29 11.48 39.37 10.96
Children 1.10 1.33 1.15 1.24 1.00 1.20
Married 0.32 0.47 0.39 0.49 0.36 0.48
Flexibility Characteristics
Level of Competition 46.44 8.80 46.96 8.56 49.41 9.46
Time Pressure 66.63 11.50 71.06 8.36 71.06 7.98
Duration of Workweek 50.99 15.77 57.13 15.01 62.30 15.92
Structured vs. Unstructured 26.17 6.85 24.58 7.04 22.48 7.22
N 26617 111827 14967




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































New Jersey 1990 1990
Washington, DC 1991 1991
Vermont 1992 1992
Source: Waldfogel (1999)
For the purposes of our event study, all states not listed in this table have an event
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I Appendix of Chapter 1: Data-Matching
The data I use for analysis in this paper are composed of several data sources. The
director data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, available from
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). In order to merge the director data
with financial data from the firms, I use data available from Coles et al. (2014).
The Coles et al. (2014) data are matched to the director data following the direc-
tions listed on Lalitha Naveen’s webpage https://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/.
Once the data are matched to the Coles et al. (2014) data, I can merge the
director data to financial data and CEO data. Data on the returns on assets and
CEO data are merged based on the year of observation of the meeting date. For
instance, if the annual meeting took place on December 31, 2007, the year would
be considered 2007 and the match would take place accordingly. Compustat data
are organized by fiscal years. In order to merge the Compustat data, I use the
observation for the first fiscal year that ends after the annual meeting occurred. For
instance, if the annual meeting took place on December 31, 2007 and the fiscal
year ended on January 31, 2008, I would match these two sets of observations
together. The CRSP data are recorded by month. The CRSP data are matched
based on the month and year of the end of the fiscal year. For instance, if the fiscal
year ended on December 31, 2007, I would match the observation with CRSP data
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from December, 2007.
II Appendix of Chapter 1: Director-Identification
The director ID that I use for director fixed effects is the same director ID created
by Coles et al. (2014). I use the Coles et al. (2014) director ID because the
Institutional Shareholder Services ID is not consistent before or after the year
2007, when RiskMetrics, the original purveyor of the data, was purchased by
Institutional Shareholder Services. Coles et al. (2014) correct the director ID
for the change. However, the Coles et al. (2014) data do not include the years
2015–2017. Therefore, I follow their methodology and use the Director Detail ID
variable provided by Institutional Shareholder Services to provide the directors
with a consistent ID for those years.
There are about 26,000 different director IDs in the final data set. The director
IDs are based on the individual director and not the firm the director sits on. For
instance, if a board member sits on several boards, he has the same director ID
for each observation. I have checked the first 300 director IDs, comprising more
than 5,000 observations, and have found that a particular director ID value has not
been linked to multiple directors using name matching. When cleaning the indi-
cator variable for a female board member, I found two instances where different
directors had the same director ID. I correct the two director IDs and describe the
correction in Appendix III. Further, I found that several board members had the
same director ID for the years 2015–2017 that they had prior. The finding for the
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years 2015–2017 provides evidence that the director ID expansion was successful.
III Appendix of Chapter 1: Data Cleaning
A review of the director data shows a few observations that have subsequently
been cleaned. The cleaning involved the variables for the director’s tenure, age,
and gender.
The first variable I update is for director tenure. In 1999, James Ganley served
on the board of Family Golf Centers. He is incorrectly listed as joining the board
in 1905 instead of 1994, as identified by SEC filings. I update the director tenure
variable for this error. There are also 575 observations where the tenure value in
year t is less than that for year t − 1 for a given director. Most of these are due
to inconsistent recording of the year the director joined the board. I correct the
variable so that the tenure level increases by 1 year above the tenure level in year
t− 1.
The second variable I update is for the director’s age. Several observations
are listed with ages in the single digits and one observation is listed as 2015. I
use the age of the board members in subsequent years to correct the variable. For
instance, and with apologies to Mary Malone, she was incorrectly listed in 1996.
I use her age in 1997, 47 years of age, to correct the variable for 1996 to 46 years
of age. There are two directors who have two observations each in the data set.
Both observations occur in subsequent years and consistently list their age in the
single digits. These observations are not updated.
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The last variable I update is the indicator for the gender of the board members.
There are numerous instances where the gender of a board member is inconsis-
tently recorded. I identify the inconsistently-recorded observations and use the
board member’s name or news articles about the board member to consistently
record their gender.
IV Appendix of Chapter 1: Alternative Specifications
Table A1: Tests for Firm Differences By Median Tenure Level
Characteristic Below Median Boards Above Median Boards P-Value
Market-to-Book Ratio 2.00 2.01 0.614
Return on Assets 2.23 4.50 0.000
CEO Compensation 6,727.73 5,748.46 0.000
CEO Incentive Pay 0.62 0.57 0.000
CEO Turnover 0.091 0.087 0.268
Observations 11,787 13,640 -
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, CRSP, and Greene and Smith (2017).
All characteristics are measured as in Table 1. The level of observation is a firm-year. Market-to-Book Ratio is calculated follow-
ing Adams and Ferreira (2009) as Book V alue of Assets−Shareholder Equity+Market V alue of Equity
Book V alue of Assets
.
Return on Assets is calculated as IncomeBeforeExtraordinary Items
Book V alue of Assets
∗ 100. Due to data limitations for CEO data,
there are only 9,452 observations for CEO outcomes for first-quintile firms; for fifth-quintile firms, there are 11,094 CEO observa-
tions. CEO Compensation is real total CEO compensation recorded in 1000s of 2003 dollars and is taken from Greene and Smith
(2017). CEO Incentive Pay is calculated following Adams and Ferreira (2009) as 1 − Salary+Bonus
Total CEO Compensation
. CEO
Turnover is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is observed for the last time in the data set but the firm is observed in
subsequent years.
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Table A2: Tests for Firm Differences By Coefficient of Variation for Board Tenure
Characteristic Below Median Boards Above Median Boards P-Value
Market-to-Book Ratio 2.07 1.93 0.000
Return on Assets 3.29 3.61 0.152
CEO Compensation 6,141.74 6,255.45 0.547
CEO Incentive Pay 0.59 0.58 0.024
CEO Turnover 0.086 0.092 0.177
Observations 12,709 12,718 -
Notes: Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, CRSP, and Greene and Smith (2017).
All characteristics are measured as in Table 1. The level of observation is a firm-year. Market-to-Book Ratio is calculated follow-
ing Adams and Ferreira (2009) as Book V alue of Assets−Shareholder Equity+Market V alue of Equity
Book V alue of Assets
.
Return on Assets is calculated as IncomeBeforeExtraordinary Items
Book V alue of Assets
∗ 100. Due to data limitations for CEO data,
there are only 10,206 observations for CEO outcomes for first-quintile firms; for fifth-quintile firms, there are 10,340 CEO ob-
servations. CEO Compensation is real total CEO compensation recorded in 1000s of 2003 dollars and is taken from Greene and
Smith (2017). CEO Incentive Pay is calculated following Adams and Ferreira (2009) as 1− Salary+Bonus
Total CEO Compensation
.
CEO Turnover is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is observed for the last time in the data set but the firm is observed
in subsequent years.
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Table A3: Director Tenure and Committee Membership
Any Audit Compensation Nomination
Dependent Variable: Committee Committee Committee Committee
ln(Director Tenure) 0.008*** -0.014*** 0.040*** 0.055***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Median Board Tenure -0.002*** 0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Proportion of Prior Attendance Problems 0.053** 0.025 0.037 0.049
(0.023) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Outisde Board Seats 0.004*** 0.001 0.006** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Board Size -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fraction Independent -0.107*** -0.353*** -0.279*** 0.051
(0.019) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
ln(sales) 0.000 0.012*** -0.018*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.000 0.003** -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Return on Assets -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share-Return Volatility -0.078** 0.070 0.022 -0.269***
(0.039) (0.062) (0.065) (0.065)
Sarbanes-Oxley 0.029*** -0.080*** 0.035** 0.224***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Constant 1.028*** 0.845*** 0.943*** 0.391***
(0.024) (0.039) (0.040) (0.042)
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Director Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 166,471 166,471 166,471 166,471
Number of Directors 22,658 22,658 22,658 22,658
F-Stat 57.06*** 65.13*** 58.71*** 82.68***
R-squared 0.033 0.032 0.030 0.049
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between director tenure and committee membership.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured as in Table 1. The level of
observation is the board member. Directors who were not independent were excluded from the sample. In column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator
equal to one if the board member sits on at least one of the audit, compensation, or nominating committee. In columns 2–4, the dependent variable is an
indicator equal to one if the board member sits on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee. Committee membership is only available in the data from
1998–2017. ln(Director Tenure) is the natural log of director tenure. Median Board Tenure is included to control for the tenure of the rest of the board and is
included because there may be competition for committee placement. Proportion of prior attendance problems is the proportion of observed years the board
member served with attendance problems. All four columns report estimated coefficients from linear probability models with director and year fixed effects.
The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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Table A4: Outside Director Tenure and Committee Membership
Any Audit Compensation Nomination
Dependent Variable: Committee Committee Committee Committee
ln(Inside Director Tenure) 0.002 -0.021*** 0.038*** 0.060***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ln(Outside Director Tenure) 0.025*** 0.014** 0.028*** 0.010*
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Median Board Tenure -0.002*** 0.002* -0.003** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Proportion of Prior Attendance Problems 0.068** -0.005 0.057 0.070*
(0.031) (0.041) (0.043) (0.041)
Outside Board Seats -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 0.009**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Board Size -0.010*** -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.012***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fraction Independent -0.117*** -0.409*** -0.293*** 0.060
(0.030) (0.056) (0.055) (0.053)
ln(sales) 0.003 0.018*** -0.016*** -0.010*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.001 0.005* -0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Return on Assets -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share-Return Volatility -0.183*** -0.054 -0.035 -0.272**
(0.065) (0.100) (0.104) (0.107)
Sarbanes-Oxley -0.028* -0.158*** -0.021 0.195***
(0.015) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029)
Constant 1.082*** 0.914*** 1.038*** 0.429***
(0.037) (0.061) (0.063) (0.065)
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Director Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 52,823 52,823 52,823 52,823
Number of Directors 5,028 5,028 5,028 5,028
F-Stat 38.76*** 24.72*** 28.81*** 27.78***
R-squared 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.036
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between outside director tenure and committee membership.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured as in Table 1. The level of
observation is the board member. Directors who were not independent were excluded from the sample. In column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator
equal to one if the board member sits on at least one of the audit, compensation, or nominating committee. In columns 2–4, the dependent variable is an
indicator equal to one if the board member sits on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee. Committee membership is only available in the data from
1998–2017. ln(Inside Director Tenure) is the natural log of inside director tenure. lnOutside Director Tenure is defined as natural log of the total amount of




(DirectorTenurebt) − DirectorTenure1t , where b indexes the boards the director sat on in year t, B is the total number of boards
the director sat on in year t, and b = 1 is always considered the board in question. If B = 1 then the formula for outside director tenure yields zero.
Median Board Tenure is included to control for the tenure of the rest of the board and is included because there may be competition for committee placement.
Proportion of prior attendance problems is the proportion of observed years the board member served with attendance problems. All four columns report
estimated coefficients from linear probability models with director and year fixed effects. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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Table A5: Board Tenure and Refiled Financial Statements
Accounting Fraudulent Clerical Error Adverse
Dependent Variable: Restatement Restatement Restatement Restatement
Median Board Tenure 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Median Board Tenure2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CV of Board Tenure 0.001 0.004*** 0.000 0.009
(0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
Fraction Female -0.003 -0.008 0.001 -0.008
(0.031) (0.006) (0.006) (0.030)
Fraction Independent 0.115*** -0.006 -0.003 0.088***
(0.026) (0.005) (0.007) (0.026)
Board Size -0.002* -0.000 0.000 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ln(sales) 0.015*** 0.001 -0.000 0.013***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.001 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Return on Assets -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share-Return Performance -0.006 -0.001 0.001* -0.004
(0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
Constant -0.130*** -0.004 0.009 -0.106***
(0.039) (0.007) (0.009) (0.038)
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,793 22,793 22,793 22,793
Number of Firms 2,557 2,557 2,557 2,557
F-Stat 6.72*** 1.27 1.00 4.81***
Within R-squared 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.003
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and accounting restatements.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, CRSP, and Audit Analytics. All characteristics are
measured as in Table 1. The level of observation is the firm. The first column’s dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a
firm has accounting statement refiled in subsequent years. The second column’s dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if
the restatement was due to fraud. The third column’s dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the restatement was due to a clerical
error. The fourth column’s dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the restatement adversely affected the statement. All
four columns report estimated coefficients from linear probability models with firms and year fixed effects. The first column uses a sample
of every firm year. The last three columns only include observations for firms that had a restatement. The standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity.
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Table A6: Board Tenure and Refiled Financial Statements
Accounting Fraudulent Clerical Error Adverse
Dependent Variable: Restatement Restatement Restatement Restatement
ln(Median Board Tenure) 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.006*
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
CV of Board Tenure -0.001 0.004*** 0.000 0.007
(0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
Fraction Female 0.000 -0.008 0.001 -0.005
(0.031) (0.006) (0.006) (0.030)
Fraction Independent 0.115*** -0.007 -0.003 0.088***
(0.026) (0.005) (0.007) (0.026)
Board Size -0.002* -0.000 0.000 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ln(sales) 0.015*** 0.001 -0.000 0.012**
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.001 0.000 -0.001** -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Return on Assets -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share-Return Performance -0.006 -0.001 0.001* -0.004
(0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
Constant -0.124*** -0.005 0.010 -0.102***
(0.039) (0.007) (0.009) (0.038)
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,754 22,754 22,754 22,754
Number of Firms 2,555 2,555 2,555 2,555
F-Stat 7.41*** 1.36 0.94 5.20***
Within R-squared 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.002
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and accounting restatements.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, CRSP, and Audit Analytics. All characteristics are
measured as in Table 1. The level of observation is the firm. The first column’s dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a
firm has accounting statement refiled in subsequent years. The second column’s dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if
the restatement was due to fraud. The third column’s dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the restatement was due to a clerical
error. The fourth column’s dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the restatement adversely affected the statement. All
four columns report estimated coefficients from linear probability models with firms and year fixed effects. The first column uses a sample
of every firm year. The last three columns only include observations for firms that had a restatement. The standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity.
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Table A7: Board Tenure and Appointments
Independent Female Age Black
Dependent Variable: Appointments Appointments of Appointments Appointments
Lagged Median Board Tenure -0.001 -0.007 -0.049 -0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.120) (0.003)
Lagged Median Board Tenure2 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Lagged CV of Board Tenure -0.003 -0.012 0.351 0.004
(0.021) (0.033) (0.618) (0.015)
ln(CEO Tenure) -0.022** -0.017 -0.441* 0.006
(0.009) (0.012) (0.234) (0.007)
CEO Age -0.007*** -0.000 0.037 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.039) (0.001)
Female CEO 0.003 -0.065 0.030 0.026
(0.039) (0.066) (0.990) (0.029)
CEO Director -0.017 0.040 0.726 -0.025
(0.040) (0.073) (1.070) (0.039)
Lagged Board Size -0.008* 0.007 -0.134 0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.117) (0.004)
Lagged Fraction Independent -0.228* -0.089 -4.275 -0.028
(0.118) (0.151) (2.967) (0.074)
ln(Logged Sales) 0.025 0.061** -0.497 0.019
(0.017) (0.028) (0.592) (0.018)
Lagged Market-to-Book Ratio -0.001 0.021* -0.061 0.008
(0.006) (0.011) (0.174) (0.007)
Lagged Return on Assets -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.025) (0.000)
Lagged Share-Return Volatility 0.224 0.076 0.482 -0.120
(0.187) (0.344) (5.914) (0.170)
Lagged Share-Return Performance 0.008 0.011 0.158 -0.003
(0.013) (0.019) (0.411) (0.012)
Sarbanes-Oxley 0.185*** 0.156 5.233*** 0.010
(0.047) (0.096) (1.554) (0.045)
Constant 1.294*** -0.412 60.057*** -0.068
(0.200) (0.286) (5.429) (0.170)
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,413 3,413 3,404 3,413
Number of Firms 1,315 1,315 1,314 1,315
F-Stat 3.14*** 2.05*** 2.88*** 1.37*
R-squared 0.054 0.027 0.042 0.017
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and the proportion of appointments in a year that are independent, the proportion of appointments in a year that are
female, the average age of appointments, and the proportion of appointments in a year that are white.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured as in Table 1 and lagged values
are lagged by one year. The level of observation is the firm-year. All specifications include year and firm fixed effects. The dependent variable in column 1 is
the proportion of appointments to the board in a year that are independent. The dependent variable in column 2 is the proportion of appointments to the board
that are women. The dependent variable in table is the average age of appointments to the board. The dependent variable in column 4 is the proportion of
appointments to the board that are white. The proportion of appointments that are white is based on whether the appointment’s ethnicity is listed as Caucasian
or unknown. Median Board Tenure is the median length of tenure on the compensation committee andMedianBoardTenure2 is the square of median
length of tenure. ln(CEO Tenure) is the natural log of CEO Tenure. CEO Age is the age of the CEO. Female CEO is the indicator equal to one if the CEO is
a woman. CEO Director is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO served on the board as well. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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Table A8: Board Tenure and Appointments
Independent Female Age Black
Dependent Variable: Appointments Appointments of Appointments Appointments
ln(Lagged Median Board Tenure) 0.010 -0.000 0.261 -0.006
(0.011) (0.017) (0.337) (0.009)
Lagged CV of Board Tenure -0.004 -0.016 0.412 0.005
(0.021) (0.033) (0.621) (0.015)
ln(CEO Tenure) -0.021** -0.017 -0.439* 0.006
(0.009) (0.012) (0.234) (0.007)
CEO Age -0.007*** -0.000 0.040 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.039) (0.001)
Female CEO 0.006 -0.061 -0.036 0.026
(0.039) (0.066) (1.005) (0.029)
CEO Director -0.016 0.042 0.780 -0.026
(0.040) (0.073) (1.073) (0.039)
Lagged Fraction Independent -0.223* -0.083 -4.342 -0.028
(0.118) (0.152) (2.962) (0.074)
Lagged Board Size -0.008* 0.007 -0.142 0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.117) (0.004)
ln(Lagged Sales) 0.025 0.060** -0.496 0.019
(0.017) (0.028) (0.601) (0.018)
Lagged Market-to-Book Ratio -0.001 0.020* -0.023 0.009
(0.006) (0.011) (0.171) (0.007)
Lagged Return on Assets -0.000 0.000 -0.024 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.023) (0.000)
Lagged Share-Return Volatility 0.246 0.111 -0.736 -0.124
(0.187) (0.347) (5.918) (0.171)
Lagged Share-Return Performance 0.008 0.010 0.161 -0.003
(0.013) (0.019) (0.412) (0.012)
Sarbanes-Oxley 0.182*** 0.152 5.096*** 0.009
(0.046) (0.096) (1.552) (0.045)
Constant 1.278*** -0.426 59.564*** -0.066
(0.200) (0.288) (5.480) (0.170)
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,410 3,410 3,401 3,410
Number of Firms 1,314 1,314 1,313 1,314
F-Stat 3.20*** 2.03*** 2.98*** 1.40*
Within R-squared 0.054 0.026 0.042 0.017
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and the proportion of appointments in a year that are independent, the proportion of appointments in a year that are
female, the average age of appointments, and the proportion of appointments in a year that are white.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured as in Table 1 and lagged values
are lagged by one year. The level of observation is the firm-year. All specifications include year and firm fixed effects. The dependent variable in column 1 is
the proportion of appointments to the board in a year that are independent. The dependent variable in column 2 is the proportion of appointments to the board
that are women. The dependent variable in table is the average age of appointments to the board. The dependent variable in column 4 is the proportion of
appointments to the board that are white. The proportion of appointments that are white is based on whether the appointment’s ethnicity is listed as Caucasian
or unknown. ln(Median Board Tenure) and ln(CEO Tenure) are the natural log of Median Board Tenure and CEO Tenure. CEO Age is the age of the CEO.
Female CEO is the indicator equal to one if the CEO is a woman. CEO Director is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO served on the board as well.
The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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Table A9: First Stage Results for the Median and Coefficient of Variation of Board
Tenure
Dependent Variable: ln(Median Board Tenure) ln(CV of Board Tenure)
ln(Outside Median Tenure) 0.115*** -0.019***
(0.013) (0.006)
Outside CV of Tenure 0.038 0.011
(0.025) (0.011)
Fraction Female -0.272*** 0.156***
(0.064) (0.028)
Fraction Independent -0.34*** 0.077***
(0.061) (0.026)





Centered R-squared 0.045 0.0533
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes
Observations 20,853 20,853
Number of Companies 2,068 2,068
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: First-stage results for median and coefficient of variation of board tenure.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics
are measured as in Table 1. The level of observation is the firm-year. All specifications include year and firm fixed
effects. Median Board Tenure is the median level of tenure on the board. CV of Board Tenure is the coefficient of
variation of board tenure. Outside Median Tenure is the average median board tenure of outside boards that a firm’s
board members sit on. Outside CV of Tenure is the average coefficient of variation of board tenure of outside boards
that a firm’s board members sit on. If the firm did not have any outside board members that were on an outside
board, the firm is omitted from the estimation. The F-Stat is the statistic from an F-test for joint significance of the
instruments. The values are statistically significant and above or near 10 indicating that the instruments are not weak
instruments. A Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic for underidentification is equal to 3.54 with a p-value equal to 0.06.
The result is to reject the null hypothesis of underidentification at the 10 percent level. A Kleibergern-Paap rk Wald
F Statistics is equal to 1.77 and indicates that the instruments are not weak. The standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity.
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Table A10: Board Tenure and Market-to-Book Ratio
Dependent Variable: ln(Market-to-Book Ratio) OLS Firm Fixed Effects IV
ln(Median Board Tenure) 0.021 0.002 -0.454**
(0.013) (0.011) (0.230)
CV of Board Tenure -0.090*** -0.032 -1.500
(0.026) (0.024) (1.178)
Fraction Female 0.241*** -0.020 0.085
(0.085) (0.072) (0.142)
Fraction Independent -0.362*** -0.258*** -0.298***
(0.086) (0.063) (0.065)
Board Size -0.006 -0.012*** 0.019
(0.004) (0.003) (0.028)




Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,089 21,089 20,853
Number of Firms - 2,294 2,068
F-Stat 45.91*** 70.40*** 46.81***
R-squared 0.098 0.110 -0.556
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and firm performance measured as Market-to-Book Ratio.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured
as in Table 1. The level of observation is the firm-year. The dependent variable is Market-to-Book Ratio, calculated following
Adams and Ferreira (2009) as Book V alue of Assets−Shareholder Equity +Market V alue of Equity
Book V alue of Assets
.
The first column displays results from an OLS model with industry fixed effects. The second column displays results from a
model with firm fixed effects. The third column displays results from an instrumental-variables model with firm fixed effects.
Median Board Tenure and CV of Board Tenure are instrumented for using the Average Outside Median Board Tenure and Aver-
age Outside CV of Board Tenure. All columns include year fixed effects and correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity.
Column 1 clusters the standard errors at the firm level.
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Table A11: Board Tenure and Return on Assets
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets OLS Firm Fixed Effects IV
ln(Median Board Tenure) 3.155*** 0.403 12.087
(0.439) (0.520) (9.732)
CV of Board Tenure 1.521** 0.013 45.745
(0.696) (0.892) (45.597)
Fraction Female 4.749*** 3.127 -0.792
(1.722) (2.401) (5.408)
Fraction Independent -2.443 -2.369 -1.922
(1.768) (1.846) (2.936)
Board Size -0.086 -0.249*** -1.252
(0.080) (0.084) (1.070)




Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,089 21,089 20,853
Number of Firms - 2,294 2,068
F-Stat 11.83*** 13.07*** 14.55***
R-squared 0.075 0.032 -0.295
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and firm performance measured as return on assets.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured
as in Table 1. The level of observation is the firm-year. The dependent variable is return on assets. The first column displays
results from an OLS model with industry fixed effects. The second column displays results from a model with firm fixed effects.
The third column displays results from an instrumental-variables model with firm fixed effects. Median Board Tenure and CV
of Board Tenure are instrumented for using the Average Outside Median Board Tenure and Average Outside CV of Board
Tenure. All columns include year fixed effects and correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity. Column 1 clusters the
standard errors at the firm level.
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Table A12: First Stage Results for the Median and Coefficient of Variation of
Board Tenure
Dependent Variable: Median Board Tenure Median Board Tenure2 CV of Board Tenure
Outside Median Tenure 0.16*** 3.20*** -0.004*
(0.035) (0.796) (0.002)
Outside Median Tenure2 -0.003 -0.09* -0.00004
(0.002) (0.046) (0.0001)
Outside CV of Tenure 0.47*** 10.59*** 0.007
(0.163) (3.328) (0.011)
Fraction Female -2.87*** -63.04*** 0.15***
(0.394) (7.251) (0.029)
Fraction Independent -2.08*** -32.91*** 0.08***
(0.392) (7.800) (0.027)
Board Size -0.15*** -2.60*** 0.03***
(0.017) (0.307) (0.002)
ln(sales) 0.49*** 6.37*** -0.002
(0.064) (1.318) (0.005)
F-Stat 27.64*** 16.78*** 5.79***
Centered R-squared 0.043 0.026 0.056
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,893 20,893 20,893
Number of Companies 2,070 2,070 2,070
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: First-stage results for median and coefficient of variation of board tenure.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured as in Table 1. The
level of observation is the firm-year. All specifications include year and firm fixed effects. Median Board Tenure is the median level of tenure
on the board. CV of Board Tenure is the coefficient of variation of board tenure. Outside Median Tenure is the average median board tenure of
outside boards that a firm’s board members sit on. Outside CV of Tenure is the average coefficient of variation of board tenure of outside boards
that a firm’s board members sit on. If the firm did not have any outside board members that were on an outside board, the firm is omitted from the
estimation. The F-Stat is the statistic from an F-test for joint significance of the instruments. The values are statistically significant and above or
near 10 indicating that the instruments are not weak instruments. A Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic for underidentification is equal to 1.56 with a
p-value equal to 0.212. The result is to fail to reject the null hypothesis of underidentification at the 10 percent level. A Kleibergern-Paap rk Wald
F Statistics is equal to 0.52 and indicates that the instruments are not weak. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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Table A13: Board Tenure and Market-to-Book Ratio
Dependent Variable: ln(Market-to-Book Ratio) OLS Firm Fixed Effects IV
Median Board Tenure 0.001 -0.002 -0.139
(0.007) (0.005) (0.125)
Median Board Tenure2 0.000 0.000 0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
CV of Board Tenure -0.094*** -0.038 -1.676
(0.026) (0.023) (1.679)
Fraction Female 0.243*** -0.019 0.112
(0.085) (0.072) (0.233)
Fraction Independent -0.358*** -0.255*** -0.261***
(0.085) (0.063) (0.080)
Board Size -0.006 -0.012*** 0.025
(0.004) (0.003) (0.042)




Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes
Observations 21,125 21,125 20,893
Number of Firms - 2,302 2,070
F-Stat 44.66*** 68.15*** 40.91***
R-squared 0.098 0.110 -0.722
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and firm performance measured as Market-to-Book Ratio.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured
as in Table 1. The level of observation is the firm-year. The dependent variable is Market-to-Book Ratio, calculated following
Adams and Ferreira (2009) as Book V alue of Assets−Shareholder Equity +Market V alue of Equity
Book V alue of Assets
.
The first column displays results from an OLS model with industry fixed effects. The second column displays results from a
model with firm fixed effects. The third column displays results from an instrumental-variables model with firm fixed effects.
Median Board Tenure, Median Board Tenure2 , and CV of Board Tenure are instrumented for using the Average Outside Median
Board Tenure and Average Outside CV of Board Tenure. All columns include year fixed effects and correct the standard errors
for heteroskedasticity. Column 1 clusters the standard errors at the firm level.
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Table A14: Board Tenure and Return on Assets
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets OLS Firm Fixed Effects IV
Median Board Tenure 0.769*** 0.071 3.068
(0.151) (0.164) (4.788)
Median Board Tenure2 -0.018*** -0.004 -0.074
(0.006) (0.006) (0.231)
CV of Board Tenure 0.809 -0.606 47.752
(0.746) (0.860) (62.578)
Fraction Female 5.054*** 2.922 -0.079
(1.711) (2.410) (9.397)
Fraction Independent -2.767 -2.084 -2.048
(1.799) (1.853) (3.417)
Board Size -0.047 -0.254*** -1.352
(0.082) (0.084) (1.583)




Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes
Observations 21,125 21,125 20,893
Number of Firms - 2,302 2,070
F-Stat 11.63*** 12.76*** 11.07***
R-squared 0.074 0.033 -0.342
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and firm performance measured as return on assets.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured
as in Table 1. The level of observation is the firm-year. The dependent variable is return on assets. The first column displays
results from an OLS model with industry fixed effects. The second column displays results from a model with firm fixed effects.
The third column displays results from an instrumental-variables model with firm fixed effects. Median Board Tenure, Median
Board Tenure2 , and CV of Board Tenure are instrumented for using the Average Outside Median Board Tenure and Average
Outside CV of Board Tenure. All columns include year fixed effects and correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity.
Column 1 clusters the standard errors at the firm level.
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Table A15: Board Tenure and Market-to-Book Ratio
Dependent Variable: ln(Market-to-Book Ratio) OLS Firm Fixed Effects IV
Median Board Tenure 0.008** 0.001 0.216
(0.004) (0.003) (0.764)
CV of Board Tenure 0.011 0.030 6.053
(0.045) (0.042) (18.412)
Fraction Female 0.380*** 0.101 -0.312
(0.133) (0.127) (1.009)
Fraction Independent -0.260** -0.221** 0.386
(0.132) (0.111) (2.233)
Board Size -0.012* -0.024*** -0.208
(0.007) (0.006) (0.534)
ln(sales) -0.006 -0.016 -0.005
(0.013) (0.026) (0.052)




Observations 8,577 8,577 8,391
R-squared 0.082 0.130 -7.658
Number of Companies 1,180 994
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and firm performance measured as Market-to-Book Ratio.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured
as in Table 1. The level of observation is the firm-year. The dependent variable is Market-to-Book Ratio, calculated following
Adams and Ferreira (2009) as Book V alue of Assets−Shareholder Equity +Market V alue of Equity
Book V alue of Assets
.
The first column displays results from an OLS model with industry fixed effects. The second column displays results from a
model with firm fixed effects. The third column displays results from an instrumental-variables model with firm fixed effects.
Median Board Tenure and CV of Board Tenure are instrumented for using the Average Outside Median Board Tenure and Aver-
age Outside CV of Board Tenure. All columns include year fixed effects and correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity.
Column 1 clusters the standard errors at the firm level. The table above also includes Firm Age, which is based upon the firm’s
initial public offering. The variable is only available for 8,577 observations and tends to be only available for younger firms.
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Table A16: Board Tenure and Return on Assets
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets OLS Firm Fixed Effects IV
Median Board Tenure 0.462*** 0.058 -3.609
(0.106) (0.136) (18.033)
CV of Board Tenure -0.429 1.269 -111.789
(1.646) (1.671) (432.378)
Fraction Female 9.882*** 7.816 16.537
(3.348) (5.342) (24.251)
Fraction Independent -4.573 0.756 -9.460
(3.703) (4.120) (52.781)
Board Size -0.156 -0.517** 3.018
(0.188) (0.212) (12.530)
ln(sales) 3.251*** 5.607*** 5.188***
(0.448) (1.124) (1.519)




Observations 8,577 8,577 8,391
R-squared 0.103 0.043 -0.919
Number of Companies 1,180 994
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Relationship between board tenure and firm performance measured as Market-to-Book Ratio.
Data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services, Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP. All characteristics are measured
as in Table 1. The level of observation is the firm-year. The dependent variable is Market-to-Book Ratio, calculated following
Adams and Ferreira (2009) as Book V alue of Assets−Shareholder Equity +Market V alue of Equity
Book V alue of Assets
.
The first column displays results from an OLS model with industry fixed effects. The second column displays results from a
model with firm fixed effects. The third column displays results from an instrumental-variables model with firm fixed effects.
Median Board Tenure and CV of Board Tenure are instrumented for using the Average Outside Median Board Tenure and Aver-
age Outside CV of Board Tenure. All columns include year fixed effects and correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity.
Column 1 clusters the standard errors at the firm level. The table above also includes Firm Age, which is based upon the firm’s
initial public offering. The variable is only available for 8,577 observations and tends to be only available for younger firms.
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V Appendix of Chapter 2
Table B1: Summary Statistics (1996–2003)
Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Director Characteristics
Female 90,352 0.09 - - -
Independent 90,352 0.78 - - -
Attended Less than 75% 90,352 0.02 - - -
Committee Member 72,523 0.69 - - -
Audit Member 72,523 0.39 - - -
Nomination Member 72,523 0.28 - - -
Compensation Member 72,523 0.38 - - -
Firm Characteristics
Net Sales (Millions of 2017 Dollars) 10,096 6,137.43 16,553.35 -23.75 333,537
ln(sales) 10,095 7.52 1.52 -1.93 12.72
Tobin’s q 10,096 2.05 2.054 0.34 78.56
ROA 10,096 1.34 24.65 -602.52 60.09
Volatility 10,096 0.13 0.07 0.04 1.22
Performance 10,096 0.011 0.63 -1.20 12.78
Board Size 10,096 9.24 2.67 2 24
Any Women 10,096 0.58 - - -
One Woman 10,096 0.38 - - -
CEO Characteristics
Real Compensation (Thousands of 2017 Dollars) 7,752 7,099.56 20,275.19 0.002 985,636.1
CEO Incentive Pay 7,752 0.50 0.28 0 1
Source: Institutional Shareholder Services (2018a); Institutional Shareholder Services (2018a); Compustat
(2018a); Compustat (2018b); Compustat (2018c); Greene and Smith (2017); CRSP (2019); U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2019)
Notes: Female is an indicator variable equal to one if the director is a woman. Independent is an indicator variable equal to one if the director is
not an employee of the firm. Attend less than 75% is an indicator variable equal to one if the director did not attend at least 75% of the board
meetings in the last year. Committee Member is an indicator variable equal to one if the director is a member of at least one committee of the Audit
Committee, Nomination Committee, and the Compensation Committee. Net Sales is reported in millions of 2017 dollars. Tobin’s q is calculated as
(BookV alueofAssets−ShareholderEquity+MarketV alueofEquity
BookV alueofAssets
. ROA is the return on assets for the firm and is calculated
as IncomeBeforeExtraordinary Items
Book V alue of Assets
∗ 100. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the stock price return for the prior 60
months. Performance is the stock return for the year net of the value-weighted CRSP index. Board size reports the number of seats on the board. Any
Women is an indicator equal to one if the director serves on a board with at least one woman. One Woman is an indicator equal to one if the director
serves on a board with exactly one woman. Real Compensation is reported in thousands of real 2017 dollars. CEO Incentive Pay is the fraction of the




Table B2: Summary Statistics (2004–2017)
Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Director Characteristics
Female 138,226 0.14 - - -
Independent 138,226 0.85 - - -
Attended Less than 75% 138,226 0.01 - - -
Committee Member 138,226 0.73 - - -
Audit Member 138,226 0.40 - - -
Nomination Member 138,226 0.40 - - -
Compensation Member 138,226 0.39 - - -
Firm Characteristics
Net Sales (Millions of 2017 Dollars) 15,360 8,729.87 26,308.09 3.38 500,021.7
ln(sales) 15,360 7.78 1.52 1.22 13.12
Tobin’s q 15,360 1.97 1.18 0.40 16.54
ROA 15,360 4.83 10.34 -305.75 78.31
Volatility 15,360 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.58
Performance 15,360 0.03 0.37 -1.07 6.27
Board Size 15,360 9.00 2.23 1 39
Any Women 15,360 0.72 - - -
One Woman 15,360 0.36 - - -
CEO Characteristics
Real Compensation (Thousands of 2017 Dollars) 12,807 5,659.25 6,657.40 0.001 155,720.8
CEO Incentive Pay 12,807 0.64 0.25 0 1
Source: Institutional Shareholder Services (2018a); Institutional Shareholder Services (2018a); Compustat
(2018a); Compustat (2018b); Compustat (2018c); Greene and Smith (2017); CRSP (2019); U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2019)
Notes: Female is an indicator variable equal to one if the director is a woman. Independent is an indicator variable equal to one if the director is
not an employee of the firm. Attend less than 75% is an indicator variable equal to one if the director did not attend at least 75% of the board
meetings in the last year. Committee Member is an indicator variable equal to one if the director is a member of at least one committee of the Audit
Committee, Nomination Committee, and the Compensation Committee. Net Sales is reported in millions of 2017 dollars. Tobin’s q is calculated as
(BookV alueofAssets−ShareholderEquity+MarketV alueofEquity
BookV alueofAssets
. ROA is the return on assets for the firm and is calculated
as IncomeBeforeExtraordinary Items
Book V alue of Assets
∗ 100. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the stock price return for the prior 60
months. Performance is the stock return for the year net of the value-weighted CRSP index. Board size reports the number of seats on the board. Any
Women is an indicator equal to one if the director serves on a board with at least one woman. One Woman is an indicator equal to one if the director
serves on a board with exactly one woman. Real Compensation is reported in thousands of real 2017 dollars. CEO Incentive Pay is the fraction of the




Table B3: Gender and Committee Memberships (1998–2003)
Committee Audit Compensation Nomination
Dependent Variable: Membership Committee Committee Committee
Female 0.036*** 0.050*** -0.042*** 0.019
(0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
Proportion of Prior Attendance Problems -0.069*** -0.084*** -0.033 -0.028*
(0.018) (0.021) (0.023) (0.017)
Outside Board Seats 0.012*** -0.009*** 0.024*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Board Size -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fraction Independent -0.339*** -0.465*** -0.306*** -0.055
(0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.060)
Tenure -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.001 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(sales) -0.003 -0.005 0.004 0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011)
Tobin’s q -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Return on Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share-Return Volatility -0.068 -0.034 -0.142 -0.319**
(0.097) (0.089) (0.097) (0.154)
Constant 1.146*** 0.565*** 1.182*** 0.463*
(0.059) (0.088) (0.072) (0.280)
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44,355 44,355 44,355 44,355
Number of Companies 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880
Within R-squared 0.016 0.009 0.011 0.023
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The specifications above are for linear probability models with indicator variables equal to one for committee service as the dependent variable. The
specifications include the proportion of prior years a director had attendance problems, the number of other directorships the director held, the size of the board,
the fraction of independent directors on the board, the tenure of the director, the age of the director, the natural log of the firm’s net sales, Tobin’s q, ROA, and
the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All variables are measured as in Table 2.1. All specifications include firm fixed effects and year dummies. The
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and observations are restricted to independent directors.
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Table B4: Gender and Committee Memberships (2004–2017)
Committee Audit Compensation Nomination
Dependent Variable: Membership Committee Committee Committee
Female 0.046*** -0.014 0.012 0.078***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Proportion of Prior Attendance Problems -0.082** -0.377*** 0.072 0.078
(0.034) (0.049) (0.045) (0.049)
Outside Board Seats 0.011*** 0.004 0.016*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Board Size -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Fraction Independent -0.327*** -0.410*** -0.328*** -0.303***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038)
Tenure -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.001** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(sales) -0.001 -0.001 -0.010** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Tobin’s q 0.004** 0.002 0.003* 0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Return on Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share-Return Volatility -0.046 0.012 -0.096** -0.052
(0.054) (0.046) (0.048) (0.058)
Constant 1.056*** 0.989*** 0.783*** 0.613***
(0.051) (0.057) (0.057) (0.061)
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 112,315 112,315 112,315 112,315
Number of Companies 1,721 1,721 1,721 1,721
Within R-squared 0.056 0.024 0.014 0.017
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The specifications above are for linear probability models with indicator variables equal to one for committee service as the dependent variable. The
specifications include the proportion of prior years a director had attendance problems, the number of other directorships the director held, the size of the board,
the fraction of independent directors on the board, the tenure of the director, the age of the director, the natural log of the firm’s net sales, Tobin’s q, ROA, and
the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All variables are measured as in Table 2.1. All specifications include firm fixed effects and year dummies. The
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and observations are restricted to independent directors.
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Table B5: Gender and Committee Memberships (1998–2017)
Committee Audit Compensation Nomination
Dependent Variable: Membership Committee Committee Committee
Female 0.044*** 0.001 -0.000 0.065***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Proportion of Prior Attendance Problems -0.077*** -0.154*** -0.004 0.000
(0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019)
Outside Board Seats 0.011*** -0.001 0.018*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Board Size -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Fraction Independent -0.254*** -0.478*** -0.348*** -0.070*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.039)
Tenure -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.001*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.003*** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(sales) 0.003 -0.004 -0.009** 0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Tobin’s q 0.001 0.001 0.003** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Return on Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share-Return Volatility -0.133** 0.026 -0.036 -0.355***
(0.053) (0.046) (0.051) (0.071)
Constant 1.053*** 0.579*** 1.327*** 0.415
(0.041) (0.055) (0.046) (0.286)
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 156,670 156,670 156,670 156,670
Number of Companies 2,404 2,404 2,404 2,404
Within R-squared 0.043 0.022 0.015 0.026
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The specifications above are for linear probability models with indicator variables equal to one for committee service as the dependent variable. The
specifications include the proportion of prior years a director had attendance problems, the number of other directorships the director held, the size of the board,
the fraction of independent directors on the board, the tenure of the director, the age of the director, the natural log of the firm’s net sales, Tobin’s q, ROA, and
the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All variables are measured as in Table 2.1. All specifications include firm fixed effects and year dummies. The
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and observations are restricted to independent directors.
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Table B6: Probability a Board Member Has an Attendance Problem (1996–2003)




Fraction Women -0.429** -0.033
(0.184) (0.021)
[-0.029**]
Outside Board Seats 0.058*** 0.004*** 0.068*** 0.005***
(0.009) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001)
Board Size 0.043*** 0.001** 0.045*** 0.001*
(0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
Fraction Independent 0.152 0.033** 0.180 0.033**
(0.113) (0.013) (0.120) (0.014)
Tenure -0.007*** -0.001*** -0.006** -0.000***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Age -0.008*** -0.000*** -0.009*** -0.000***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
ln(sales) -0.045*** -0.003 -0.038*** -0.002
(0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003)
Tobin’s q -0.007 0.000 -0.010 -0.000
(0.006) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
Return on Assets 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Share-Return Volatility 0.870*** -0.031 0.792*** -0.020
(0.204) (0.049) (0.213) (0.053)
Constant -1.633*** 0.041 -1.673*** 0.043
(0.149) (0.027) (0.157) (0.028)
Sample Independent Independent Male Independent Male Independent
Directors Directors Directors Directors
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Industry Firm
Observations 67,162 67,162 59,896 59,974
Number of Companies 2,053 2,053
Within R-squared 0.003 0.003
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 include probit regression coefficients. Columns 2 and 4 include linear probability model coefficients. The dependent variable
is an indicator equal to one if the director had an attendance problem, defined as attending less than 75% of meetings in a year. The specifications
include the proportion of prior years a director had attendance problems, the number of other directorships the director held, the size of the board, the
fraction of independent directors on the board, the tenure of the director, the age of the director, the natural log of the firm’s net sales, Tobin’s q, ROA,
and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All variables are defined as in Table 2.1. All probit specifications include 1-digit industry dummies and
year dummies. Brackets contain the average marginal effects for probit models. All linear probability specifications include firm fixed effects and year
dummies. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and observations are restricted to independent directors. In specifications without
firm fixed effects, standard errors are clustered at the director-by-firm level.
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Table B7: Probability a Board Member Has an Attendance Problem (2004–2017)




Fraction Women -0.284 -0.005
(0.173) (0.007)
[-0.006*]
Outside Board Seats -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.013) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000)
Board Size 0.028*** 0.000* 0.030*** 0.000*
(0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Fraction Independent -0.438** 0.013* -0.441** 0.010
(0.190) (0.008) (0.205) (0.008)
Tenure -0.010*** -0.000*** -0.009*** -0.000***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Age -0.007*** -0.000** -0.007*** -0.000**
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
ln(sales) -0.033*** -0.002 -0.029** -0.002
(0.012) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001)
Tobin’s q -0.009 -0.002*** -0.018 -0.002***
(0.012) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000)
Return on Assets -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Share-Return Volatility 0.586* 0.009 0.626* 0.009
(0.320) (0.014) (0.339) (0.015)
Constant -1.331*** 0.026** -1.296*** 0.032**
(0.221) (0.012) (0.238) (0.013)
Sample Independent Independent Male Independent Male Independent
Directors Directors Directors Directors
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Industry Firm
Observations 112,250 112,250 95,299 95,299
Number of Companies 1,721 1,720
Within R-squared 0.002 0.002
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 include probit regression coefficients. Columns 2 and 4 include linear probability model coefficients. The dependent variable
is an indicator equal to one if the director had an attendance problem, defined as attending less than 75% of meetings in a year. The specifications
include the proportion of prior years a director had attendance problems, the number of other directorships the director held, the size of the board, the
fraction of independent directors on the board, the tenure of the director, the age of the director, the natural log of the firm’s net sales, Tobin’s q, ROA,
and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All variables are defined as in Table 2.1. All probit specifications include 1-digit industry dummies and
year dummies. Brackets contain the average marginal effects for probit models. All linear probability specifications include firm fixed effects and year
dummies. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and observations are restricted to independent directors. In specifications without
firm fixed effects, standard errors are clustered at the director-by-firm level.
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Table B8: Probability a Board Member Has an Attendance Problem (1996–2017)




Fraction Women -0.387*** -0.012
(0.127) (0.008)
[-0.015*]
Outside Board Seats 0.043*** 0.002*** 0.050*** 0.002***
(0.007) (0.000) (0.008) (0.001)
Board Size 0.037*** 0.001*** 0.039*** 0.001***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Fraction Independent -0.003 0.016** 0.020 0.016*
(0.100) (0.008) (0.107) (0.009)
Tenure -0.008*** -0.000*** -0.007*** -0.000***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Age -0.008*** -0.000*** -0.008*** -0.000***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(sales) -0.040*** -0.003** -0.034*** -0.002*
(0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001)
Tobin’s q -0.008 -0.000 -0.012* -0.001*
(0.006) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
Return on Assets 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share-Return Volatility 0.746*** 0.010 0.697*** 0.010
(0.171) (0.017) (0.180) (0.018)
Constant -1.483*** 0.044*** -1.507*** 0.045***
(0.122) (0.013) (0.129) (0.014)
Sample Independent Independent Male Independent Male Independent
Directors Directors Directors Directors
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Industry Firm
Observations 179,412 179,412 155,273 155,273
Number of Companies 2,576 2,575
R-squared 0.007 0.007
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 include probit regression coefficients. Columns 2 and 4 include linear probability model coefficients. The dependent variable
is an indicator equal to one if the director had an attendance problem, defined as attending less than 75% of meetings in a year. The specifications
include the proportion of prior years a director had attendance problems, the number of other directorships the director held, the size of the board, the
fraction of independent directors on the board, the tenure of the director, the age of the director, the natural log of the firm’s net sales, Tobin’s q, ROA,
and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All variables are defined as in Table 2.1. All probit specifications include 1-digit industry dummies and
year dummies. Brackets contain the average marginal effects for probit models. All linear probability specifications include firm fixed effects and year
dummies. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and observations are restricted to independent directors. In specifications without
firm fixed effects, standard errors are clustered at the director-by-firm level.
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Fraction Women -0.445** -0.462** -0.770
(0.184) (0.209) (0.565)
[-0.030**] [-0.031**] [-0.183]
Fraction New Men -0.317* -0.304
(0.174) (0.608)
[-0.021*] [-0.072]
Lagged New Men -0.453**
(0.216)
[-0.031**]
Outside Board Seats 0.057*** 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.065**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.027)
Board Size 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.016
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.019)
Fraction Independent 0.151 0.195 0.104 -0.168
(0.112) (0.121) (0.141) (0.406)
Tenure -0.007*** -0.006** -0.006** 0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
Age -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
ln(sales) -0.044*** -0.038*** -0.031** -0.023
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.037)
Tobin’s q -0.007 -0.010 -0.011 -0.021
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.030)
Return on Assets 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Share-Return Volatility 0.873*** 0.814*** 0.621** 2.439***
(0.202) (0.213) (0.265) (0.915)
Constant -1.632*** -1.680*** -1.498*** -0.185
(0.148) (0.157) (0.184) (0.609)
Sample Independent Veteran Veteran Prior Attendance
Directors Directors Directors Problem
Observations 70,771 59,896 43,926 1,787
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The above table reports estimated coefficients for probit models. The specifications include the proportion of prior years a
director had attendance problems, the number of other directorships the director held, the size of the board, the fraction of independent
directors on the board, the tenure of the director, the age of the director, the natural log of the firm’s net sales, the Tobin’s q, the ROA,
and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All variables are measured as in Table 2.1. All specifications include 1-digit industry
dummies and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the director-by-firm level. Moreover, the standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and observations are restricted to independent directors. In Columns 2–3 the sample is restricted to men who were
not newly appointed. In Column 4 the sample is restricted to men with prior attendance problems. Brackets contain average marginal
effects for probit specifications.
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Fraction Women -0.275 -0.120 0.977**
(0.173) (0.182) (0.437)
[-0.006] [-0.002] [0.076**]
Fraction New Men 0.256 1.106*
(0.220) (0.595)
[0.006] [0.086*]
Lagged New Men 0.136
(0.264)
[0.003]
Outside Board Seats 0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.085**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.042)
Board Size 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.052***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017)
Fraction Independent -0.448** -0.452** -0.532** -1.424***
(0.187) (0.206) (0.233) (0.535)
Tenure -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.005 -0.014*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
Age -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
ln(sales) -0.030*** -0.029** -0.031** -0.070*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.038)
Tobin’s q -0.009 -0.018 -0.006 -0.089*
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.050)
Return on Assets -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Share-Return Volatility 0.646** 0.614* 0.776** 2.261**
(0.318) (0.339) (0.382) (0.984)
Constant -1.365*** -1.291*** -1.270*** 0.327
(0.219) (0.238) (0.264) (0.566)
Sample Independent Veteran Veteran Prior Attendance
Directors Directors Directors Problem
Observations 116,807 95,299 83,939 4,438
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The above table reports estimated coefficients for probit models. The specifications include the proportion of prior years a
director had attendance problems, the number of other directorships the director held, the size of the board, the fraction of independent
directors on the board, the tenure of the director, the age of the director, the natural log of the firm’s net sales, the Tobin’s q, the ROA,
and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All variables are measured as in Table 2.1. All specifications include 1-digit industry
dummies and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the director-by-firm level. Moreover, the standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and observations are restricted to independent directors. In Columns 2–3 the sample is restricted to men who were
not newly appointed. In Column 4 the sample is restricted to men with prior attendance problems. Brackets contain average marginal
effects for probit specifications.
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Fraction Women -0.392*** -0.319** 0.132
(0.128) (0.139) (0.361)
[-0.016***] [-0.012**] [0.017]
Fraction New Men -0.109 0.360
(0.139) (0.445)
[-0.004] [0.045]
Lagged New Men -0.211
(0.168)
[-0.008]
Outside Board Seats 0.043*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.021
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.023)
Board Size 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.028**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013)
Fraction Independent -0.006 0.025 -0.091 -0.717**
(0.099) (0.108) (0.126) (0.339)
Tenure -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Age -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
ln(sales) -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.029*** -0.048*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.028)
Tobin’s q -0.008 -0.012* -0.010 -0.045*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.026)
Return on Assets 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002** 0.006**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
Share-Return Volatility 0.760*** 0.704*** 0.629*** 2.230***
(0.170) (0.180) (0.219) (0.670)
Constant -1.488*** -1.509*** -1.364*** 0.347
(0.120) (0.129) (0.149) (0.424)
Sample Independent Veteran Veteran Prior Attendance
Directors Directors Directors Problem
Observations 187,578 155,273 128,057 6,260
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The above table reports estimated coefficients for probit models. The specifications include the proportion of prior years a
director had attendance problems, the number of other directorships the director held, the size of the board, the fraction of independent
directors on the board, the tenure of the director, the age of the director, the natural log of the firm’s net sales, the Tobin’s q, the ROA,
and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All variables are measured as in Table 2.1. All specifications include 1-digit industry
dummies and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the director-by-firm level. Moreover, the standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and observations are restricted to independent directors. In Columns 2–3 the sample is restricted to men who were
not newly appointed. In Column 4 the sample is restricted to men with prior attendance problems. Brackets contain average marginal
effects for probit specifications.
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Table B12: CEO Compensation and Female Representation (1996–2003)
Dependent Variable Incentive Pay CEO Compensation
Fraction Female 0.199 0.972** 0.321 0.114
(0.357) (0.445) (0.206) (0.199)
CEO Age -0.010* -0.013** -0.004 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Female CEO 0.189 0.285 0.150 0.109
(0.283) (0.262) (0.168) (0.118)
CEO Director -0.562 -0.407 -0.321** -0.209
(0.359) (0.479) (0.130) (0.215)
CEO Tenure -0.027*** -0.022*** -0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Board Size 0.013 -0.012 0.014* -0.008
(0.015) (0.016) (0.008) (0.007)
Fraction Independent 2.020*** -0.155 0.845*** -0.213
(0.302) (0.299) (0.167) (0.134)
ln(sales) 0.313*** 0.339*** 0.444*** 0.403***
(0.030) (0.068) (0.018) (0.030)
Tobin’s q 0.089*** 0.023* 0.088*** 0.032***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.014) (0.005)
Return on Assets -0.000 -0.008*** -0.000 -0.002***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Share-Return Volatility 6.476*** 1.167 3.460*** -0.241
(0.718) (1.012) (0.436) (0.453)
Constant -5.056*** -1.809** 2.428*** 5.367***
(0.812) (0.786) (0.684) (0.353)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Industry Firm
Observations 7,721 7,721 7,752 7,752
Number of Companies 1,602 1,607
R-squared 0.142 0.036 0.375 0.081
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 examine the natural log transform of the proportion of CEO compensation tied to incentive pay calculated as
ln( IncentivePay




Columns 3 and 4 examine the natural log of total CEO compensation recorded in thousands of 2003 dollars. The specifications include the age of the
CEO, an indicator for the CEO being a woman, an indicator for the CEO serving on the board, the CEO tenure, the board size, the fraction of independent
directors, ln(sales), Tobin’s q, ROA, and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All variables are measured as in Table 2.1. The standard errors are
corrected for heteroskedasticity and in specifications without firm fixed effects the errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table B13: CEO Compensation and Female Representation (2004–2017)
Dependent Variable Incentive Pay CEO Compensation
Fraction Female 0.103 -0.399* 0.327* 0.195
(0.246) (0.220) (0.178) (0.127)
CEO Age -0.009* -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Female CEO 0.085 0.146 0.090 0.063
(0.124) (0.109) (0.066) (0.062)
CEO Director -0.197 0.074 -0.109* 0.042
(0.124) (0.087) (0.063) (0.050)
CEO Tenure -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.004 0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Board Size 0.020 0.009 0.032** 0.006
(0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.006)
Fraction Independent 1.574*** 0.510** 0.778*** 0.210
(0.369) (0.243) (0.208) (0.140)
ln(sales) 0.311*** 0.262*** 0.361*** 0.384***
(0.030) (0.044) (0.033) (0.025)
Tobin’s q 0.087*** 0.093*** 0.044* 0.082***
(0.033) (0.019) (0.024) (0.011)
Return on Assets 0.000 0.005*** 0.002 0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share-Return Volatility 1.026 0.335 0.612 0.296
(0.662) (0.473) (0.461) (0.272)
Constant -3.816*** -2.687*** 4.541*** 4.942***
(0.565) (0.447) (0.463) (0.257)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Industry Firm
Observations 12,786 12,786 12,807 12,807
Number of Companies 1,675 1,676
R-squared 0.178 0.111 0.292 0.073
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 examine the natural log transform of the proportion of CEO compensation tied to incentive pay calculated as
ln( IncentivePay




Columns 3 and 4 examine the natural log of total CEO compensation recorded in thousands of 2003 dollars. The specifications include the age of the
CEO, an indicator for the CEO being a woman, an indicator for the CEO serving on the board, the CEO tenure, the board size, the fraction of independent
directors, ln(sales), Tobin’s q, ROA, and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All variables are measured as in Table 2.1. The standard errors are
corrected for heteroskedasticity and in specifications without firm fixed effects the errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table B14: CEO Compensation and Female Representation (1996–2017)
Dependent Variable Incentive Pay CEO Compensation
Fraction Female 0.135 -0.264 0.323** 0.061
(0.214) (0.188) (0.144) (0.102)
CEO Age -0.010*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.003**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Female CEO 0.098 0.205** 0.102 0.114**
(0.125) (0.093) (0.069) (0.050)
CEO Director -0.213* 0.024 -0.128** -0.029
(0.120) (0.086) (0.062) (0.047)
CEO Tenure -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Board Size 0.012 -0.006 0.021** -0.002
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004)
Fraction Independent 1.815*** 0.658*** 0.793*** 0.271***
(0.245) (0.164) (0.144) (0.089)
ln(sales) 0.315*** 0.241*** 0.400*** 0.342***
(0.024) (0.030) (0.020) (0.016)
Tobin’s q 0.101*** 0.048*** 0.083*** 0.054***
(0.017) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005)
Return on Assets -0.002 0.002** -0.001 0.002***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share-Return Volatility 3.499*** 1.146*** 2.024*** 0.581***
(0.520) (0.380) (0.324) (0.205)
Constant -4.617*** -2.785*** 3.413*** 5.043***
(0.482) (0.310) (0.460) (0.168)
Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Industry Firm
Observations 20,507 20,507 20,559 20,559
Number of Companies 2,200 2,204
R-squared 0.191 0.126 0.315 0.071
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 examine the natural log transform of the proportion of CEO compensation tied to incentive pay calculated as
ln( IncentivePay




Columns 3 and 4 examine the natural log of total CEO compensation recorded in thousands of 2003 dollars. The specifications include the age of the
CEO, an indicator for the CEO being a woman, an indicator for the CEO serving on the board, the CEO tenure, the board size, the fraction of independent
directors, ln(sales), Tobin’s q, ROA, and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All variables are measured as in Table 2.1. The standard errors are
corrected for heteroskedasticity and in specifications without firm fixed effects the errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table B15: Probability of CEO Turnover (1996–2003)
Dependent Variable CEO Turnover
Fraction Female 0.005 0.011 0.004 0.010
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Fraction Female by Performance -0.086 -0.082
(0.066) (0.066)
Fraction Independent -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.252*** -0.252***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067)
Fraction Independent by Performance -0.029 -0.023
(0.048) (0.048)
Share-Return Performance -0.003 0.003 0.019 0.020
(0.006) (0.008) (0.039) (0.039)
CEO Age 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female CEO 0.074 0.072 0.075 0.073
(0.087) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087)
CEO Director -0.107 -0.107 -0.108 -0.108
(0.128) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129)
CEO Tenure 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Board Size 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(sales) -0.026* -0.026* -0.026* -0.026*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Share-Return Volatility -0.047 -0.047 -0.048 -0.048
(0.212) (0.212) (0.212) (0.212)
Constant -0.403** -0.401** -0.402** -0.401**
(0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169)
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,752 7,752 7,752 7,752
Number of Companies 1,607 1,607 1,607 1,607
R-squared 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.126
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table provides the results of linear probability models where an indicator variable equal to one if the firm experienced
CEO turnover for any reason during the year is the dependent variable. All columns include coefficient estimates from linear
probability models for CEO turnover. The specifications include the age of the CEO, an indicator for the CEO being a woman,
an indicator for the CEO serving on the board, the CEO tenure, the board size, the fraction of independent directors, ln(sales),
and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All specifications include firm fixed effects. The standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedasticity.
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Table B16: Probability of CEO Turnover (2004–2017)
Dependent Variable CEO Turnover
Fraction Female -0.119** -0.122** -0.119** -0.122**
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Fraction Female by Performance 0.110 0.112
(0.068) (0.069)
Fraction Independent -0.165** -0.164** -0.165** -0.163**
(0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068)
Fraction Independent by Performance 0.001 -0.018
(0.076) (0.079)
Share-Return Performance -0.039*** -0.051*** -0.040 -0.036
(0.007) (0.009) (0.065) (0.066)
CEO Age 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female CEO -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.074***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
CEO Director -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.125***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
CEO Tenure 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Board Size 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(sales) -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Share-Return Volatility 0.224* 0.218* 0.223* 0.218*
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125)
Constant -0.254** -0.248** -0.254** -0.249**
(0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120)
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,807 12,807 12,807 12,807
Number of Companies 1,676 1,676 1,676 1,676
R-squared 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table provides the results of linear probability models where an indicator variable equal to one if the firm experienced
CEO turnover for any reason during the year is the dependent variable. All columns include coefficient estimates from linear
probability models for CEO turnover. The specifications include the age of the CEO, an indicator for the CEO being a woman,
an indicator for the CEO serving on the board, the CEO tenure, the board size, the fraction of independent directors, ln(sales),
and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All specifications include firm fixed effects. The standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedasticity.
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Table B17: Probability of CEO Turnover (1996–2017)
Dependent Variable CEO Turnover
Fraction Female -0.022 -0.020 -0.022 -0.021
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Fraction Female by Performance -0.032 -0.024
(0.049) (0.049)
Fraction Independent -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.153*** -0.153***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Fraction Independent by Performance -0.047 -0.044
(0.040) (0.040)
Share-Return Performance -0.020*** -0.017*** 0.018 0.017
(0.005) (0.006) (0.033) (0.033)
CEO Age 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female CEO -0.027 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
CEO Director -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
CEO Tenure 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Board Size 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(sales) -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Share-Return Volatility 0.276*** 0.277*** 0.277*** 0.278***
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087)
Constant -0.324*** -0.324*** -0.327*** -0.327***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,559 20,559 20,559 20,559
Number of Companies 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204
R-squared 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table provides the results of linear probability models where an indicator variable equal to one if the firm experienced
CEO turnover for any reason during the year is the dependent variable. All columns include coefficient estimates from linear
probability models for CEO turnover. The specifications include the age of the CEO, an indicator for the CEO being a woman,
an indicator for the CEO serving on the board, the CEO tenure, the board size, the fraction of independent directors, ln(sales),
and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return. All specifications include firm fixed effects. The standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedasticity.
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Table B18: Percentage of Shares Held (1996–2003)
Fraction Female -0.074 1.114
(1.327) (0.842)
Board Size -0.066** -0.053**
(0.030) (0.024)




Tobin’s q -0.037*** -0.012
(0.013) (0.008)
Return on Assets 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)




Fixed Effects? Industry Firm
Observations 7,966 7,966
Number of Companies 2,054
R-squared 0.097 0.011
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The regressions coefficients reported above are for the dependent variable for the percentage of
the firm’s shares held by the average director of the firm. The specifications include the proportion of the
board that is independent, ln(sales), Tobin’s q, ROA, and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return.
All variables are measured as in Table 2.1. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are
clustered at the firm level for specifications without firm fixed effects.
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Table B19: Percentage of Shares Held (2004–2017)
Fraction Female 0.404 -0.228
(0.552) (0.233)
Board Size -0.032 -0.014
(0.020) (0.012)




Tobin’s q -0.009 -0.037***
(0.031) (0.012)
Return on Assets 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)




Fixed Effects? Industry Firm
Observations 15,358 15,358
Number of Companies 1,720
R-squared 0.173 0.047
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The regressions coefficients reported above are for the dependent variable for the percentage of
the firm’s shares held by the average director of the firm. The specifications include the proportion of the
board that is independent, ln(sales), Tobin’s q, ROA, and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return.
All variables are measured as in Table 1. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are
clustered at the firm level for specifications without firm fixed effects.
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Table B20: Percentage of Shares Held (1996–2017)
Fraction Female 0.281 -0.056
(0.711) (0.261)
Board Size -0.048** -0.042***
(0.021) (0.012)




Tobin’s q -0.029* -0.024***
(0.015) (0.007)
Return on Assets 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)




Fixed Effects? Industry Firm
Observations 23,324 23,324
Number of Companies 2,576
R-squared 0.134 0.057
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The regressions coefficients reported above are for the dependent variable for the percentage of
the firm’s shares held by the average director of the firm. The specifications include the proportion of the
board that is independent, ln(sales), Tobin’s q, ROA, and the volatility of the firm’s stock price return.
All variables are measured as in Table 1. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are
clustered at the firm level for specifications without firm fixed effects.
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Table B21: Tobin’s q and Female Representation (1996–2003)
OLS FE IV
Fraction Female 0.342*** -0.052 -1.049***
(0.131) (0.119) (0.361)
Board Size -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Fraction Independent -0.220** -0.017 0.044
(0.087) (0.067) (0.056)




Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Firm
Observations 10,095 10,095 9,869
Number of Companies 2,055 1,829
R-squared 0.071 0.090 0.069
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the firm’s Tobin’s q calculated via
(BookV alueofAssets−ShareholderEquity+MarketV alueofEquity
BookV alueofAssets
. The specifications include the pro-
portion of women on the board, the size of the board, the proportion of independent board members on the board, and ln(sales).
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the firm level in specifications without firm fixed effects.
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Table B22: Tobin’s q and Female Representation (2004–2017)
OLS FE IV
Fraction Female 0.087 0.026 -0.067
(0.083) (0.064) (0.136)
Board Size -0.004 -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Fraction Independent -0.299*** -0.208*** -0.197***
(0.115) (0.068) (0.051)




Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Firm
Observations 15,360 15,360 15,268
Number of Companies 1,721 1,630
R-squared 0.108 0.149 0.149
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the firm’s Tobin’s q calculated via
(BookV alueofAssets−ShareholderEquity+MarketV alueofEquity
BookV alueofAssets
. The specifications include the pro-
portion of women on the board, the size of the board, the proportion of independent board members on the board, and ln(sales).
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the firm level in specifications without firm fixed effects.
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Table B23: Tobin’s q and Female Representation (1996–2017)
OLS FE IV
Fraction Female 0.166** -0.069 -0.523***
(0.079) (0.064) (0.138)
Board Size -0.009** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Fraction Independent -0.242*** -0.215*** -0.177***
(0.077) (0.054) (0.036)




Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Firm
Observations 25,455 25,455 25,258
Number of Companies 2,577 2,381
R-squared 0.087 0.103 0.096
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the firm’s Tobin’s q calculated via
(BookV alueofAssets−ShareholderEquity+MarketV alueofEquity
BookV alueofAssets
. The specifications include the pro-
portion of women on the board, the size of the board, the proportion of independent board members on the board, and ln(sales).
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the firm level in specifications without firm fixed effects.
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Table B24: ROA and Female Representation (1996–2003)
OLS FE IV
Fraction Female 12.012*** -2.675 -13.204
(3.473) (3.759) (15.728)
Board Size -0.053 -0.529*** -0.530***
(0.133) (0.126) (0.109)
Fraction Independent -10.317*** 3.105 3.755
(2.102) (2.778) (3.131)




Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Firm
Observations 10,095 10,095 9,869
Number of Companies 2,055 1,829
R-squared 0.070 0.027 0.026
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the firm’s ROA. The specifications include the proportion of women on the board, the size of the board,
the proportion of independent board members on the board, and ln(sales). Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are
clustered at the firm level in specifications without firm fixed effects.
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Table B25: ROA and Female Representation (2004–2017)
OLS FE IV
Fraction Female -1.328 -0.774 -2.280
(1.353) (1.525) (4.843)
Board Size -0.204*** -0.275*** -0.275***
(0.076) (0.096) (0.087)
Fraction Independent -6.893*** -5.191*** -5.023***
(1.706) (1.805) (1.734)




Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Firm
Observations 15,360 15,360 15,268
Number of Companies 1,721 1,630
R-squared 0.057 0.065 0.065
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the firm’s ROA. The specifications include the proportion of women on the board, the size of the board,
the proportion of independent board members on the board, and ln(sales). Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are
clustered at the firm level in specifications without firm fixed effects.
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Table B26: ROA and Female Representation (1996–2017)
OLS FE IV
Fraction Female 2.462 1.403 -3.494
(1.552) (2.095) (5.646)
Board Size -0.076 -0.283*** -0.284***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.069)
Fraction Independent -7.949*** -3.103** -2.693*
(1.445) (1.550) (1.626)




Fixed Effects? Industry Firm Firm
Observations 25,455 25,455 25,258
Number of Companies 2,577 2,381
R-squared 0.065 0.036 0.035
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the firm’s ROA. The specifications include the proportion of women on the board, the size of the board,
the proportion of independent board members on the board, and ln(sales). Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are
clustered at the firm level in specifications without firm fixed effects.
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VI Appendix of Chapter 3
Figure C1: Uncontrolled Median Wage Gaps Excluding Minimum Wage Workers
(1975–2015)
(a) (b)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS
Notes: In the figures above we have reported the raw median wage gaps between white men and workers from two demographic categories: white
women (a) black men (b) omitting workers who fail to earn more than the minimum wage. The key finding of these graphs is that, in line with
expectations, the gender wage gaps are smaller for part-time workers than full-time workers even when omitting workers who fail to earn more than
the minimum wage. However, we do not see this pattern for black men. Therefore, the flexibility hypothesis is supported because women have higher
roles in household production, and therefore demand more flexibility than their male counterparts.
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Figure C2: Controlled Estimated Wage Gaps Excluding Minimum Wage Workers
(1975–2015)
(a) (b)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS
Notes: In the figures above we have reported the controlled, estimated wage gaps between white men and workers from Equation 3.1 from two
demographic categories: white women (a) and black men (b) omitting workers who fail to earn more than the minimum wage. The key finding of
these graphs is that, in line with expectations, the gender wage gaps are smaller for part-time workers than full-time workers. However, we do not see
this pattern for black men. Therefore, the flexibility hypothesis is supported because women have higher roles in household production, and therefore
demand more flexibility than their male counterparts.
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Figure C3: Difference in Wage Gaps Excluding Minimum Wage Workers (1975–
2015)
(a) (b)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS
Notes: In the figures above we have reported the difference in the controlled, estimated wage gaps between white men and workers from a modified
version of Equation 3.1 from two demographic categories: white women (a) and black men (b) omitting workers who fail to earn more than the
minimum wage. The modified Equation 3.1 includes all workers and indicator variables which are the interaction between the demographic categories
and the hours-worked status. For instance, there are two variables for white men: white man part-time and white-man over-time, where white man
full-time is omitted. The key finding of these graphs is that, in line with expectations, the gender wage gaps are smaller for part-time workers than
full-time workers. However, we do not see this pattern for black men. Therefore, the flexibility hypothesis is supported because women have higher
roles in household production, and therefore demand more flexibility than their male counterparts.
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Figure C4: Estimated Wage Gaps Based on Marital Status (1975–2015)
(a) (b)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS
Notes: In the figures above we have reported the difference in the controlled, estimated wage gaps between white men and workers from a modified
version of Equation 3.1 from two demographic categories: white women (a) and black men (b) omitting workers who fail to earn more than the
minimum wage. The modified Equation 3.1 includes all workers and indicator variables which are the interaction between the demographic categories
and the hours-worked status. For instance, there are two variables for white men: white man part-time and white-man over-time, where white man
full-time is omitted. The key finding of these graphs is that, in line with expectations, the gender wage gaps are smaller for part-time workers than
full-time workers. However, we do not see this pattern for black men. Therefore, the flexibility hypothesis is supported because women have higher
roles in household production, and therefore demand more flexibility than their male counterparts.
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Figure C5: Estimated Wage Gaps from Last Week’s Hourly Wages (1978–2015)
(a) (b)
Source: Merged Outgoing Rotation Group files available from the NBER
Notes: In the figures above we have reported the controlled, estimated wage gaps between white men and workers from the OLS procedure outlined
in Equation 3.1 from two demographic categories: white women (a) and black men (b) using the MORG. The key finding of these graphs is that, in
line with expectations, the gender wage gaps are smaller for part-time workers than full-time workers even when accounting for measurement error that
may be present in the ASEC data.
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Figure C6: Difference in Wage Gaps (1975–2015)
(a) (b)
Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey available through IPUMS
Notes: In the figures above we have reported the difference in the controlled, estimated wage gaps between white men and workers from a modified
version of Equation 3.1 from two demographic categories: white women (a) and black men (b). The modified Equation 3.1 includes all workers and
indicator variables which are the interaction between the demographic categories and the hours-worked status. For instance, there are two variables
for white men: white man part-time and white-man over-time, where white man full-time is omitted. The key finding of these graphs is that, in line
with expectations, the gender wage gaps are smaller for part-time workers than full-time workers. However, we do not see this pattern for black men.
Therefore, the flexibility hypothesis is supported because women have higher roles in household production, and therefore demand more flexibility than
their male counterparts.
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Figure C7: Part-Time Work and O*Net Flexibility Measures (1975–2015)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Source: American Community Survey available through IPUMS
Notes: In the figures above we have reported the fraction of workers in an occupation who are part-time as a function of the level of flexibility in the
occupation. The theory is that if an occupation has a high cost of flexibility, there will be fewer workers working part-time in the occupation due to the
costs. If this is true, there should be a negative slope of the regression line between the proportion of workers in the occupation who are part-time and
the level of flexibility. For three of four flexibility characteristics, we see this is the case.
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